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SUM1fARY 
This thesis is based on observation and interviews carried out in 
two engineering firms in the West Midlands between October 1978 and May 
1980. Besides presenting and analysing a core of empirical material, it 
seeks to develop a general argument concerning the material and social 
bases of control over labour in the workplace. In doing so, this research 
points out some of the ways to link two major trends in the literature: 
the institutional approach to the study of labour relations and the more 
recent studies of the labour process. 
. 
During the 1970s, the two companies studied implemented a reform 
of labour relations which appears to be typical of developments which took 
place in engineering and, more generally, in the manufacturing sector of 
British industry over the decade following the publication of the Donovan 
Report. The problem under study is the impact of this institutionalisation 
of workplace labour relations on the control workers have over the utilisa- 
tion of their labour power in the work process. 
The fieldwork showed that, behind similar organisational and insti- 
tutional features, sharply different work relations had developed. The de- 
gree of control imposed by manual workers over issues such as assignment 
of labour, labour mobility, manning levels, job demarcations, immediate in- 
tensity and distribution of effort, was significantly higher in one of the 
two case studies. At Firm A, the institutional reform helped management 
to confine job control within narrow limits while, at Firm B, similar changes 
did not help management to reduce worker control over effort but rather 
contributed to stabilise it. 
In seeking to explain this social process, attention is given to 
management strategies and to the strength of workers' organisations. It 
is also argued that the nature and contours of the work process sets the 
material basis for control over labour utilisation, the pattern of control 
also being shaped by«social relations in the workplace. The main implica- 
tions of the research for theory and policy are discussed in the final chap- 
ter. It is suggested that although job control resisted changes in the 
structure of labour relations, in a context of economic recession, it might 
be more vulnerable to market pressures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on the control exercised by British engineering 
workers over specific aspects of their work. More specifically, it seeks 
to analyse the impact of the recent reform of workplace labour relations 
on job control. The analysis is based on observation and interviews 
carried out in two engineering firms in the West Midlands between October 1978 
and May 1980. The main objective of this introductory chapter is to develop 
a conceptual framework which will be useful in analysing the empirical 
material and in raising the broader implications of the research for 
policy and theory. 
Control over labour utilisation in the production process has 
recently become a central theme in the study of labour relations. In this 
sense, Hyman (1975: 12) defined the subject matter of industrial relations 
as the 'processes of control over work relations'. This notion of control 
is also a good starting point for interpreting the different functions and 
objectives of both management and trade unions. 
Considering first the study of management, Storey (1983: 1,98) noted 
recently that the question of managerial control of labour, and especially 
the more value-laden notions of managerial prerogatives and management 
rights, had been relatively neglected by British scholars in the field of 
industrial relations. In contrast, as he pointed out, this had been a 
classic theme in the North American literature. In Britain, much attention 
had been given to such themes as workers' organisations and activities, 
industrial conflict, and the institutions of labour relations. It appears, 
however, that the tide has turned over recent years. Above all it is 
Braverman (1974: 63) who has contributed most to reasserting the view that 
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control over the labour process was 'the essential function of management 
in industrial capitalism'. Contributors to the voluminous post-Braverman 
debate, conducted mainly at a theoretical level, have become more and more 
critical of Labor and Monopoly Capital. 
1 But the point here is that the 
structures and strategies developed by management to control labour at 
the point of production have remained a major theme throughout these 
discussions. Besides this trend, moreover, a concern with the current lack 
dýýtvýýpýýtiy 
of knowledge about management behaviour, as well as the greater predominance 
of management in times of economic recession, have led to a considerable 
growth in research into management policies and strategies in industrial 
relations (Winchester, 1983: 107). 
As for labour, the encroachment of management control has been a 
constant preoccupation all through the history of workers' organisations. 
As Hyman and Elger (1981: 115) have pointed out, 'workers' controls within 
the labour process and its organization should be viewed as a natural 
extension of the type of counter-control inherent in all forms of trade 
union action'. In this sense, the pioneer study of Goodrich (1975) gives 
a good account of worker control in British industry in the first quarter 
of the century. Its central concept of the 'frontier of control' remains 
an interesting tool of analysis (Marsden, 1978: 2-7; Edwards, 1983: 22-5). 
The history of craft control and job control in Britain, especially in the 
engineering industry, provides the background of the present research on 
control in the workplace. For instance, the reasons for the comparatively 
wide diffusion of worker regulation from craftsmen to important segments of 
semi-skilled and unskilled labour in Britain remain a challenging question. 
Nevertheless, the contemporary definition of job control adopted here refers 
1. For recent contributions to and reviews of this debate, see Littler, 1982; Littler and Salaman, 1982; Wood, 1982; Edwards, 1983; Storey, 1983; 
and Manwaring and Wood, 1984. 
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to a more precise and circumscribed phenomenon. 
This study focuses on the overall influence exercised by employees, 
once they have been hired, over the way their potential is converted into 
effort. More precisely, job control is defined as the restraints imposed 
by workers on the way their labour power is utilised by management in the 
work process. The meaning of this concept will become more obvious in 
light of the following analytical framework. The notion of job control 
will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, so that only three 
considerations of the above definition need to be stressed at this stage. 
First, in such discussions on worker control the term 'control' is con- 
sidered only in its relative sense (Friedman, 1977: 82-5). It refers to a 
set of constraints or limits imposed upon management freedom in a context 
where the latter assumes responsibility for strategic decisions and is in 
command of the operations. Second, workers are acting from a defensive 
position, since management has the initiative and holds, in most situations, 
the ultimate power to reconsider not only the terms but also the very 
existence of the employment relationship. Third, it may be of interest to 
note that job control and restrictive labour practices broadly encompass 
the same reality, although from a different ideological viewpoint. The 
'problem of restrictive practices' has been a focal point of criticism 
concerning trade union practices for a very long time in Britain (Zeitlin, 
1980: 119-20), and it became a major point of contention in the context of 
the industrial relations crisis which led to the Donovan Commission. 
2 In 
comparison, it is felt that the concept of job control is both more precise 
and more conducive to objective research. 
The other part of the problem under study is the institutional reform 
2. Important discussions on restrictive labour practices are found in Flanders, 1964; Donovan Commission Research Papers no. 4,1967; Donovan 
Report, 1968; and Aldridge, 1976. 
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of workplace labour relations. The idea here is to analyse the impact 
of changes in the structure of labour relations on job control. This 
institutional reform is studied as part of the dynamics between managerial 
strategies to control labour and workers' adaptation and resistance. Insti- 
tutional reforms are also likely to reflect some evolution in the balance 
of power between the parties. 
Before going further, it is necessary to set out the analytical 
framework of the study. In particular, it seeks to establish the relation- 
ship between productive activities and the institutional components of 
labour relations. A second section discusses the nature of the reform of 
workplace labour relations in the British context. The third and final 
section deals with research strategies and methods. 
1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A central argument of this study is that the function of production 
is at the heart of the whole spectrum of labour relations in the workplace. 
It suggests that a direct reference to the work process could contribute 
to a better understanding of the relations between labour and management 
at this level. Such a proposition needs to be developed in some detail. 
The concept of labour process refers to the transformation of 
material into a product by the utilisation of labour and the instruments of 
labour. It is a process by which a combination of the activity of the 
workers and the use of material resources (machinery, tools, equipment, 
natural and raw materials, etc. ) results in production. However, the 
labour process is more than an activity of production; it also involves 
social relations at the point of production. It is appropriate to stress 
Burawoy's distinction between these two aspects of the labour process: 
It has two analytically distinct but concretely inseparable 
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components -a relational and a practical aspect. I refer 
to the relational aspect of the labor process as the 
relations in production or production relations. They are, 
for example, the relations of the shop floor into which 
workers enter, both with one another and with management. 
In its practical aspect the labor process is a set of 
activities that transform raw materials into useful objects 
or fractions of useful objects with the assistance of 
instruments of production. This involves labor, the 
expenditure of effort, the translation of the capacity to 
work into actual work, of labor power into labor. (1979: 15) 
From this analytical distinction between the practical and the relational 
aspects of the labour process it is possible to establish a corresponding 
distinction between the concepts of work process and work relations. 
Hence, in this study, the definition of work process is restricted to the 
practical or technical aspect, whereas work relations refers to the 
relational aspect of the labour process, and is a synonym for relations 
of production. At a later stage an attempt will be made to operationalise 
the concept of work process (or technical labour process) so that it 
becomes a useful tool of analysis. 
Therefore, work relations are the immediate (or direct) relation- 
ships between workers and managers at the point of production. Such a 
definition is broad enough to cover the relationships into which workers 
enter with one another as well as those occurring between members of 
different strata of the management team. Interesting as these relationships 
may be, however, they are not the major preoccupation of students of 
control in the workplace. Rather, attention focuses on the two characteristic 
elements of work relations: the sale of labour power and the control over 
the work process (Hyman, 1980a). In the study on job control, social 
relations dealing with the second element of work relations are the most 
relevant; these are the relations of subordination between management and 
-6- 
workers. 
3 
This type of analysis directs attention to the social function of 
management in the capitalist enterprise. While profitability remains the 
ultimate object of the enterprise, the essential function of management is 
to control the utilisation of labour and capital in the work process. Manage- 
ment's objective is not to maximise control but to develop the pattern of 
control which is more conducive to the optimal utilisation of labour power. 
Much of the complexity of the managerial function may be understood in 
reference to the distinction between labour power (or the worker's capacity 
to work) and labour. In the words of Braverman (1974: 54), 'what the worker 
sells, and what the capitalist buys, is not an agreed amount of labor, but 
the power to labor over an agreed period of time'. The contrast between 
the great potential of labour power and the many constraints upon its 
realisation in the work process represents one of the main features of 
control in the workplace. These constraints upon the realisation of the 
potential inherent in labour power are of at least two different orders. 
In the same way as for material resources, some limitations, such as 
injuries or health problems, are independent of the will of workers or 
managers, and others are due to problems of work organisation. Certain 
constraints, however, are the result of conscious and deliberate obstruction 
by the workforce to the realisation of the potential inherent in their 
labour power. This form of resistance, which may be spontaneous or 
organised, is peculiar to labour. 
Paradoxically, part of the problem for management lies in its 
dependence upon a variable degree of initiative, discretion and skills on the 
part of labour. In a recent article, Manwaring and Wood (1984) have insisted 
3. In the usual distinction established by Flanders (1975: 88) and Fox (1966: 6-7; 1971: 158), relations of subordination correspond to managerial 
relations, while those having to do with the sale of labour power are 
called market relations. 
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on the role of subjectivity and 'tacit skills' in the contribution of 
labour to production. These resources are inherent in labour power and 
workers may be willing to co-operate and apply them to the production 
process. The problem for management is that this very autonomy and dis- 
cretion can be turned against the employers' interests. In modern 
conditions of production, simple coercion is usually counter-productive to 
dissolving worker resistance. Hence it is in order to secure worker 
co-operation or compliance with the conversion of his or her labour power 
into effort and profit that management has to organise its own structure 
of supervision and control. The worker is thus subordinated to management 
control. 
This discussion of the transformation of labour power into effort 
already points to the material basis of conflict in the workplace. In the 
words of Edwards and Scullion (1982a: 5), 'the process of production involves 
continuous conflict over the terms on which employers extract effort from 
workers'. This 'struggle for control' focuses mainly on the deployment 
of labour and the level of effort, and conflict is likely to occur when 
organised workers infringe upon 'management rights' to direct labour. In 
capitalist relations of production, the possibility that such conflict 
occurs is exacerbated by the opposing interests of the two parties involved 
at the point of production. Hence Nolan (1983: 303) points out that what 
'distinguishes the employment relationship from other types of exchange' 
is that 'the parties continue to stand in a contradictory relationship after 
the exchange has been consummated' (see also Gabriel, 1978: 344). In such 
a context, the relations of subordination and the exercise of management 
control are a persistent source of tension and conflict. 
Each of the two elements of work relations defined above is a potential 
basis for conflict. The existence of conflictual interests concerning the 
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sale of labour power, or market relations, is obvious. But sources of 
conflict relating to control over the work process are more persistent and 
pervasive. While management seeks to develop a pattern of control conducive 
to profit, workers are likely to try to impose some control over the way, 
and the conditions under which, their labour power is utilised in the 
production process. In sum, there is a fundamental conflict between the 
interests of management and labour, and these interests regularly develop 
into different patterns of rational behaviour. 
Conflict, nevertheless, is only one of the two poles in the dynamics 
of work relations. The other is accommodation, and the material basis 
for co-operative relations stems from the interdependence of management 
and labour in the production process. Accommodation, however, does not 
imply that workers and trade unions recognise the legitimacy of the nature 
of this interdependence, and particularly their subordinate position. It 
means, rather, that under existing social relations of production, and 
independently of the underlying forces which affect people at work, the 
parties have to negotiate and eventually to compromise if the employment 
relationship is to be continued. In short, the parties have to bargain 
and seek to accommodate conflicting interests because they cannot do without 
each other. 
Again a distinction, which corresponds to the two elements of work 
relations, can be drawn between the two aspects of interdependence. Firstly, 
the workers must sell their labour power to earn their living and employers 
must buy it to gain anything from their capital investment. Second, once 
they are agreed on a contract of employment, management and labour still 
have to make arrangements for the transformation of labour power into 
effort. The actualisation of the potentiality of labour necessitates the 
development of a modus vivendi, if a viable level of production is to be 
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maintained. Hence the primary economic function of both management and 
labour is determined by production, the source of conflict but also the D1( 
source of compromise. 
It follows that what characterises capitalist work relations is not 
so much the fundamental conflict of interest between the parties, which 
is itself a primary characteristic of other types of social and economic 
relations. It is the fact that management and labour have to achieve a 
relative degree of accommodation, in order to organise and maintain 
production, while their interests in the production process are contradictory. 
Furthermore, there is no easy solution for the parties involved since there 
is a need not only to maintain the relationship but to achieve a viable 
level of output, be it fixed by market forces, expected rates of profit, 
or other economic or political choices. 
4 
This characteristic of accommodating conflictual relations in 
production is a dominant feature of workplace labour relations, for the 
object of labour relations is to govern, to bring some order into work 
relations. Labour relations are more or less structured, more or less insti- 
tutionalised, through joint procedures and mechanisms for governing work 
relations and managing conflict. It may be useful to establish an analytical 
distinction between the relations conducted through the institutional framework 
4. Cressey and Maclnnes (1980: 5-16) present a stimulating discussion on the 
contradictory relationship between capital and labour. They point out 
that the relationship is contradictory for both capital and labour. Hence 
while labour seeks to resist the subordination of capital, it also 
'has an interest in the maintenance of that relationship and therefore 
the viability of the unit of capital which employs it' (p. 15). Paul Edwards 
(1983: 17) comments that Cressey and MacInnes's argument 'is an intermediate 
step, and not the fundamental explanation of the nature of the capital- 
labor relation, because it treats antagonistic and co-operative relation- 
ships on an equal footing. The present claim is that exploitation lies 
at the heart of the relation and that co-operation is a subsidiary 
concept reflecting the fact that capital has to induce workers to work. ' 
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and those which develop without reference to, or indeed outside, any 
procedural arrangement. In general, it is also true that the more the 
relations are centralised the more they tend to be institutionalised, shop- 
floor relations leaving more scope for informality. 
In these relations, the central objective of both management and 
labour is to reinforce or maintain their control over work relations. If 
the output of this process of control most often takes the form of rules, this 
is not the only form of control. The result of the power relationship with 
respect to labour utilisation cannot be circumscribed by referring exclusively 
to the web of rules, although this remains the focal point of attention. 
Many constraints upon management freedom to organise production lines, 
caused, for instance, by disputes over piecework standards, do not take 
the form of rules. One may point to deals which the participants describe 
with phrases such as 'precedent', 'one-off', etc. The empirical chapters 
will provide some evidence on these matters. 
From what has been presented so far, it follows that the structure 
of labour relations has a derivative function with reference to production, 
the primary function of the enterprise. This means that labour relations 
are not an autonomous network of relations but are significant only in 
relation to production activities and social relations. As part of his 
critique of orthodox industrial relations, Hyman (1979a: 428) pointed out 
that 
les auteurs traditionnels en relations industrielles 
ont presente des analyses souvent sophistiquees de la 
'regulation des täches' et des 'systemes de regles', 
sans reconnattre, du moins en apparence, que les 
superstructures (procedures et institutions) sur 
lesquelles ils se concentrent trouvent leurs fondements 
dans la sphere de production. 
The author did not develop all the implications of his argument for the 
study of workplace labour relations. He did, however, emphasise its 
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corollary, which is that industrial relations should not be seen as a 
sphere of relations which is autonomous from social relations of production 
(Hyman, 1978 and 1979a). This also means that the structure of labour 
relations can be studied as a superstructure with reference to the labour 
process, the infrastructure underlying the relation between management 
and labour. From another perspective, this is a distinction between what 
is primarily a political process (regulation and control over work relations) 
and an economic function (production). 
The proposition that productive activities represent the underlying 
basis of workplace labour relations is a major feature of this study's 
analytical framework. Hence in studying the impact of the institutionali- 
sation of labour relations on job control, which is the object of the 
study, the first task is to assess the influence of the technical conditions 
of production. The intention is to ascertain whether the work process has 
a mediating influence on the relationship between the social process 
of the institutionalisation of labour relations and job control. Besides 
the work process, the other type of mediating factor which deserves major 
attention is social organisation. This is the study of management and 
labour or, more accurately, the shop-floor organisation. While the work 
process accounts for the material basis of the relationship, a careful 
study of management, of the workers' organisation, as well as of the social 
relations which develop between these two, is also essential to a proper 
assessment of the effect of institutionalisation on job control. 
The intention is to establish a link between the institutional 
approach to labour relations and the labour process approach. Much in line 
with the Anglo-American tradition in industrial relations, a good deal of 
attention is given here to the procedures and institutions of job regulation. 
Indeed, much of the attention focuses on detailed case studies of the post- 
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Donovan reform of collective bargaining. But an effort is also made to 
apply the concept of work process to empirical research and hence to take 
advantage of some of the progress made in this area of industrial 
sociology. While there has been little integration of these two approaches 
so far, a better understanding of control in the workplace may be gained 
by trying to fill this gap. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN BRITAIN 
During the 1960s, public attention became increasingly concerned 
with the problems of the British manufacturing sector. Among these 
problems, the peculiarity of British industrial relations appeared to 
raise the greatest concern on the part of employers and government officials. 
The following discussion starts from the most authoritative and influential 
analysis of the industrial relations crisis, that of the Donovan Commission. 
The Commission held the view that the substantial growth of work- 
place bargaining, which had been influenced to a large extent by the 
pressure of full employment, had generated industrial disorder. The most 
obvious manifestations of the crisis were the high frequency of unofficial 
strikes and the extent of wage drift, with direct effects on labour costs 
and inflationary pressure. It was also felt that the informal system was 
contributing to the inefficient use of manpower and the occurrence of 
restrictive labour practices. The latter was seen as the most fundamental 
problem. 
While informal and fragmented bargaining appeared to be dysfunctional 
to many observers, the Commission recognised 'that the participants in 
the current arrangements are, generally speaking, well satisfied with them' 
(Donovan Commission, 1968: para 126). Among the possible advantages for the 
parties involved, the Report noted the flexibility of these informal 
arrangements and the fact that 'a very high degree of self-government in 
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industry is provided', in a situation where 'all work groups are given 
scope to follow their own customs and to take their own decisions' (para 129). 
However, the members of the Donovan Commission considered that these 
arrangements 
can be condemned only because the benefits are outweighed 
by the shortcomings: the tendency of extreme decentrali- 
zation and self-government to degenerate into indecision 
and anarchy; the propensity to breed inefficiency; and 
the reluctance to change. (para 130) 
According to the analysis of the Commission, these labour problems 
were primarily caused by major dysfunctions in the structure of labour 
relations (Purcell, 1981: chapter 1). The Commission emphasised the 
contrast between the formal and the informal systems of industrial 
relations, which were said to be in conflict (paras 149 and 162). More 
precisely, it was said to be a 'conflict between the pretence of industry- 
wide agreements and the realities of industrial relations' (para 176). 
Indeed, the formal position on manageriäZ prerogatives had more to do 
with pretence or illusion than with reality, especially in engineering, 
and many held the view that working on the basis of such a false premise 
actually weakened managerial control. Professor Clegg, an influential 
member of the Commission, wrote later that 
managers were hindered from realistic attempts to 
use manpower more efficiently by the widespread 
illusion that 'the employment and discharge of 
workers, the manning of machines, the pace of work, 
the introduction of new machinery and new jobs' were, 
or ought to be, within the scope of 'managerial 
prerogative' when in reality they were in many 
instances under the control of work group customs. 
(1976a: 448) 
Hence the observation that the 'assumptions of the formal system still 
exert a powerful influence over men's minds and prevent the informal 
system from developing into an effective and orderly method of regulation' 
(Donovan, 1968: para 149). 
The structure of labour relations was dysfunctional with respect to 
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its two major functions: the regulation of conflict and the stabilisation 
of management control. Neither the 'formal system' (with all its intrinsic 
limitations) nor the poorly developed structure of labour relations in the 
workplace could channel the pressure coming from what Flanders (1975: 108-13) 
called the 'challenge from below'. This led to a diminution of management 
control, the development of a substantial degree of job control, and an 
outburst of conflict. In an important article first published in 1969, 
Fox and Flanders, two leading members of the 'Oxford School', pursued this 
analysis of structural weaknesses. Starting with a distinction between 
craftsmen who 'had always aspired to extend their own unilateral regulation' 
and 'non-craft groups whose shop-floor power awakened new aspirations', 
they gxplained how 
the established formal machinery of bilateral regulation 
too often failed to create the norms necessary to meet 
these-new aspirations; partly indeed it was unable to do 
so because they were not susceptible to regulation by 
standardised rules throughout an industry, and employers 
in any case refused to negotiate on subjects they considered 
to be a 'managerial prerogative'. So the opportunity to deal 
with them bilaterally at the level of relatively large units 
of regulation was missed, and it was left to work groups 
themselves to impose what standards they could, thereby 
causing the regulative order to become fragmented over the 
new as well as the old issues of concern and conflict. 
(Flanders, 1975: 266-7) 
According to this well-known interpretation of Fox and Flanders, such 
fragmentation was equivalent to a breakdown of social regulation, where 
'an excessive proliferation of normative systems can therefore produce 
social consequences that are similar to those resulting from the absence 
of any norms to regulate conflict' (Flanders, 1975: 255). 
Although the Report does not emphasise it greatly, the Donovan 
Commission pointed out that the pressure of full employment in the postwar 
decades had contributed heavily to the growth of workplace bargaining and 
the predominance of the informal system (see paras 74,106 and 111). With 
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the development of vigorous and autonomous shop steward organisations and 
the rather unsophisticated nature of British management as regards labour 
corystrol, work relations had deteriorated to the point of disorder in 
many workplaces. An additional factor, considered as a major cause of 
labour problems by structural reformers, was the anachronistic nature of 
many payment systems. Indeed, in engineering, traditional and outdated 
piecework schemes were seen by many as the primary cause of the breakdown 
of managerial control. It would appear that these causal factors, which 
put the accent on the limitations of the collective bargaining structure, 
represent the main elements of the Donovan analysis of the industrial 
relations crisis. 
Independent of the intrinsic value of this analysis, the prescriptions 
for reform of the Royal Commission were very much in line with its definition 
of the problem. It recommended the reinforcement, if not the creation, 
of an institutional framework for conducting labour relations at the work- 
place or company level. The Commissioners enjoined management to develop 
'comprehensive and authoritative collective bargaining machinery to deal 
at company and/or factory level' and 'joint procedures for the rapid and 
equitable settlement of grievances' (para 182). 
The Donovan Commission expressed a strong belief in joint regulation, 
notably for its positive impact on the legitimacy of the rule-making 
process. Their position was also very much in the spirit of Flanders's 
famous observation that, in the context which has been outlined, management 
'can only regain control by sharing it' (1975: 172). A second major consi- 
deration which underlay their propositions is that management should 
recognise shop stewards as legitimate partners in building up such an 
institutional framework of workplace relations. Thirdly, the Commission 
considered that such a reform, for which management had a primary responsi- 
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bility, should be conducted on a voluntary basis. However, it recommended 
the creation of a Commission which would have the power to investigate and 
suggest specific ways to improve collective bargaining in particular firms. 
The Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) was set up and contributed 
to the procedural reform (Purcell, 1979a; 1981). 
The Donovan Commission, as well as most advocates of reform, argued 
for more rationality in the conduct of labour relations. Clegg explained 
how 
they proposed formalization because they believed that open 
acknowledgement of the extent of joint regulation in the 
plant by all concerned would lead to a much-needed 
rationalization of the whole process of collective 
bargaining. (1979: 237) 
The argument of rationality is one of the fundamental principles of the 
pluralist approach to reformism. It is, however, beyond the scope of 
this chapter to get involved in the interpretation or critique of this 
approach. 
s 
It would also be difficult to assess the actual influence of the 
Donovan Commission in fostering change in workplace labour relations 
over the last fifteen years. What is relevant, however, is that, even on 
a voluntary basis, such institutional reform actually occurred. Two 
major surveys now provide convincing evidence to this effect. The Warwick 
survey (Brown, 1981) collected information from a sample of 970 manu- 
facturing establishments of more than fifty employees. The major theme 
of The Changing Contours of British Industrial Relations was the formali- 
sation and institutionalisation of labour relations at plant or company level. 
This was the result of several interrelated developments. To start with, 
the authors pointed to the growing specialisation and professionalism of 
5. For such a discussion, see in particular Fox, 1973; Goldthorpe, 1977; 
Clegg, 1975; Hyman, 1978; and R. K. Brown, 1978. 
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industrial relations management. Industrial relations had become a more 
central preoccupation of management, and as part of their strategy for 
reform, 'in the five years after 1972 almost half the manufacturing 
establishments of 50 or more employees took tangible steps to strengthen 
/ and formalise the position of their shop stewards' (Brown, 1981: 74). This 
made easier the implementation of disputes procedures in the establishment 
and the formalisation of collective bargaining at plant or company level. 
Single-employer bargaining had become the most important means of pay 
determination for two-thirds of manual workers. 
The recent comprehensive DE/PSI/SSRC survey (D-anie1 and Millward, 
1983) presents findings based on interviews conducted in 1980 with managers 
and workers' representatives of 2041 establisfiments, a representative 
sample of the whole economy. Daniel and Millward put the trends previously 
observed in manufacturing in a wider perspective, thus showing the 
diversity of British industrial relations. The results of the DE/PSI/ 
SSRC survey appear to indicate that the extent of change in institutional 
arrangements may have been less striking than had been suggested by the 
Warwick survey. When controlling for the different coverage of the two 
studies, however, their results are broadly similar for the manufacturing 
sector. Indeed, Daniel and Millward stress in conclusion that their 
results are comparable with the findings of previous surveys: 'nearly 
all of those comparisons have shown a growth in the formality of workplace 
industrial relations, either in terms of the presence of institutions such 
as committees or the presence and use of formal procedures and processes' 
(1983: 295-6). It should be added that other surveys and case studies gave 
further evidence of institutionalisation (in particular Parker, 1975; Knight, 
1979; Storey, 1980; and Purcell, 1981). 
It seems widely accepted that this reform proceeded roughly along 
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the lines of the Donovan recommendations. According to the Warwick 
survey, 'by the late 1960s the problems that came from informal, fragmented 
workplace bargaining were painfully obvious to most managements. Whether 
or not they were aware that they were doing so, they set about following 
the reforming prescriptions of the Donovan Commission' (Brown, 1981: 118; 
see also Brown, 1981: 50 and Clegg, 1979: 240,436). Purcell, who conducted 
empirical research in companies where the CIR had intervened in an attempt 
to reform industrial relations, also observed that 'the central thesis' 
of the Donovan Commission 'has become widely accepted and remains a major 
influence on management and trade union thought in industrial relations' 
(1981: 7). 
The analytical framework presented here suggests an analysis of the 
industrial relations crisis which is slightly different from the orthodox 
interpretation. It may be useful, therefore, to point to those elements 
of the analytical framework which will be conducive to empirical work 
and eventually to the development of the general analysis of this study. 
The first of these factors is the work process. In looking for the 
material basis of job control, attention will be paid to the detail of 
the work processes in three factories. Using the theoretical discussion 
on the labour process, an effort will be made to render this concept 
operational in pointing out specific dimensions for observation. A second 
focus of interest will be the nature and character of shop-floor organisations. 
Since workshop control can hardly be dissociated from types of workplace 
organisations, there will be a discussion of the specific character of the 
British shop steward system. Thirdly, since management is in command of 
the organisation of production, its policies and strategies for controlling 
labour are obviously a major concern of this study. Consideration will 
therefore be given to these material and organisational factors prior to 
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discussing changes in the institutional framework of labour relations. The 
underlying assumption is that technical conditions of production and 
social organisation may set the conditions for variable degrees of worker 
autonomy and control. Much depends on forces generated outside the 
factory, particularly labour market pressures: these more or less favourable 
conditions for job control may be amplified by the coherence or 
deficiencies of labour relations institutions. 
To conclude, the analytical framework leads to a theoretical propo- 
sition which has major implications for the interpretation of the industrial 
relations crisis. Indeed, it suggests that the structure of labour 
relations is not the primary cause, or the most important factor, in the 
development of a given pattern of control over labour utilisation, although 
it is usually an important factor. If such a proposition can be supported 
by empirical evidence, it may well be that the Donovan Commission exaggerated 
the autonomy of labour relations and hence the possibilities-of-structural 
reform. 
3. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS 
I 
3.1 Research Strategy 
It should be obvious by now that the main preoccupation of the 
study is not so much with the scope of workers' influence as with their 
actual degree of control over particular aspects of labour utilisation. The 
focus is on the true extent of workers' challenge to management control, 
of their incursion into matters which many would regard as managerial pre- 
rogatives. In studying the impact of institutional reform on the degree of 
job control, it was felt that proper consideration should be given to the 
overall change in the pattern of labour control, not just to changes in 
formal collective bargaining. Attention had to be given to control over 
work relations at the point of production, which encompasses customary 
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regulation and worker unilateral regulation as well as the whole process 
of informal regulation. 
Hence there is much evidence that the post-Donovan reform has 
generally produced an increase in the scope of formal collective bargaining 
(Parker, 1975; Knight, 1979; Storey, 1980; Daniel and Millward, 1983). More 
than a shift in the balance of power, this may indicate changes in the 
process of job regulation. Many of the issues now negotiated at plant or 
company level were previously controlled unilaterally either by workers or 
their managers. Accordingly, formalisation may have reduced job control, 
reinforcing management control over labour utilisation. Alternatively, it 
may have stabilised or even reinforced workers' control. (That is a stimulating 
but also very demanding object of study. ) 
To study this problem, there was a need for qualitative information, 
which could only be acquired through in-depth case studies. If observation 
in a limited number of workplaces appeared to be the most appropriate 
method considering the problem under study, there were also complementary 
reasons for following this path. Together with reading relevant literature, 
observation within factories was seen as a way to gaining a better under- 
standing of British industrial relations. Indeed, a good grasp of this 
complex structure of labour relations was necessary to comprehend institu- 
tional reform. Similarly, a precise and concrete view of the process of 
regulation`in, a limited number of specific issues was also considered 
essential. In short, observation was not only the main method for 
collecting data, it was part of a learning process. All this was made more 
relevant by my situation as a foreign student. 
The strategy, as well as the work more generally, was very much 
influenced by the great interest in workplace labour relations at the SSRC 
Industrial Relations Research Unit at the University of Warwick, to which 
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I was attached as a research student. Members of the IRRU played a major 
role in the development of research into labour relations at the micro 
level. Much of their empirical work had been undertaken in the engineering 
sector, partly because of the location of the University of Warwick. It 
was decided, partly for pragmatic reasons, that this study should also 
focus on this industrial sector. Empirical research was conducted in 
two engineering firms in the West Midlands, both manufacturing components 
for the motor industry. On the one hand, going into a field where so much 
knowledge and expertise was shared by many specialists may be seen as a 
poor strategy. On the other hand, the extensive amount of published 
material on workplace relations in British engineering could be seen as an 
asset. It made possible the acquisition of a degree of knowledge necessary 
before starting with the fieldwork and, by providing analytical tools 
and insights, it stimulated research and helped the development of 
analysis and arguments. 
The research strategy was not a comprehensive plan which oriented 
the work from-the beginning. Much in line with the empirical tradition, 
it was often more a question of pragmatic choices, in a context where the 
researcher was very much dependent upon his environment. As noted by 
Nicholson, Ursell and Blyton in their study on the Sheffield City branch 
of NALGO, 
in field research, what it is desirable or possible to 
investigate, and by which methods, is constrained by the 
access opportunities available to the researcher, research 
resources, and the special characteristics of the setting 
in which the research takes place. (1981: 44) 
Accordingly, it is fair to note that the design of this research as well as 
the specific nature of the problem under study evolved throughout the 
period of fieldwork. 
While having no control over the object of study is a general rule 
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in social science research, there are further constraints which may be 
more peculiar to the type of study carried out here. The first of these 
is that this method of research requires the full co-operation of both 
sides throughout. Gaining access to a plant usually is the result of a 
long process involving dealings with senior management representatives, 
leaders of the shop steward organisations, and full-time officials of the 
respective unions. Once collaboration has been agreed by all parties, the 
confidence of the participants is never gained once and for all, and the 
researcher can only proceed to deeper and more sensitive issues if he or 
she has ensured this confidence. Observation and interviewing require a 
good deal of time on the part of many participants, a cost for which the 
results of fundamental research represent a very modest compensation. 
A second constraint is that, in securing this co-operation, the 
researcher must preserve his or her independence from either side. 
6 In 
contrast to many other research projects on management or on trade unions, 
the researcher cannot afford to take sides, or to get too involved in the 
activities and strategies of one or the other of the two parties involved 
in labour relations. And while doing so, he or she still has to raise 
and stimulate some interest for the research on the part of the participants. 
Thirdly, the whole process is made more difficult because of the conflictual 
nature of the relations between labour and management. Considering that 
managers and workers' representatives are involved in a struggle for control 
over work relations, they are naturally suspicious of the intrusion of any 
observer which might eventually affect their position or cause further 
difficulties. However, this constraint does not represent a major impediment 
6. ), 4 jardet defined succinctly the problem of the independence of the 
research worker in the sense discussed here as that of 'ne pas etre 
agi par tel ou tel acteur, manipule et somme de prendre parti' (1983: 32). 
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if the participants as well as the observer are aware of and used to such 
a conflictual context. To the extent that managers and shop stewards 
perceive the conflict as having more to do with structures than with the 
character and attitudes of the people involved, and to the extent that they 
have developed bargaining relationships, the work of the researcher is 
made easier. 
3.2 Research Methods 
The main method of research was observation covering a period'of 
four months in each of the two firms (from October 1978 to February 1979 
in the first case, and from July to November 1979 in the second). Observa- 
tion in the second factory (Firm B) was more regular, mainly because of 
its proximity to the University. Since the problem under study was also 
better defined at that stage, information regarding Firm B is more 
extensive in depth and coverage. 
In both cases the researcher was allowed to move freely and meet 
people in the factory as well as to attend labour-management meetings. Given 
the emphasis I wished to put on the work process, a good deal of time was 
spent on the shop-floor. Basically, I tried to understand the sequence and, 
integration between the operations, the division of labour, and the nature 
and complexity of particular jobs. The technique consisted mainly of talking 
to manual workers and supervisors about specific conditions of work, and 
the method of regulation of these conditions. I also enquired about the 
structure and working of management and of shop steward organisations. 
Besides production activities, observation also focused on various types of 
labour-management meetings, at different levels of the hierarchy. In both 
firms, I attended many of these meetings which consume so much of the time 
of labour managers, senior production managers, and leading members of the 
shop steward organisations. Some of these meetings had to do with the formal 
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disputes procedure. Other structures, such as the works council at Firm A 
and the JSSC-managing director meeting at Firm B, considered new issues 
on a monthly basis. For each of these, as well as for the monthly 
information meeting at Firm B, several meetings were attended, so that an 
assessment of the nature of the issues and the process of decision-making 
could be made. Finally, in both workplaces I took advantage of the 
opportunities to attend shop steward, JSSC, and branch meetings. 
As Batstone et al. (1977: 275) have noted, 'observation in practice 
involves a number of research techniques, not least informal interviewing'. 
Indeed, on many occasions observation would not be really fruitful if the 
researcher was not allowed to talk to people so that the nature and meaning 
of the situation might be understood. Although observation and informal 
interviewing overlap considerably, there is, at least in principle, a 
distinction to be made between these two techniques. In the first case, 
the researcher does not play any initiatory role; he is simply a good 
listener who does not seek to direct the flow of the conversation. In 
informal interviewing, the researcher plays a more active role in leading 
the communication towards specific issues in order to get precise informa- 
tion, or the informant's version on a given situation. 
Most informal interviews were done on the shop-floor or at the 
employee's usual working situation, usually without an appointment and in 
a casual manner. These appeared to be positive conditions for an exchange 
in which the worker or the manager felt free to say what he knew and what he 
really felt about an issue. In some situations, the writing of short notes 
during the conversation was appropriate. However, depending on the 
subject discussed, it often seemed better not to be seen taking notes of 
the detail of the information. The writing up of extensive fieldwork notes 
had to be completed afterwards, on a day-to-day basis. Observation and 
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informal interviewing were therefore the primary sources of the information 
presented in this study. A large number of formal and more structured 
interviews were also carried out, especially at Firm B. In this case, 
thirty-four of these were conducted with shop stewards, supervisors, 
production managers, and labour managers. These in-depth interviews, for 
which I used an aide-memoire, helped to get information of greater con- 
sistency and depth on a number of specific issues. 
Besides observation and various types of interview, I sought to make 
use of all documentary sources available. At the early stage of each case 
study, I went through management files. At Firm A these were rather 
sketchy, although good series of data on matters such as absenteeism, 
labour turnover, years of service, and overtime hours were provided to 
assist the annual negotiations. Moreover, exhaustive notes were taken 
from the minutes of the works council monthly meetings, starting with the 
creation of this body in October 1975 up to early 1980. I also greatly 
benefited from the fact that the CIR had conducted an inquiry into 
Firm A in 1972-3. The report offered an important source of information 
on industrial relations in the early seventies, so that I could compare 
and account for changes in labour relations over a significant period of 
time. In the case of Firm B, I gradually gained access to a variety of 
sources from which it was possible to study the development of labour 
relations since the mid-sixties. For instance, original and detailed 
sources on the industrial relations crisis of the late 1960s are analysed in 
Chapter 4. The minutes books of the weekly meetings of the TGWU shop 
stewards' committee for the period December 1970 to September 1979 also 
were a source of information of considerable help. 
Finally, follow-up research was undertaken in the two cases (in 
December 1979 at Firm A and in May 1980 at Firm B). This consisted mainly 
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of long interviews with key informants within the groups of managers and 
shop stewards. It proved to be particularly helpful in controlling for 
change over time and in testing ideas with participants at a preliminary 
stage of the analysis. Overall, therefore, some of the value of this 
method of investigation may lie in the complementarity of the techniques 
used. The validity of a specific piece of information can be tested by 
different techniques as well as different sources. On most issues, it was 
possible to confront the interpretation of many actors and hence go some 
way towards assessing the different interests and sets of arguments 
involved. 
The analytical framework developed in this chapter has put some 
emphasis on the importance of studying labour relations with reference to 
production activities. Before elaborating the thesis further, it is there- 
fore necessary to present in some detail the two manufacturing units which 
have been the object of the study. Hence Chapters 2 and 3 focus mainly 
on the production process, the composition of the workforce and the shop- 
floor organisations in these factories. The sequence of the following 
chapters is fairly straightforward. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the 
institutionalisation of labour relations and its impact on management and 
workers' organisations. In two subsequent chapters (6 and 7), the empirical 
material on job control is analysed in some detail. These chapters form 
the basis for the general arguments of the dissertation, which are developed 
further in the 'General Conclusions'. 
CHAPTER 2 
WORK PROCESSES AND MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS 
In line with bur analytical approach, it is appropriate to set out 
in some detail the characteristics of the production units studied before 
looking at the institutions of labour relations. Chapters 2 and 3 intro- 
duce the main features of the work process, the nature of work, and the 
organisations of management and labour. This material will be used in two 
ways. First, much of the empirical data will be used in the development 
of analyses and arguments throughout the dissertation. Second, Chapters 2 
and 3 are mainly, but not exclusively, about facts. They give the author 
an opportunity to set the basis for some of the explanatory factors of 
the thesis, notably concerning the implications of the work process for 
job control, as well as the specific nature of workers' organisations in 
British engineering. 
Our main objective was to study the impact of reform in institutional 
industrial relations on worker control, by making comparisons between two 
or more workplaces. As noted in the preceding section on research strategy, 
it was decided to conduct a few in-depth case studies in the engineering 
industry. A major reason for directing attention towards our first case 
study was that the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) had conducted 
an inquiry there in 1972-3. By itself, this meant that the company had 
experienced industrial relations problems and that a reform strategy had 
at least been prescribed to its management. As all parties had agreed to 
give us access and to co-operate, we were able to ascertain that the 
institutional reform had been carried out, with major effects on the state 
of labour relations. At Firm At labour relations were stable. While the 
domestic union organisation showed most of the institutional characteristics 
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usually found in engineering factories, it did not really manifest the 
strength and character which a foreign student had come to expect in going 
through the literature on this industry. Although the workers' organisation 
had accumulated a good network of rights and benefits, management was 
well in command of production. 
In order to assess the actual impact of institutional reform and to 
explore the sources of variation in worker control, it was hoped that 
Firm B would have many points in common with Firm A so that a number of 
factors could be held constant. Hence we were looking for a comparison 
with another medium-size engineering factory in the West Midlands. It was 
hoped, in particular, that we would be able to study a more robust workers' 
organisation, one which could be seen as more typical of the engineering 
sector. We were therefore fortunate to gain the co-operation of the 
parties at Firm B, in which the unions had locally established a reputation 
for militancy in the late sixties. 
As we proceed with the comparison of the two cases studied, it will 
be possible to control some of the variables which could have influenced 
the relationship between institutional reform and job control. The most 
important, of these are the industrial sector, the type of product, the 1/ 
main technology used, and the financial situation of the company. As 
regards the important factor of size, the production process and the 
industrial relations structure of the two factories of Firm A were highly 
integrated, and these are treated as a single industrial organisation. If 
this were acceptable, the difference in size between the two cases would 
not be substantial enough to be seen as a major and independent source of 
variation (Edwards and Scullion, 1982a: 26). Having said that, differences 
in the size of the factories were real and it follows that the influence 
of these will be considered at various stages of the analysis. If one 
A 
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also considers that the two managerial organisations could be characterised, 
in very general terms, as relatively progressive, the two cases studied 
certainly had many features in common. And yet, this story is one of 
contrasts in labour relations. Hence a major theme of Chapters 2 and 3, 
a theme which will become more obvious at a later stage in the dissertation, 
is that behind similar organisational and institutional features, sharply 
different work relations were hidden. 
1. FIRMA 
1.1 The Company and Its Product Markets 
Firm A, located in an area known as the Black Country (near 
Birmingham), was founded in 1924 and formed into a private company in t 
1941. The enterprise was originally a small machine shop located at West 
Bromwich. In the early 1950s the equipment was moved from West Bromwich 
to the current site of the machine shops, hereafter called Factory II. 
Around 1968 the foundry was reorganised in a separate plant, to be called 
Factory I. The latter was therefore a recent building, although it looked 
much older. The founder of the company was still chairman of the board 
a few years ago, and a member of his family was managing director at the 
time of the research. The enterprise still showed some characteristics 
of a family-owned and -controlled company, and it was not federated. 
In October 1978, the company employed 815 people at two factories 
one and a half miles apart. There were 264 manual workers employed in the 
foundry (Factory I) and Factory II consisted basically of three traditional 
machine shops in which the iron castings produced in the foundry were 
transformed. The toolroom and drawing office as well as the company's 
head office were also located there. Hence, most senior managers and the 
large majority of clerical employees were based at Factory II, which employed 
ýý ýý 
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about 500 employees in October 1978,430 of them as manual workers. 
The firm specialised in the production of small components to the 
vehicle sector of the engineering industry. For many years, it had been 
a leading supplier of tappets and valve guides to the motor industry in 
Britain and in Europe. Most of the production was sold directly to the 
vehicle manufacturers, which meant that the company had relatively few 
customers, most of whom happened to be large enterprises. During a 
period of nineteen months ending on 31 July 1978, the turnover of E9.3 
million was distributed as follows: Ford Motor Company, 41 per cent 
(in the UK, West Germany and Spain); BL, 16.5 per cent; Perkins (UK and 
USA), 13.5 per cent; Chrysler, 3.6 per cent; and others, 11.4 per cent. 
Direct exports represented approximately 29 per cent of the turnover 
in 
this period. 
In such a market, the firm produced strictly in order to satisfy 
specific customers' requirements. This implies that marketing was the 
first function in the manufacturing cycle and production the last. While 
the enterprise supplied a very limited number of customers, it nevertheless 
offered a relatively large range of product specifications, each customer 
requiring many distinct product specifications for different models of 
vehicles. As a consequence, the company produced a mixture of batches 
of various quantities. Only a few product lines could be classified as 
mass production, in the sense that machine operatives were assigned to the 
production of a specific component continually on both shifts. 
Firm A operated in a very specialised market and was the leading 
supplier of these components in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the 
company should have been in a good position to pass on the increasing costs 
to its customers, considering that these components were essential and 
represented a very small proportion of the customers' expenditures. However, 
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the company had not been able to take advantage of this position over 
recent years, mainly because of the decline of the motor industry in 
Britain and the competition of overseas manufacturers. This industrial 
unit also had very limited possibilities for diversification; to a large 
extent it was dependent upon a limited number of customers. 
According to the figures provided by the company, it reported 
losses of £156,700 (8.3 per cent of turnover) and £142,100 (6.9 per cent 
of turnover) for the years 1971 and 1972.1 During the financial years 
1973,1974 and 1975, the firm achieved small profits of £29,500 (1.1 per 
cent of turnover), £58,800 (1.8 per cent), and £75,500 (1.8 per cent). 
After a small deficit of £51,886 (1.1 per cent) in 1976, the company 
registered a profit of £151,048 (1.6 per cent) during the period of nineteen 
months which ended on 31 July 1978. The author is not in a position to 
assess convincingly the profitability of the company studied. However, the 
following observations are relevant for our purpose: the company's profita- 
bility during this period can confidently be characterised as very low; 
management frequently used this as an argument in its dealings with shop 
stewards; and these union representatives generally perceived the company 
as making little profit. 
1.2 The Work Process 
The whole process of fabrication of these components was highly 
integrated, from the manufacture of the mould in the foundry to final 
grinding operations in the second factory. One could regroup the successive 
processes of foundry production into three types of operation, to be 
executed in separate shops. First, there was the fabrication of the moulds, 
1. All these figures are those of profit (losses) 'after extraordinary 
items'. This means the remaining profits after financial charges 
and taxation, but before dividends. 
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from a mixture of sand and other substances, in the two core-making shops. 
Secondly, there were the various operations performed along the two tracks, 
which were used as mould conveyor and called the 'pouring tracks'. One 
could observe the repetitive work of those assigned to the loading of 
the tracks. The task of the casters then consisted of pouring the hot 
metal into the moulds, the most crucial operation in the work process of 
the foundry. Interestingly, the casters, of whom there were four on each 
track, received the highest basic rate and the highest average earnings 
per hour of all the manual workers of the two factories. From the tracks, 
the castings were directed to the 'round table', where the operators 
detached the castings from the moulds. This was one of the heaviest and 
most demanding jobs of the two plants, carried out in a very unpleasant 
working environment. Third, the castings were sent to the dressing shop, 
where surplus metal was removed. Foundry workers also did a rough 
inspection in this separate shop before the castings could be transported 
to the machine shops. The work of the largest occupational group in the 
dressing shop, the bobbers, was rather similar to that of the machine 
shop workers in the second factory. However, the machinery was more 
elementary and the physical effort more continuous in the dressing shop. 
As expected, these foundry workers had to perform their tasks under 
poor working conditions. Rimmer, whose research was conducted in foundries 
in the West Midlands, observed that 'foundry work is generally characterized 
by great extremes of temperature and a dusty atmosphere, and is dangerous 
if workers are not sure of the correct safety precautions' (1972: 10). 
The three machine shops were the centre of most of the operations 
in the second factory. The largest group of workers consisted of 240 machine 
operatives divided into two job classifications: the machinists (128) and 
the operators. The basis for this distinction, dating only from 1978, was 
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that machinists were also setting their machines, in contrast to the 
operators. The machinists had to show a higher level of qualification, and 
the job of many of them consisted of operating a set of two or more machines, 
each of them executing one or a number of modifications on the component. 
The machinists also controlled the quality of the grinding operations 
performed at their work stations. Hence most of them were quite autonomous. 
They-neither needed the help of the toolsetter nor appreciated the inter- 
vention of the patrol inspectors. Indeed, the machinists insisted on not 
recognising the 'skilled status' of toolsetters and patrol inspectors, two 
groups which had not served any apprenticeship. For their part, the, 
machinists acted as skilled production workers, in contrast to the 
operators. 
Machinists and operators transformed the iron castings into final 
products by making use of light but highly specialised machinery. Although 
these were conventional machine shops, various types of machinery could 
be differentiated, and this could be very significant for the study of job 
control. Hence, adopting the distinction made by Pierre Dubois, there were 
non-automatic machines on which the operative had to intervene at every 
cycle, and semi-automatic machines on which he or she did not have to do 
so in the same repetitive way. 
2 
Machine operatives working on semi- 
automatic machines only had a limited influence on the quantity produced 
because the job was, to some extent, machine-paced. For them, there were 
limitations to what could be earned from the piecework system. By contrast, 
the final grinding operations were usually performed on non-automatic machines. 
2. The original distinction reads as follows: 'Nous distinguons trois 
niveaux de machinisme: travail sans outil ou avec outil tenu ä la 
main ..., travail sur machine fixe avec intervention humaine ä 
chaque cycle ou travail sur machine non automati ue ..., travail sur machine automata ue absence d intervention humaine ä chaque 
cycle) 1978: 175. The term semi-automatic machine is more 
appropriate than automatic machine to describe the machines in 
operation in the factories studied. 
- 34 - 
Many machinists working on these were highly autonomous production workers, 
with a good deal of control over the pace of their work. What operated 
against many of them as regards the effort bargain, however, was that they 
worked on isolated work stations. Ancillary workers had to move the 
castings from one work station to the next. In such a situation, piecework 
bargaining was conducted on an individual basis and machinists were on 
their own in their dealings with the work study engineer. Again, this 
useful distinction between isolated (or separated) work stations and linked 
work stations was suggested by Dubois and his colleagues of the Groupe de 
Sociologie du Travail (see in particular Dubois, 1978: 175-6). These technical 
conditions of production will be analysed in Chapters 6 and 7, where it is 
suggested that-the nature of the work process in the machine shops 
provides the basis for limited labour cohesiveness and strong management 
control. 
However, a number of production constraints were likely to build up 
pressure and uncertainty and to have consequences for management strategies 
in labour relations. First, the work process was characterised by batch 
production. It was observed that it did not create anything like the 
situation of perpetual change seen in the press shops of the other firm 
studied. For one thing, the product demand was more stable and the typical 
size of batches larger in the case of Firm A. Moreover, the production of 
different specifications within the same category of castings did not 
necessitate major modifications with regard to layout of equipment and 
manning levels, either in the foundry or in the machine shops. Nevertheless, 
batch production required flexibility and was likely to generate uncertainly 
within the circle of supervisors and production managers. 
A second constraint was a more regular cause of concern for management. 
The flow of castings coming from the foundry to the machine shops of the 
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second factory created problems. The two plant managers explained in 
interviews that they had not been able to accumulate a significant reserve 
of rough castings for the machine shops over the last couple of years. 
Such a reserve could have mitigated the consequences of fluctuations in 
the level of output. In the current situation, it was not unusual to have 
to stop production on some lines in the machine shops because of material 
shortage. Hence, over a period of six weeks ending on 1 December 1978, 
material shortage was the most important of seventeen categories of down 
time; 
3 it made up 22.2 per cent of all hours of non-productive work. Over 
a similar six-week period ending in December 1979, material shortage 
accounted for 32.9 per cent of hours lost and was still clearly the major 
cause of down time. Over these two samples of six weeks, down time caused 
by material shortage made up as much as 4.8 and 7.6 per cent of all the 
working hours of production workers in the two factories. Finally, the 
CIR had stressed a third production constraint of some importance. It 
reported that 'the company is under continual pressure to maintain both 
the quality and quantity of supplies to the requirements of its customers 
whose stocks are normally only sufficient for about one week's production' 
(1973: para 8). 
1.3 Management Organisation 
The board of directors of the company was composed of nine people, 
four of whom were executive directors. They were supported by six other 
senior managers with the status of 'staff directors'. The personnel 
director was one of them, and he reported directly to the managing director. 
It is under his leadership that the integration of the institutions of 
labour relations at company level has been realised since 1974. There 
3. 'Down time' is the usual term for 'non-productive work' by production 
workers. 
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were, as well, three other layers in the organisation: managers (12), 
superintendents (19 in the production areas), and 35 foremen. 
A relatively small network of senior managers (four executive 
directors and six staff directors) were able to exercise relatively strong 
control over the day-to-day activities of the company, and, in particular, 
its production. Some of the characteristics underlined in this chapter 
contributed to this. To start with, the company dealt with few customers 
in a single product market. This meant, among other things, that there 
was relatively little stress on marketing or on research and development. 
Moreover, negotiation with suppliers was not a crucial area of management 
activity, the foundry producing the castings out of raw material, which 
represented a comparatively limited proportion of total company costs. 
4 
i 
Senior managers paid most attention to the function which was the most 
critical one: production. They were particularly sensitive to the level 
of production because of the high degree of integration of the operations 
within as well as between the two factories. Consequently, a very important 
proportion of management's strategies and interventions related to the 
objective of achieving the most efficient use of labour in operating the 
existing equipment. At least four of the staff directors were regularly 
involved in production issues on the shop-floor. And eleven of the nineteen 
superintendents with responsibilities for production reported directly to 
the plant directors. 
An additional reason why top managers were very much in control of 
production was their computer information system. The application of the 
4. Over the period of nineteen months ending on 31 July 1978, 'direct 
materials and sands' cost the equivalent of 14.2 per cent of the 
company's turnover. The value of 'all other purchases' made up for 
an additional 20.3 per cent of the turnover. The item 'wages and 
salaries' represented 53.1 per cent of the turnover. 
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piecework scheme generated a substantial amount of data on the performance 
and working time of production workers. The data collected concerned 
the quantity produced, down time (broken down into 17 categories), individual 
earnings, and scrap work. These data were analysed by computer and broken 
down by department, by shift, and by operative, depending upon requirements. 
From the information collected from the piecework cards, managers also 
possessed the necessary data to work out direct labour costs and profit 
margins for every product specification. Senior managers did not necessa- 
rily take full advantage of this bulk of information, but it was certainly 
used to detect problem areas. Indeed, the impression which emerged 
from interviews with managers was that they were becoming more and more 
aware of the possibilities of the company's computer as an instrument of 
management control. 
2. FIRM B 
2.1 The Company and Its Product Markets 
Firm B is an engineering firm in Coventry. It was formed in 1926 
by the merger of two companies, one fabricating radiators and the other 
specialising in presswork. It moved to its present site in 1930 and 
became a public company in 1953. In August 1979, about 1,250 people were 
employed in the factory studied, 829 of them as manual workers. In contrast 
to Firm A, this company was a member of the local engineering employers' 
association. 
Since 1955, the company had been part of a large engineering group, 
of which it was a wholly owned subsidiary. The activities of the group 
were not limited to the motor industry. It also had interests in the 
aircraft and general engineering industries. The group was based in 
England and had many subsidiaries in the UK, as well as some in Europe, 
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North America and South Africa. 
In many ways, Firm B was a complex organisation: since 1976 it 
had been organised into four divisions, it sold its products to four 
different markets, and its manual workforce was paid according to various 
systems and, indeed, various piecework schemes. In August 1979,476 manual 
employees were working in the Presswork Division, which produced half of 
the company's turnover during the same year. The activities of this 
largest division centred upon the manufacture of pressed components for 
the motor industry. Its main products were clutch covers, brake back 
plates and brake shoes. 
Several characteristics of this product market had implications for 
the work process. As was the case at Firm A, this division was exclusively 
concerned with 'production to orders', i. e. production of batches to 
satisfy the specific requirements of customers. A major difference, 
however, was that most of the press shop production was not directly sold 
to vehicle manufacturers but to large manufacturers of components for the 
motor industry. Usually the pressed components manufactured at Firm B 
were assembled by the manufacturer of larger parts (e. g. brakes, clutches) 
and then sold to car manufacturers. At the time of our research, more than 
80 per cent of the presswork output was sold to only three large component 
suppliers, Automotive Products Ltd., Lucas Girling Ltd., and Rockwell 
(Germany). The Presswork Division was therefore at the third layer of 
production, while the other firm studied was at the second layer. Such a 
position in the market had at least two major effects on the work process. 
First, the Presswork Division had to provide a large range of product speci- 
fications, to be produced in as many batches of different sizes. This was 
because each of its large customers offered a large range of products and 
specifications to the motor industry. Secondly, the organisation of 
production had to be highly flexible and capable of quick diversification 
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of its range of products. In short, to the extent that the leading 
assemblers of components diversified their order-books, their own 
suppliers, who happened to be of a more modest size, had to adapt quickly 
to maintain their share of the market. 
The second largest division, the Heat Transfer Division, employed 
238 manual workers and produced a quarter of the overall turnover in 1979. 
It produced a very extensive range of heat exchange equipment of all 
types and sizes. It was organised into two units of production corresponding 
to different product markets. The first, the Automotive Heat Transfer Unit 
(ART), dealt with the firm's original market, the production of radiators 
for the motor industry. The company no longer supplied a significant 
proportion of radiators for volume passenger cars but manufactured replýce- 
ment radiators for many leading models. The second production unit, Power 
Plant Heat Transfer (PPHT), produced cooling equipment for industrial 
engines, marine installations, and land-based power stations. Paradoxically, 
considering the size and complexity of these products, production within 
PPHT was not based on high capital investment, for example in comparison 
with the press shops. A major characteristic of the work process in PPHT 
was that research and development, and also marketing, played a more pivotal 
role than they did in any of the other production processes of the firms 
studied. Our observation and interviewing in this second division were 
mainly limited to the AHT unit. 
A third division, the Heat Transfer Service Division, consisted 
basically of a number of radiator service branches in many large British 
cities. Finally, the fourth division dealt with a completely different 
product market, the production of space heating equipment for industry and 
offices. 
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From a number of documentary sources, 
5 it is possible to outline 
the general trend in the company's profitability over the last decade. 
After a modest profit of £278,000 during the financial year ending in 
September 1969, Firm B reported six consecutive years of losses, ranging 
from £248,000 to £879,000. A recovery started in 1976, and the firm 
registered profits of £895,000 (5 per cent of the turnover) and £723,000 
(4.2 per cent) in 1977 and 1978. However, the company suffered losses of 
£811,000 (5 per cent of the turnover) in 1979. These figures are con- 
sistent with a statement made by a group spokesman in 1980: 'Firm B 
have been the most consistently unprofitable subsidiary of our group. They 
made losses from 1970 to 1975 and in 1979 - and will do so this year'. 
6 
In August 1980, only three months after our final programme of interviewing, 
the company was sold to another engineering group. 
2.2 The Work Process 
The presswork production was concentrated in two large shops 
separated by a driveway. From the steel store, the raw material was cut 
to the appropriate size and then transported to the presses. These presses 
were the focus of the work process and the 130 press operators represented 
a homogeneous occupational group with a great deal of influence within the 
shop-floor organisation. The presses were laid down in four sections 
commonly referred to as the 'press shops'. The largest of these was press 
shop no. 3, where the presses of medium and heavy tonnage were laid down on 
ten production lines. 
In the press shops, and especially in the two smallest sections, one 
5. These are the Reports to Employees, 1978 and 1979; the Annual Report and 
Accounts of the group for the years 1967 to 1978; and the Profit and Loss 
Account of Firm B for the years 1974 to 1977. 
6. Coventry Evening Telegraph, 12 August 1980. 
- 41 - 
could observe many one-man operations, i. e. situations in which one press 
operator worked on his own. In these cases, the operator was supported by 
a 'designated shop labourer' who did the 'service' for a given work group. 
There were also many two-men operations, where two operators worked in a 
team on the same press. But most of the output was produced on lines of 
presses. Depending upon the nature of the batch and the number of presses 
which could be linked by conveyor belts, a production line could be manned 
by between three and twelve, and occasionally more, operators. They would 
then swop jobs regularly and receive the same piecework bonus. 
The press shops were concerned exclusively with batch production 
and although there was wide variation in the size of batches, these were 
predominantly of small and medium quantities. This was not seen as and 
ideal situation by production managers, since it caused too many disruptions 
in the work process. In the words of the unit manager in shop no. 3, 
'small batches imply greater use of setters, of fork-lift drivers; it is 
more difficult to manage, in one word, it is less efficient'. 
7 Although 
the different sections and production lines were, as far as possible, 
organised according to product specifications, the lines frequently had to 
be reorganised several times during a single shift, for different batches. 
Such a change of batch almost inevitably meant that they would work 
according to a different standard, since the size or the weight of the 
component (if not the job content itself) would change. And this would 
often imply a reorganisation of the line, with different manning levels. In 
short, frequent reorganisation of the work process was usual in the press 
shops. All this meant that a multitude of standard quantities and manning 
levels had to be negotiated and re-negotiated on the shop-floor. 
7. Formal interview, 7 May 1980. 
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The presses represented the highest investment of capital in the 
whole factory. However, all the presses were non-automatic machines. This 
meant that on every press one operator had to press a button to start each 
cycle of production. Many presses could be operated at a maximum of 900 
cycles per hour, and a work pace of 500 or 600 strokes per hour (and often 
more) was usual. This made for an unlimited margin for speeding-up. There 
was a huge gap between the quantity which could be produced during a short 
period of time and what might be agreed as a normal performance or, to 
use the technical term, the 'standard performance'. In such conditions, 
the determination of the standard time, usually referred to in terms of 
number of components per hour, was primarily a matter for bargaining. The 
wage-effort bargain and the intensity of effort were therefore major 
I 
issues of day-to-day bargaining and conflict in the press shops. 
In a presswork factory, the toolmakers have a very crucial role 
to play. Most of the work of the 93 toolmakers was centred upon the 
machining, fitting and repairing of tools for the press shops. In one of 
the two sub-sections of this large toolroom, there was a group of about 35 
skilled machinists. In the second sub-section, a group of about 25 fitters 
was working mainly on new tools, and another, slightly larger, one was 
involved in the repairing of the tools from the presses. This latter 
group was divided into three teams, each of them under the leadership of 
a 'leading hand' chosen by the section manager. Members of this repairing 
section would frequently 'go down to the press shops' to complete the 
maintenance of the tools. The section as a whole occasionally took advantage 
of the strategic position of these toolmakers - directly involved as they 
were at production level - to apply sanctions against the company. This 
type of collective resistance was bound to create friction between the tool- 
makers and the toolsetters and press operators, who happened to be members of 
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a different union. 
Since it is also intended to analyse in some detail various aspects 
of work relations in the Automotive Heat Transfer Unit (ART), it is 
relevant to outline the contours of the work process there. The ART unit 
was organised in three sections. A group of 50 manual workers was employed 
in the section of the tinsmiths, 39 of them being craftsmen. Each of the 
tinsmiths individually applied his skill to various tasks (of which welding 
was the most important) in the assembling of radiators, following a fairly 
traditional process. Various parts were transported by an overhead track 
to the different work stations. Over the previous twenty years, the 
importance of this group in the factory had declined dramatically. There 
were as many as 200 tinsmiths in the no. 2 shop in 1959. Nevertheless, 
they had preserved their shop rules and craft traditions, based on loný- 
standing membership of the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, 
Heating and Domestic Engineers (NUSMW). Also, a most traditional piecework 
scheme, which reinforced craft control, had been in operation since the 
shop. had existed. 
A second section, called Fitting and Welding no. 2 (FW2), was 
composed of nineteen semi-skilled workers. Their most important single 
operation was welding, but they also performed various ancillary tasks, some 
of them with rather obsolete equipment such as hand presses. Their main 
role in the work process consisted of preparing some pressed components 
coming from the press shops before their assembly by the tinsmiths. Here 
was therefore a section of time-rated workers whose position in the work 
process placed them between two groups of pieceworkers. Members of FW2 
felt comparatively underpaid and, taking advantage of the fact that the 
press shops were producing in batch, their covert resistance often led to 
the formation of bottle-necks in the flow of material. Moreover, job 
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demarcation problems between the TGWU and AUEW members of FW2 and the*tin- 
smiths generated tense work relations and conflict. 
The third section of AHT consisted of a group of 24 semi-skilled 
workers. Members of this section, called the Copper Core section, performed 
various tasks related to the assembling and testing of radiator frames. 
This involved a mixture of purely manual jobs (i. e. without any tools), of 
welding, and it also included the operation of various types of equipment. 
2.3 Management Organisation 
Over the 1970s, the viability of the company studied was very much 
dependent upon the financial backing of the larger engineering group, which 
was itself quite profitable. Obviously this meant that the group's 
directors were showing a strong interest in the management of Firm B. The 
directors of the latter had to make decisions within firm guidelines on 
aspects dealing with major economic policies; this was especially the case 
for choices regarding product specialisation and investment. Hence the 
credits for investment, allocated annually by the group, were very limited 
over this last decade. Nevertheless, senior managers stressed in interviews 
that they were left with the necessary autonomy to manage the allocated 
resources and, in particular, to develop labour relations strategies which 
they felt would be conducive to profitability. In other words, it was up to 
them to develop the appropriate organisational structures and to organise 
and control production, within the boundaries set by the larger engineering 
group. 
The managing director of Firm B did not sit on the main board of the 
group. However, one of the group's directors was chairman of the board of 
directors of Firm B; he was a non-executive director. The seven other 
directors of the company were executive directors, including the personnel 
director. These senior managers, as well as one additional divisional 
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manager, also formed the management committee, which met on a weekly 
basis. 
The management structure of the company consisted of five hierarchical 
levels, under the guidance and co-ordination of the managing director, 
who was highly involved in the various managerial functions. The company 
being organised in four divisions, one or two of the senior managers 
responsible for each of these (level 4) were members of the management 
committee. These divisions were established on the basis of the different 
product markets, and the management structure had developed accordingly. 
In contrast with Firm A, where management control*was remarkably centralised, 
in this case a good deal of influence was exerted at an intermediate level, 
that of the unit manager (level 3). In collaboration with the production 
control department and the section managers, the unit managers set the 
priorities for production on a weekly basis. Unit managers were in control 
of the day-to-day decisions with respect to production, and were also 
quickly involved if any 'labour problems' occurred. While, in principle, 
the section managers (level 2) had the responsibility for organising 
production and deciding 'on the running of the shop', most unit managers 
restrained this degree of autonomy. In a later chapter, attention will be 
drawn to the weakening of the position of junior managers, and foremen in 
particular, as the reform of labour relations proceeded. 
3. COMPARISON AND SYNTHESIS 
A major concern in this brief chapter was the influence of product 
markets upon the work process. The two firms studied had many points in 
common with respect to the product market and this 
provided 
some ground 
for comparison. Both were supplying components to the vehicle sector of 
the engineering industry, a sector in decline over the last fifteen years or 
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so. The two companies faced serious problems relating to their market 
situation, and the structural problems in this industrial sector have been 
worsening with the deepening of the current economic recession. Also, some 
figures showing the very low profitability of the enterprises studied were 
quoted. 
Both firms operated on the basis of production to orders, by which 
production was organised to satisfy the specific requirements of a few 
large customers. And both were involved predominantly in batch production, 
which is usually associated with 'fragmented management control systems' 
(Kynaston, Reeves and Woodward, 1970). This gave managements more freedom 
of choice in elaborating their control systems, but it also led to a great 
deal of pressure and uncertainty. 
As noted by Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 'the task of management 
is to make decisions in situations of uncertainty' (1977: 155). Indeed, the 
degree of uncertainty arising from constraints imposed on the work process 
by product market considerations is likely to have a significant influence 
on the pattern of control over work relations. On this matter, the degree 
of uncertainty was found to be significantly higher and the work process 
considerably more fragmented in the press shops of Firm B. in comparison 
with the machine shops of Firm A. To some extent, this may be explained by 
referring to the evidence presented in this chapter. 
The first point was that the size of batches was smaller in the 
press shops, where small batches were predominant. Secondly, there was a 
larger range of products, divided into a larger number of specifications (in 
terms of size and other requirements), in the Presswork Division. These 
two factors meant that major changes in layout of equipment, manning levels, 
and assignment of labour occurred more frequently in the press shops than in 
the machine shops of Firm A. Thirdly, Firm B sold most of its production 
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to large manufacturers of components. Operating at this third layer of 
production in the motor industry, the Presswork Division had to diversify 
its production to meet the requirements of the large intermediary between 
it and the vehicle manufacturers. Indeed, generally speaking, the product 
demand happened to be more stable in Firm A, a factor contributing to the 
reduction of pressure at shop-floor level. 
Our main task in this chapter consisted of describing the main 
features of the product markets and the technical conditions of production. 
Many of these characteristics may have some influence on control over 
the labour process. Hence, in many ways, the work process at Firm B 
appeared to be more difficult to manage, an explanatory factor worth 
considering in our study of job control. 
CHAPTER 3 
WORKERS AND THEIR ORGANISATIONS 
In this brief chapter, most of the attention focuses on the two 
shop-floor organisations, a term which refers not only to the shop stewards 
but also to the members they represent. Perhaps there is a tendency in the 
literature to overestimate the influence of the shop steward in building a 
stronger or weaker workplace organisation. Although the shop steward has 
a crucial representative role to play and is often seen as the leader 
within the constituency, the autonomy and strength of workplace organisation 
rest on a complex interplay of different factors. In trying to account for 
a substantial difference in the strength and character of the two shop- 
floor organisations studied, some attention is paid to social and material 
factors which may be influential. Hence we look in some detail at the 
composition of the labour force and the way the shop-floor organisation 
develops in relation to the workers' contribution to the work process. 
1. FIRM A 
1.1 Composition of the Labour Force 
Since production at Factory I only started in 1968, it is not 
possible to compare the size of the workforce over a long period of time. 
However, a comparison of the data for January 1973, published by the CIR, 
with those we collected in 1978 shows a remarkable stability. While Firm A 
employed 783 people in 1973, this number was up to 805 in 1978. The 
number of manual workers was 691 and 694 respectively. Yet, changes occurred 
in 1979. Approximately 60 employees then accepted voluntary redundancy 
and many other jobs were also lost by attrition. The losses were concen- 
trated in the dressing shop (Factory I) and on the night-shift of the 
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machine shops (Factory II), many employees being transferred to production 
work on days to replace those leaving the company. In other words, the 
company reduced drastically its labour force on nights and intensified 
production on days where labour costs are lower and the labour force 
is more easily controlled. Management explained its decision by referring 
to losses of orders and the need for a significant improvement in 
productivity. In a period of recession, management's strategy was to 
reduce labour costs and maintain a similar level of output. 
The distribution of the workforce between the two plants did not 
show any variation either between 1973 and 1978. There was virtually no 
labour mobility between the factories. It was only in 1979 that management 
began to advertise the vacancies for one plant in the other factory. In 
any case, however, management discouraged inter-plant mobility, which 
occurred only exceptionally. In fact, management's view was shared by the 
workers of the machine shops (in the largest factory) to whom we talked. 
They emphasised the contrast between working conditions in the two factories 
and some referred to the foundry as a 'horrible place to work'. As one 
would expect, working conditions were indeed much more difficult in the 
foundry (dirty, dusty atmosphere; extremes of temperature; etc. ). 
Because such a division within the company's workforce might have 
many implications, we studied more closely the patterns of employment of 
the two factories. It seemed appropriate to look first at the data on 
length of service, a usual indicator of labour force stability. The series 
of data presented in Table 3.1 are not strictly comparable since the 
figures for Firm A cover manual workers only while those for the other firm 
are representative of all employees. In any case, our dicussion rests on the 
analysis of general trends at Firm A, the data for the other firm being 
presented here as a basis for comparison. Table 3.1 shows that there was 
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TABLE 3.1 
LENGTH OF SERVICE OF CURRENT EMPLOYEES 
Firm A Firm B 
Manual Workers - October 1978 All Employees - 
Foundry Machine Shops Total' 
September 1979 
xxxx 
Less than 1 year 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-20 years 
Over 20 years 
Number of 
Employees 
18.3 10.2 13.0 12.4 
49.6 33.1 38.8 20.8 
19.6 28.4 25.4 25.4 
7.1 16.2 13.0 25.1 
5.4 12.0 9.7 16.2 
240 450 690 1,310 
a relatively stable pattern of employment in Firm B, especially when one 
considers the whole distribution. There was more continuity of employment 
than in the firm discussed here and, more typically, the situation at Firm B 
compared well (as a whole) with the four engineering factories studied by 
Edwards and Scullion during the same period (1982a: 64). 
The most striking data on length of service are those for the foundry, 
where a substantial majority of manual workers had been in employment for 
less than five years. This was, by any standard, a very discontinuous pattern 
of employment. If, again, one refers to the Edwards and Scullion research, 
this is comparable to the pattern of female workers in the clothing industry. 
This was an important element in the building up of their general argument on 
the pattern of control. The strength of their argument, moreover, was that 
high labour turnover was as much the result of a particular type of management 
control as one of the causes of weak labour cohesiveness. 
The data on instability of employment at Firm A (and especially in the 
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foundry) are more significant when considering the remarkable stability in 
the size of the workforce within each of the two factories between 1973 and 
1978. Indeed, what is striking when one studies the pattern of employment 
at Firm A is not so much the proportion of workers who were employed over the 
last year but the very sizable proportion of those who had between one and 
five years of service. Half of the foundry workers and one-third of the 
machine shop workers fell into this category. It does not appear that the 
usual interpretation in terms of an 'induction crisis' would explain this 
satisfactorily. It is possible to go some way towards understanding this 
pattern of discontinuity of employment by studying labour turnover. 
TABLE 3.2 
FIRM A: OVERALL RATE OF LABOUR TURNOVER FOR MANUAL WORKERS 
IN EACH FACTORY, 1974-78 
Foundry Machine Shops 
zz 
1974 45.5 19.7 
1975 20.9 18.8 
1976 24.7 10.4 
1977 25.0 7.7 
1978 29.9 15.0 
A first glance at Table 3.2 will make obvious the significant 
variation in labour turnover over the years. If one looked for a crude 
average of labour turnover over this five-year period, it would be around 
13 per cent in the machine shops and 28 per cent in the foundry. If the 
cec r. w, L, 
first figure does not appear to be unusual, labour turnover was byal 1 metes 
very high in the foundry. By comparison, labour turnover at Firm B was 
8.2 per cent for manual workers and 10.8 per cent for all employees over the 
year ending 30 September 1978. Over the following year, the overall rate 
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TABLE 3.3 
FIRM A: LABOUR TURNOVER BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, 1973-78 
Skilled 
Labour 
Foundry 
Production 
and In- 
direct Labour 
Machine 
Shops 
Produc- 
tion 
Machine 
Shops 
Indirect 
Labour 
Total 
1973 22 78 65 42 207 
1974 18 100 36 37 191 
1975 12 58 12 20 102 
1976 7 46 17 24 94 
1977 16 62 20 17 115 
1978 12 85 19 27 143 
Total number of 
separations 87 429 169 167 852 
Percentage of total 
leaving over 6 
years 10.2 50.3 19.8 19.6 
Percentage of 
manual workforce 
in October 1978 21.0 26.9 44.2 7.8 
Number of 
employees in 
October 1978 146 187 307 54 694 
(all employees) was 14.3 per cent at Firm B and the annual Report to Employees 
1979 stated: 
Despite two headcount reduction exercises during the year 
our labour turnover figure is well below the national 
average of 16.8% and it is clear that we have a large 
proportion of people who have stayed with the Company 
for a long time. 
Indeed, one of the firm's 
rdirectors 
noted in informal interview that labour 
turnover might be too low in the sense that there were not enough 'new blood' 
and there were correspondingly too many customary practices which impeded 
upon labour productivity. 
One may get a closer look at the situation by looking at Table 3.3. 
The contrast between the foundry and the machine shops looks much sharper. 
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The two smaller groups are quite interesting. Skilled workers accounted for 
a much smaller proportion of turnover than their relative size (21 per 
cent of manual workers). In contrast, ancillary workers (indirect labour) 
in the machine shops had a very high level of labour turnover. They 
caused the same proportion of labour turnover (almost 20 per cent) as the 
large group of production workers in the same factory, although the size 
of these two groups was obviously not comparable. 
The contrast is particularly noteworthy when one looks at the two 
large groups of production workers. Production and indirect labour in the 
foundry accounted for half of all labour turnover, although it represented 
only a quarter of the workforce. By contrast, production workers in the 
machine shops were characterised by a relatively stable employment relation- 
ship. When enquiring about this marked contrast, one consistently heard 
the same explanation, which was also endorsed by the CIR (1973: 3): 'the 
higher figure at the foundry is explained by the service pattern of the 
Yemeni employees who return home for a period after two or three years' 
employment'. In fact, the proportion of immigrant workers was estimated at 
about 65 per cent of all manual workers in the foundry in 1979. Most of them 
came from Pakistan and the Yemen. By contrast, they represented 
approximately 12 per cent of the manual workforce in the other factory, most 
of them working on ancillary and unskilled jobs. (Indeed, this may also 
contribute to an explanation of the high labour turnover for indirect labour 
in the machine shops. ) Another striking resemblance to the situation 
observed by Edwards and Scullion in the clothing industry (1982a: 57-8) is 
the fact that high labour turnover was not considered as a serious problem 
by managers. There was little problem in recruiting to replace those 
leaving, and quitting was not seen as an expression of conflict but as a 
characteristic of the composition of the labour force. Management compilation 
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(over a period of six years) of the reasons given by employees at the time 
of leaving, which is presented'in Table 3.4, lends some support to this 
TABLE 3.4 
REASONS GIVEN BY EMPLOYEES* FOR LEAVING: 1973 TO 1978 
Foundry Machine Company 
Shops 
777 
Better job 23.5 25.0 24.2 
Family/ill health 8.4 8.8 8.6 
Leaving UK 22.2 7.6 15.3 
Retirements 4.0 9.5 6.6 
Dismissals/redundancies 10.3 8.0 9.3 
Died 1.9 3.8 2.8 
No reason given 29.6 37.1 33.1 
Number of separations 473 420 893 
*Includes manual workers and staff. Only 41 of the 893 separations were by 
staff employees. 
explanation, although the data are somewhat equivocal. It will be noted that 
the proportion of those leaving for a 'better job' and of those with 'no 
reason given' was substantial in both plants. 
One may suggest another reason why the whole issue of instability of 
employment in the foundry was not much of a problem for management. Of the 
immigrant workers leaving the country to visit their family, some would come 
back and seek employment again in the foundry. The practice was that the 
company re-employed some of them, provided they had a good record. Until 
recently, they all started again at the bottom of the promotion ladder. In 
June 1979 the company agreed to an unpaid leave clause for workers visiting 
families overseas which reads: 'A maximum of thirteen weeks leave can be taken 
after five years continuous employment, with no loss of employment rights'. 
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In view of the pattern of employment described above, it appears that most 
of those concerned could not qualify for this. Besides the obvious advantage 
of re-employing the 'best' workers, this had the value of building up a 
reserve of trained employees within the factory. Let us take the example 
of the caster job, which was the highest grade in (and the most coveted of) 
the production jobs. Since some of these employees had already done this 
job, left the company and came back on a lower grade job, any absence or 
temporary shortage of labour on this most important job could be filled 
very quickly. There was also another way by which management made use of 
such a reserve of labour. It was not uncommon for some immigrant workers 
to introduce friends and relatives to the managers, even when there was no 
job vacancy advertised. Conversely, the plant director sometimes asked 
them to find someone to fill a particularly difficult job. 
It is worth having a closer look at other aspects of the work 
situation of immigrant labour in this foundry. A sharp labour segmentation 
existed in terms of skill and occupational classification, a pattern similar 
to the description given by Rimmer (1972: 32-7) who did some fieldwork in 
four foundries in the West Midlands. There were very few immigrants in 
the group of skilled workers. Moreover, although a sizable majority of 
all production and indirect labour were immigrants, there was still a 
significant pattern of segmentation within these groups. Hence, most of 
the 29 workers classified as 'bobbers' (the second highest job grade) in 
the dressing shop were white workers' While most of the jobs demanding 
heavy physical effort, in the unpleasant environment which characterises 
foundry production, were staffed by immigrant labour. This was the case for 
most jobs in the core-making shop as well as the work of the 'round table 
operators', who knocked the castings out of the moulds. It has to be noted 
that most immigrant workers achieved good earnings, at least by internal 
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comparison, although many had to work long hours of overtime to attain this. 
Hence, of the eight highest classifications (company-wide) for average 
gross pay in October 1978, six had a majority of immigrant workers. Indeed 
all of these earned more than the highest grades of skilled workers 
(including toolmakers, electricians, furnacemen, and maintenance fitters). 
Some emphasis is placed here on the contrast between the Firm A 
factories as regards work relations and, especially, the patterns of employ- 
ment. A high degree of instability of employment in the foundry was seen 
as the most striking feature in this respect. In this research, the most 
relevant question is not the significance of high labour turnover as an 
expression of conflict, but the extent to which instability of labour 
impeded the development of collective organisation and job control. As some 
researchers have pointed out, 'it has long been recognised that a factory 
characterized by instability is less likely to develop a strong shopfloor 
organization than one where the majority of workers have been present for 
many years: this has obvious implications for the discussion on collective 
action' (Edwards and Scullion, 1982a: 55). High instability, therefore, may 
undermine the necessary basis for labour cohesiveness and organisation. A 
further consideration is that leaving may be seen as an alternative to 
collective resistance for expressing conflict. This would be in line with 
the labour market interpretation in terms of 'exit and voice' which was 
put forward by Hirschman (1972) and recently developed by American scholars 
(Freeman, 1980; Freeman and Medoff, 1980). Without putting too much 
emphasis on this general interpretation, it is certainly obvious that while 
a serious degree of collective organisation and control had developed in 
most sections of Firm B, a pattern of 'leaving rather than resisting' was 
observed in the other firm, especially in the foundry. 
There was a clear segmentation between the workforce of these two 
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factories. Each plant recruited in a different stratum of the working 
population and there was practically no movement of labour between them. 
This objective division may be particularly significant considering the 
high degree of integration in the work process of the two factories. 
1.2 The Shop-Floor Organisation 
The CIR report provides some background information on the develop- 
ment of union organisation in Firm A. It was noted that 
by the early 1950s, although the TGWU had some members 
on the night-shift and the AUEW represented the toolroom 
and maintenance departments, the GMWU was established as 
the main union representing the semi-skilled production 
employees. The terms and conditions of employment for 
all manual employees followed those negotiated annually 
by the GMWU for its members in the company. After 
reaching a settlement, the GMWU sent copies of the agree- 
ment to the TGWU and AUEW for signature. 
By the late 1950s however the position began to 
change as the TGWU recruited increasing numbers of 
employees. (1973: 7) 
There is a long tradition of rivalry between the unions, especially 
between the two general unions, the General and Municipal Workers Union 
(GMWU) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). Following an 
inter-union dispute, their respective regional secretaries signed a joint 
agreement in 1961.1 The CMWU was recognised as the majority union, but it 
conceded to the TGWU the right to appoint a shop steward and to represent 
its members, all of them working permanently on the night-shift at Factory II. 
Indeed, the essence of the agreement was to recognise the union basis of 
the TGWU in one of the shifts in the machine shops, but to restrict its 
influence to this area. Nevertheless, inter-union rivalry was again severe 
in 1977. The minutes of a meeting involving the managing director, other 
1. 'Agreement on recognition of National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers membership, and Transport and General Workers Union membership', 1961; Appendix 1 of the CIR report. 
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senior managers, and four GMWU shop stewards read as follows: 
Management stressed the gravity of the present situation 
and the financial implications to the Company's continuing 
survival, also stated that many important changes had taken 
place within the organization which the Management believes 
can make the Company an extremely viable operation in the 
future. 
However, that future is seriously jeopardized as long 
as inter-union conflict exists within the Company, irres- 
pective of the solving of the present dispute. 
The shop stewards replied that they were also concerned 
about the problem and its effects and indicated their 
intention to enter into negotiations with the other trade -2 
unions in order to reach an agreement regarding membership. 
On the initiative and insistence of management, which offered a formal 
(post-entry) closed shop agreement as a quid pro quo, the parties agreed 
on specific spheres of representation in 1978. This helped to stabilise 
the respective areas of each union within the company. Its content 
reflected the situation outlined below. 
In October 1978, the TGWU represented about 70 per cent of all 
manual workers on the night-shift in the machine shops, including many 
members in the skilled grades. With very few exceptions, its membership 
was effectively limited to this segment of the workforce. On the day-shift, 
the GMWU had the monopoly of representation for the production and indirect 
workers. It also represented most foundry workers (Factory I). The 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) represented an overall 
majority of the skilled workers in the company, although its stronghold was 
on the day-shift at Factory II, where the toolroom was located. Finally, 
the electricians of both plants were members of the Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU). " It should be noted, therefore, 
that each union organised a specific segment of the workforce, an additional 
source of fragmentation among the manual workforce. From the 'check-off list' 
2. Minutes of a joint meeting held on 21 October 1977. 
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provided by the company, it was possible to establish the membership of the 
individual unions in each of the two factories (Table 3.5). A comparison 
with the figures published by the CIR shows that, from 1973 to 1978, there 
was very little change in the respective influence of the four unions in 
the two factories. 
Table 3.5 also gives the shop steward distribution at the time of 
our research. There were only twelve shop stewards in the company in 1973 
compared with sixteen in 1978, the number of GMWU stewards having gone up 
from six to ten in this period. The average constituency size was neverthe- 
less 43 members in 1978, a rather high figure for the engineering industry. 
However, there were interesting variations in the size of these constituencies 
and it is worth studying more closely the pattern of shop steward representation 
of the two general unions. 
Contrary to what is seen as the general rule in engineering, the CMWU 
and the TGWU shop stewards did not represent a specific section. Indeed, 
the notion of a 'section', consisting of a group of workers involved in 
closely related operations, usually within a single shop, had hardly any 
significance with regard to work relations in this company. 
3 For instance, 
there were about 170 GMWU members working on the day-shift in Factory II. This 
large group of machine operatives and ancillary workers were scattered in 
three machine shops and a few smaller working areas, and they collectively 
elected four shop stewards. Indeed, three of them worked in the same machine 
shop (no. 1) but, to them, this did not matter. The logic of the system of 
collective shop steward representation was not based on work groups or 
sections. The shop stewards collectively representgd the members of their 
3. Batstone and his colleagues (1977: XV) defined a section as 'a team of 
workers on the shop-floor, often electing their own shop steward. The 
section often operates controls on overtime, lay-off rotas, and labour 
allocation. ' 
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union and, in most cases, they met management in pairs. Members did not 
complain about any difficulty in getting in touch with shop stewards. In 
fact, they usually had the possibility of choosing the shop steward whom 
they wished to defend their case. 
There were six shop stewards representing 136 manual workers on the 
night-shift in the machine shops. One of them represented EETPU members, 
three represented the 94 TGWU members, and the other two held credentials 
of the GMWU. The reason for the comparatively small size of the consti- 
tuencies there was that it was the only area where the two general unions 
had to live together. Since there was no cross-representation according to 
this pattern of organisation, they had parallel representation. As on 
the other shift, there was no constituency system and the shop stewards 
represented the members of their own union regardless of the department 
in which they worked. 
In contrast, there were only four GMWU shop stewards elected by the 
239 members working on different shifts in the foundry. In this case, the 
number of shop stewards was not really sufficient to provide for adequate 
representation. For instance, during our fieldwork only one steward worked 
in a large area covering four shops in which about. 120 members were employed 
on three different shifts. The four foundry shop stewards were therefore 
a small minority within the joint shop stewards' committee (JSSC), a body 
comprising all the shop stewards in the company. During our period of 
observation, moreover, none of the foundry shop stewards was a leader. 
Hence, Factory I was certainly the weakest link in the domestic union 
organisation. 
A major consequence of the pattern of shop steward representation 
presented here was that while dominant occupational groups were adequately 
represented, others had no shop steward coming from their ranks. Hence, of 
the nine shop stewards at Factory II, eight were machinists (out of a group 
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of 128) and only one was an operator (although there were 112), the operators 
earning much less than the largest group of machine operatives. There was 
no female shop steward, although many women were employed as operators or 
indirect workers. In fact, none of the stewards of this factory came 
from the ranks of indirect labour, who received the lowest basic rates and, 
by far, the lowest earnings. There were no less than 98 indirect workers 
at Factory II, and they were employed as viewers, packers, storemen, HGV 
drivers, fork-lift drivers, and labourers. 
The GMWU, the TGWU and the AUEW had a senior shop steward recognised 
by the company, although none of them was a full-time shop steward. Never- 
theless, the GMWU convenor, who was involved in both plants, spent a 
substantial proportion of his time on union duties. Over a sample period 
of four weeks in April, June, August and October 1978, the other shop 
stewards spent an average one-third of their time on union duties and were 
at their work station for 66 per cent of their 'clocked hours'. There were, 
however, important fluctuations, time-off for union business varying between 
43,39,5 (August), and 54 per cent of all hours over these weeks. Inter- 
estingly, over the same period the night-shift shop stewards spent 47 per 
cent of their time on union duties compared with only 16 per cent for those 
on days. The main reason for this was that stewards on nights frequently 
had to attend meetings during the day. 
4 
The proportion of time on union 
duties was not related to the size of the constituencies. 
4. The arrangement was rather generous in such circumstances. The shop 
stewards were then off work the preceding night, as well as the night 
following the meeting if the meeting ended after lunch. In the 
latter case, stewards were paid for 20 hours of union duties. 
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2. FIRM B 
2.1 Composition of the Labour Force 
A first observation, to be analysed with reference to the appropriate 
background in the following chapter, is that the labour force had been 
severely reduced over a period of about fifteen years. Various documents 
indicate that, over this period, employment had declined by about 900, down 
to 1,250 at the beginning of our fieldwork in 1979. Of the 1,250,829 were 
manual workers and about 350 white-collar employees. 
5 
Looking at the 
composition of the labour force at the time of the research, one noted the 
rather high ratio of white-collar employees in relation to the workforce as 
a whole. Manual workers represented 70.3 per cent of the employees compared 
with 86.2 per cent at Firm A. We do not know of any general norm in this 
respect, except for two comparative studies with rather small samples 
(Dubois, 1980; Maurice, Sorge and Warner, 1980). With reference to these 
studies, and considering the technology used, it would appear that the 
staff complement was rather high at Firm B, without necessarily being 
exceptional. 
6 
This was nevertheless a major theme of criticism from manual 
workers' representatives who argued bluntly that there were too many managers 
and non-manual employees for the number of 'directly productive workers'. 
They saw it as evidence of mismanagement. Senior managers also felt that the 
proportion of staff employees was rather high, but they provided reasons to 
5. This distribution excludes middle and senior managers as well as a 
group of 25 apprentices. 
6. From their comparison of nine factories in three countries, Maurice et 
al. reported that 'in every branch of technology, Germany clearly has 
the largest works component. Britain comes second except in large batch/ 
mass production, and France usually has the smallest works' (1980: 66). 
For the type of technology roughly comparable to our cases (large batch/ 
mass production), the works' share of total personnel was 88.0 per cent in Germany, 76.0 per cent in France and 72.4 per cent in Britain. 
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explain the situation. 
The first line of explanation suggested by management was the 
complexity of the business, which dealt with a large range of products in 
different product markets. The Heat Transfer Division (I! TD), in particular, 
required a relatively high component of research and development. Also, 
the organisation in four divisions (since 1976) probably led to uneconomical 
use of administrative and clerical resources. In short, for objective 
reasons mentioned in Chapter 2, there were difficulties in managing the 
enterprise. Secondly, the gradual decline of the labour force through 
redundancies had the effect of distorting the ratio of white-collar 
employees in relation to manual labour, mainly because of the need to safe- 
guard the infrastructure of the firm. At an information meeting we attended 
in August 1979, a shop steward pointed out that manual workers were again 
affected more severely than the staff by a programme of voluntary redun- 
dancies in HTD. Essentially, the managing director replied: 'a dilemma 
to the Company was that when the order book was low it was the time to 
concentrate on sales and related engineering activities to plan for the 
future and thus cuts in staff were not as savage as the current market 
would suggest'.? In fact, we have some information that there were drastic 
cuts in white-collar as well as in manual jobs in 1980 and 1981, as part 
of the major restructuring operation which followed the purchase of the 
factory by another engineering group. 
At another level of analysis, and looking now exclusively at the 
composition of the manual workforce, there were also major differences 
between the two case studies. Of the 829 manual workers at Firm B, 49 per 
7. 'Notes of site information meeting held on Thursday 23 August 1979', 
p. 2. Minutes taken by a management representative. 
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cent were production workers, 24 per cent were classified as skilled 
workers, and 27 per cent worked as indirect labour. 
8 
At Firm A, 60.5 per 
cent of the manual employees were production workers, with 21 per cent of 
skilled operatives and 18.5 per cent of indirect workers. Obviously, there 
are difficulties in establishing such a classification, but these should 
not be exaggerated provided the same criteria are applied. Also, the 
differences may be partly accounted for by the distinct (although quite 
comparable) technology used. For instance, because of the importance of 
presswork at Firm B, there was a need for a larger toolroom. But this 
would not help'to explain the higher ratio of indirect labour in the same 
factory. We are inclined to consider another line of explanation. 
In this connection it is relevant to refer to an important study 
by Dubois and Monjardet on the division of labour in four British factories 
coupled with seven French factories in the clothing, food, chemical, and 
glass-fibre industries (Dubois and Monjardet, 1979; Dubois 1980 and 1982). 
Their main object of study was the influence of union action on work 
organisation. A major conclusion was that, mainly as a result of stronger 
workplace unionism, manning levels appeared to be generally higher in 
Britain (Dubois, 1980). Among manual workers this was noticeable in two 
ways. First, a higher proportion of the British manual workforce was employed 
in the ancillary shops ('service fonctionnels'), these providing a service 
to the shops on direct production. Secondly, even within those shops 
undertaking direct production ('les ateliers de production'), there was a 
higher ratio of ancillary workers in British factories. The main explanatory 
factor put forward by Dubois was the decomposition of labour. This concept 
B. This classification follows closely that of Batstone et al. (1977: XV). 
In short, indirect workers are those 'not directly involved in pro- 
duction tasks' and not classified as skilled labour (e. g. storemen, 
fork-lift drivers, labourers). 
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refers to the distinction between the main types of task, i. e. setting, 
direct production, quality control, maintenance, and internal transport. 
9 
Mainly because of union strength, British workers enforced a stricter 
demarcation between these types of task. The researchers also observed 
more worker resistance to labour mobility between the shops and to intensi- 
fication of effort in the same country (Dubois, 1980). 
At this stage, it seems reasonable to suggest that the higher ratio 
of skilled operatives and indirect labour at Firm B may also be indicative 
of a stronger decomposition of labour. This, in itself, may be a manifesta- 
tion of union strength and job control. That is a question worth pursuing. 
2.2 The Shop-Floor Organisation 
All the manual workers of this factory were members of one of the 
five recognised unions. The TGWU represented approximately 595 employees 
(72 per cent of all members) and the AUEW had about 155 members (19 per 
cent). The three other unions had a much smaller membership, and each had 
one accredited shop steward. While the TGWU applied a post-entry closed 
shop, the AUEW (in the toolroom) and the NUSMW enforced a pre-entry closed 
shop. 
The stronghold of the TGWU organisation was in the press shops and 
other sections related to presswork. Almost all manual workers assigned 
to these areas were members of the majority union. Indeed, apart from the 
toolroom representative, all the shop stewards working in the Presswork 
Division had TGWU credentials. In contrast, there was multiple unionism 
9. This notion of decomposition of labour was defined as follows: 'Par 
täches fondamentales, nous entendons 1'operation sur le produit, le 
contröle du produit ou de la machine, la manutention, le reglage, ou l'entretien des machines. Ces taches peuvent etre distributes A des 
postes differents ou concentrees sur un seul poste' (Dubois, 1978: 175). 
The decomposition of labour is one of the two main aspects of the 
technical division of labour, the other being task fragmentation ('parcellisation du travail'). 
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and shop steward cross-representation in most areas of the Beat Transfer 
Division. The TGWU, the AUEW, and the National Society of Metal Mechanics 
(NSMM), in this order, shared the membership. 
The strength of the AUEW was in the toolroom. It was a 'one union 
shop' and this cohesive group of craftsmen controlled the politics of the 
union, which also represented other skilled and production workers in the 
factory. The area of the tinsmiths was also a 'one union shop' and these 
39 skilled production workers were the only members of the NUSMW there. 
The NSMM membership had declined to about 35. This union had previously 
organised an important group of skilled production workers, the polishers. 
This department was phased down and finally closed during the 1970s. Their 
membership was now scattered throughout the factory. Finally, the fifth 
union, the EETPU, represented about half of the eighteen electricians, 
the others being members of either the AUEW or the TGWU. 
In 1979 there were forty-two TGWU and five AUEW shop stewards, out 
of a total of fifty accredited stewards in the factory. Hence the 
average constituency size was a low figure of seventeen members. Two 
obvious factors contributed to this. First, the minute books of the TGWU 
shop stewards committee show that the number of TGWU stewards remained very 
stable over the seventies, in spite of the decline in membership. Indeed, 
the number of TGWU shop stewards was exactly the same in December 1970. 
This suggests that size was not a major determinant of what represented a 
separate constituency. A second factor was that, until very recently, 
management did not intervene on such an issue, on the grounds that it was 
a matter for the trade unions. At the time of our observation, however, 
management felt that the pattern of shop steward representation was rather 
odd and that there were too many stewards in some areas. The personnel 
department raised the issue in the context of the 1980 annual negotiations. 
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A document sent to the joint shop stewards committee (JSSC) states: 
It should also be the aim of the Company and the Unions 
to jointly agree on a reduced number of representatives 
(i. e. to amalgamate areas of representation). This is not 
designed to cut across Union power or to be in any way 
detrimental ... And history is important here too - if a section reduces through time to only a few employees, 
then it cannot be sensible for them to retain a representa- 
tive in his own right. 
In fact, there was wide variation in the size of the various shop 
steward constituencies. For instance, there was only one shop steward 
representing the 93 toolmakers, and only one TGWU steward for the 43 
workers in the Heating Division. In contrast, there were two shop 
stewards elected by the eight toolsetters of Press shop no. 4, each of 
them working with half of the group, according to the alternate day- and 
night-shift (which was rotating every four weeks). 
In presenting the contours of this shop-floor organisation, it 
should be noted that the shop stewards were by no means the only manual 
workers' representatives in this factory. Overall, there was a deputy 
shop steward in about half of the constituencies. The latter were involved 
in shop-floor bargaining, usually in support of the accredited shop steward 
but often on their own, in larger sections. Moreover, in at least four 
large constituencies there were elected shop committees of more than two 
members. For instance, the toolroom shop committee consisted of six 
members (one of them being deputy shop steward) and the shop steward. All 
of them were elected annually, usually with opposing candidates, and they 
regularly met the shop management as a group for bargaining and consultation. 
Another strong committee was that of the tinsmiths, composed of the shop 
steward, the shop chairman and three committee members, all elected at the 
annual shop meeting of the NUSMW. Hence, in most large shop steward con- 
10. Document entitled '1980 Hourly Paid Negotiations', written by the 
personnel director, 20 December 1979, p. 4, section 4c. 
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stituencies, the shop steward was not the only elected workers' representative. 
This means that there was even more depth within the organisation than 
the small average size of the constituencies would suggest. This may be 
seen as evidence of the extensive nature of the workers' organisation 
studied. 
However, the factors discussed so far do not reach the heart of 
the explanation for the very large number of shop stewards and the 
determination of shop steward constituencies. The fundamental reason has 
to do with the pattern of shop steward representation at Firm B. As is 
usual in well organised engineering factories, the power basis of the 
shop stewards was the section, 'the basic unit of union organisation' 
(Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1977: 135). He or she was the delegate or 
the leader of a group of employees performing closely related operations, 
usually within a single shop. Looking at it more closely, however, it 
could be seen that shop steward constituencies were defined even more 
closely. There were often many constituencies within a single shop. In 
fact, what was meant by a shop steward 'section' in this factory could be 
understood by referring to the concept of decomposition of labour, which 
was introduced in the preceding section. The shop steward was the elected 
representative of a group of workers performing a specific type of task, 
usually within the same shop and on the same shift. The pattern of shop 
steward representation was based upon the distinction between different 
types of task. The constituencies were not defined on the basis of size 
of union membership; they followed the contours of the division of labour. 
This may be illustrated by describing the shop steward organisation 
in relation to the work process of Press shop no. 3. The union organisation 
developed along the distinction between the five types of task mentioned 
earlier. Obviously, one could find several occupational groups within the 
same type of task, and each group would tend to elect its own shop steward. 
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Press operators were the largest group of production workers. There were 
35 on each of the two rotating shifts, and each shift elected a shop 
steward and a deputy shop steward. There were also two smaller groups of 
direct production workers: those doing 'reclaim' work (eight of them in 
Press shop no. 3) and the 'scrap balers' (four of them in this shop and 
seven in the shop steward constituency). Each of these elected a shop 
steward and a deputy. The second'type of task was performed by the tool- 
setters. There were about twelve on each shift, and each of these two 
groups elected one shop steward. A third type of task dealt with ualit 
control. The table inspectors and the patrol inspectors were represented 
by one shop steward, while the viewers, who were in a lower job classifica- 
tion, elected their own shop steward. There were two important groups of 
craftsmen involved in different aspects of maintenance. The toolmakers 
were concerned with the making and the repairing of the tools. We noted 
earlier how they were strongly organised. Also, the maintenance fitters 
and the electricians were regularly involved in the maintenance of the 
presses, in accordance with the rules of their respective trades. Each of 
these were also represented by a different shop steward. The fifth type of 
task in the work process of Press shop no. 3 was internal transport. The 
fork-lift drivers working there were within the constituency of a TGWU 
shop steward representing all fork-lift drivers in the factory. 
It may be noted that those working on quality control, maintenance, 
and transport were not assigned specifically to Press shop no. 3. Neverthe- 
less, many of these employees took part in the work process there on a 
continuous or very regular basis. Our intention was to show that, on every 
shift, the members of not less than ten shop steward constituencies were or 
might be directly involved in the work process of this single shop. And their 
shop steward would be most likely to intervene if there was something really 
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contentious regarding work relations there. Such a pattern of shop steward 
representation obviously had many implications for job demarcations and 
job control more generally, many of which will be dealt with at a later 
stage. 
One could also object that the situation prevailing in Press shop 
no. 3 was not typical, considering that this was a rather large shop in 
which the division of labour was quite sophisticated. In fact, although 
the number of shop stewards involved in many other shops was much smaller, 
this did not appear to be related to a different pattern of shop steward 
representation but mainly to a less extensive decomposition of labour. 
Hence there was only one shop steward representing the 93 toolmakers, and 
the bulk of production and indirect labour working in Fitting and Welding 
no. 2 and the Copper Core section also had only one representative for 
each shop, in spite of multi-unionism. In all these workshops, manual 
labour were performing various tasks and operations, but the jobs were not 
divided according to the functions of setting, production and quality 
control, and almost all the employees in the shop were in the same job 
classification. 
3. CONCLUSION 
It was stressed that there were many similarities in the organisa- 
tional and institutional features of the enterprises under study. Nerverthe- 
less, a major theme of this study is the marked contrast in the way work 
relations developed in these two cases. This observation fits particularly 
well to the subject of shop-floor organisations. Hence, in both cases, 
all manual workers were members of trade unions who benefited from union 
security (closed shop and check-off arrangements). Shop stewards and senior 
shop stewards were recognised, were in regular contact with production and 
- 72 - 
labour managers, and were offered the usual facilities to represent their 
union basis. Yet, these two workers' organisations did not have the same 
impact at all on social relationships at the point of production. Indeed, 
even before the institutional reforms took place, the shop-floor organisation 
at Firm B showed a strength and character which never existed in the other 
engineering firm. While the reasons for such a contrast between the 
two workers' organisations remain complex, it is relevant to point to 
some of the determinants of their relative strength. 
The first is the long standing of the craft unions at Firm B. 
This factory is located in Coventry, a district with a high concentration 
in engineering and a reputation for robust workplace union organisations. 
There were many indications that the AUEW, the NUSMW and the NS} had 
established a long tradition of craft control, and this for quite a long 
time. At a later stage, in the 1960s, the press shop workers were mobilised 
on issues related to the effort bargain, under the leadership of progressive 
shop stewards. The TGWU, and especially the press operators' shop stewards, 
then took the lead within the shop steward organisation. By the late 
1960s, the press operators had imposed an appreciable degree of control 
over many aspects of their work. At the time of the research, the phase 
of militancy had been over for some years, and the shop-floor organisation 
as a whole was on the defensive. Nevertheless, the institutional basis 
of the workers' organisation as well as the progress made with regard to 
control over the work process were solidly established. There was no 
indication of such developments at Firm A. The latter had developed as a 
family-owned firm, which was non-federated, and the growth of an independent 
union organisation had come at a later stage. 
Secondly, we documented in some detail the composition of the workforce 
in both cases. It was shown that there was much less continuity of employ- 
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went at Firm A, especially in the foundry. In fact, there were different 
patterns of employment in the two factories, with no labour mobility and 
very little communication between the ethnic communities. The union 
organisation was particularly weak in the foundry, with only four shop 
stewards representing 240 employees. The majority of immigrant workers 
in this factory were little involved in union activities. Their social 
relations at work were based more on ethnic groups than on work group 
composition, and these relations were not related to the shop steward 
organisation. Consequently, there was little organised resistance to 
management but only very sporadic upsurges of discontent. 
A third explanatory factor, to which a great deal of attention was 
given in the preceding sector, is the pattern of shop steward representation. 
At Firm A, the shop stewards represented the members of their union, 
irrespective of the workers' position in the work process. The shop 
steward system of the other firm followed closely the decomposition of 
labour. While cross-representation was not consistent with the pattern 
prevailing at Firm A, it was very natural in the second pattern. Although 
we found little published material on this specific aspect, the pattern of 
shop steward representation at Firm B is thought to be more typical of the 
shop steward organisations in the engineering industry. And it certainly 
contributed to a stronger shop-floor organisation. 
It is also expected that such an organisation based on the section 
level (Firm B) might be more appropriate for the development and protection 
of job control. It provided a basis for the identification of common 
(though sectional) interests and for the application of collective sanctions 
at the point of production. Essentially, the value of such a system was 
the way it related to workers' specific contributions to the work process. 
On the other hand, such a system, following the lines of the division of 
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labour, might be more liable to generate sectionalism. But in any case, 
the actual impact of sectionalism on job control, as well as on trade union 
power more generally, will have to be studied carefully. 
If the shop-floor organisation at Firm B was somewhat characterised 
by sectionalism, segmentation was a major feature of the collective 
organisation in the other firm. While the workers' organisation at Firm A 
was not so closely tied to the division of labour, it nevertheless 
reproduced other lines of division within the workforce. Each union 
organised a particular segment of the workforce. In Factory II, relations 
had always been difficult between the GMWU and the TGWU, each having its 
basis in one of the two (non-rotating) shifts. Although they were of the 
same domestic union organisation, there was almost no communication 
between union members of the two plants, except for shop stewards sitting 
on the single JSSC. In the foundry, the high instability of labour was 
pointed out as a major cause for the lack of labour cohesiveness. Hence 
it is in this context of a segmented labour force working in integrated 
work processes that management strategy for the development of the labour 
relations institutions will be studied in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALISATION 
This chapter deals with changes in labour relations institutions. 
The concept of the institutionalisation of labour relations refers to 
the development of procedures and mechanisms for regulating conflict over 
work relations. In British workplaces, this social process was instigated 
mainly by management which sought to structure and centralise labour 
relations at the place of work. It consisted, in fact, of a reinforcement 
of the structure of joint regulation at the factory or company level. 
In the cases studied, changes in the institutional framework have 
been so striking over the last decade that it is interesting to research 
into their impact on control in the workplace. Such a process must be 
studied over a significant period of time. Although the observation was 
carried out at the end of the 1970s, it is nevertheless possible, using 
various sources, to pursue these developments over a period of about ten 
years in both cases. The first section of this chapter deals with develop- 
ments which occurred at Firm A from the early 1970s until the first 
months of 1980. The second section, a study of the reforms at Firm B, 
covers the period from the late 1960s to the sale of the company in 
August 1980. A third section puts forward a comparison of the patterns 
observed in the two firms. 
1. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AT FIRM A 
1.1 Labour Relations Problems and CIR Recommendations 
The reference to the Commission on Industrial Relations for an 
investigation in August 1972 was in itself indicative of the labour relations 
problems faced by the company. Indeed, the Commission reported major 
defects in the conduct of labour relations in both plants. One of the most 
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fundamental problem areas was the payment systems. The large group of 
machine operatives was producing under a piecework scheme which had been 
in existence for about twenty years at the time of the Commission's report 
in 1973. The CIR observed that 
the absence of proper work measurement and effective 
monitoring by management encourages the growth of shop- 
floor bargaining in a piecemeal manner as settlement 
on one job upsets existing differentials with others, 
creating pressure for adjustments to restore them. (para 63) 
It also found that variation in piecework earnings for different jobs in 
the machine shops was considerable and that 'employees are dissatisfied 
with unexplained earnings differentials; management is dissatisfied with 
wage drift and its effect on costs' (para 67). 
Although the Commission found a large number of different basic 
rates for skilled workers (fifteen at Factory II and ten at Factory I), 
the payment systems covering the production workers in the foundry were 
the most striking for their fragmentation and complexity: 
Semi-skilled employees who form the majority at the 
foundry are paid a basic rate plus incentive payments 
of various kinds. 14 different rates apply to the 
130 men in this category and four rates to the 35 
women. On top of this, 12 different incentive schemes 
apply to the men and four to the women. (para 69) 
The whole system of remuneration was therefore in decay since fragmented 
bargaining generated friction between craftsmen and production workers 
about differentials. Consequently, there was little surprise in the 
finding of the Commission that 26 of the 29 recorded disputes during the 
period from December 1971 to December 1972 directly concerned pay 
(paras 73-76). 
Inter-union rivalry was also seen as one of the major industrial 
relations difficulties for management. This tradition of rivalry, 
especially between the GMWU and the TGWU, was underlined in Chapter 3. The 
CIR considered the fact that the manual unions lacked any joint committee, 
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and negotiated separately with management, as a serious impediment on the 
development of an adequate framework to deal with labour relations. 
It was typical of the general approach of the CIR that they put 
greatest emphasis on structural or institutional problems (Purcell, 1979a: 
8). The Commission reported that its enquiries 
revealed a serious absence in the company of jointly- 
agreed and effective institutions and procedures through 
which industrial relations can be conducted. There is no 
joint negotiating machinery on which all the recognised 
unions are represented, the former joint consultative 
committee has lapsed and the existing disputes procedure 
covering the majority of works employees is not 
effective. (para 80) 
A disputes procedure, including a status quo clause, had been jointly 
agreed by the company and the GMWU and the TGWU in March 1972. The CIR 
found that it was often ignored and short-circuited, however, sanctions 
being regularly applied before the procedure had been exhausted. Lack 
of authority on the part of foremen and superintendents also contributed 
to produce this type of situation. It was observed that 'employees are 
dissatisfied with their inability to get answers to complaints or 
grievances from junior management and some expressed the view that the 
only way to get management to take action was to "black" a job or threaten 
industrial action' (para 91). The personnel director also argued in 
interview that, in the early 1970s, inconsistent and uncoordinated decision- 
making by foremen and superintendents was a source of disputes. 
I 
Between January 1969 and December 1971, the company experienced 
three strikes causing a total loss of about 3,900 working days of 
production (CIR, 1973: 16). This could not be considered as a dramatic 
record. However, the CIR reported that the parties had been involved in 
a considerable number of disputes during 1972. Various sanctions, such as 
1. Interview, 21 December 1978. In 1972 he was personnel and industrial 
relations manager. 
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overtime bans, work-to-rules and blacking, had disrupted production, 
especially during the protracted wage negotiation. 
Labour relations problems were likely to affect the reliability of 
Firm A in supplying its customers. It was underlined that because of the 
company's position in the product market and the interdependence between 
the various operations, it was highly vulnerable to industrial action. 
Hence labour relations were seen as a serious problem because they contri- 
buted significantly to the poor financial record of the company. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that the firm reported its worst financial 
results of the decade in 1971 (losses corresponding to 8.3 per cent of 
the turnover) and 1972 (losses corresponding to 6.9 per cent of the 
turnover). It was also pointed out that production was very labour 
intensive. Company sources show that the cost of 'total wages and 
salaries' represented 53 per cent of the value of the turnover in 1977-8. 
In line with the general approach of the Donovan Commission and the 
Commission on Industrial Relations, the CIR's recommendations for this 
company gave management the primary responsibility for the reform. It 
recommended a major revision of the payment systems, insisting 'that 
the main need is for a readily understandable payment system in the machine 
shop which relates effort, skill and pay in an agreed manner' (para 95). 
The Commission made few specific recommendations on this matter, however, 
apart from one advocating the establishment of a work study department. 
The main body of recommendations was relevant to the need to 
reform the structure of labour relations. Hence it stressed that 'the 
parties' first priority must be the establishment of joint negotiating 
machinery for manual employees' (para 86). Purcell wrote that this usually 
was 'the central recommendation' of the CIR which 'appeared to have an 
almost standard list of recommendations' (1979a: 7-8). The Commission also 
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suggested the setting up of a joint consultative machinery. The establish- 
ment of these procedures for joint regulation required some preliminary 
conditions with regard to union representation. Hence the CIR recommended 
the creation of a joint shop stewards' committee. It also encouraged a 
joint review of the disputes procedure, stressing the need for something 
more specific on the number of stages, the time limits, and the people 
to be involved at every stage (paras 89-92). 
1.2 Changes in the Institutional Framework 
During the period which followed the CIR inquiry, the manual workers 
went on strike on two occasions. The first involved the GMWU members of 
both plants and lasted about two weeks. The'most important strike of the 
decade occurred in September 1974 when all the GMWU and TGWU members of 
both plants struck for three and a half weeks. The strike originated in 
a succession of minor disputes, one of them concerning a trade union 
claim for the payment of a few fork-lift drivers and packers who had been 
laid off. According to managers, the rank-and-file were applying 
'restrictive practices'. The company adopted a very tough line and union 
resistance finally came to an end when the members voted overwhelmingly 
to return to work, without any concession on the part of the company, 
following the recommendation of their full-time officials. 
2 
Over the 
following years the impact of this strike on the attitudes of the parties 
and the balance of power was considerable. Indeed, the company did not 
experience any other strike involving a significant group of workers and 
lasting for more than one day until the strike by AUEW and EETPU members 
during our fieldwork in 1979. The situation was therefore favourable for 
management to take the lead and implement institutional reform. 
2. Formal interviews with industrial relations officer (18 November 1978), 
personnel director (21 December 1978), and a group of three shop 
stewards (15 January 1979). 
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The negotiation of major changes in the machinery of labour relations 
proceeded at a steady pace from late 1974 until 1977. The first major 
step forward was the creation in 1974 of a joint shop stewards' committee 
(JSSC) consisting of all the manual shop stewards from both plants. Manage- 
ment insisted on the creation of this committee. Considering the long 
tradition of union rivalry, both sides accepted that this was an essential 
development if a more coherent labour relations framework was going to 
be established. 
The central piece of regulation in this respect took the form of 
a comprehensive procedural agreement signed by the full-time officials and 
senior shop stewards of the four manual unions and management representatives 
in October 1975. This agreement defined the objectives, composition and 
procedures of a works council, which was the type of joint negotiating 
and consultative machinery recommended by the CIR. This works council was 
composed of five shop stewards (two GMWU representatives and one from 
each of the other unions) and management representatives. It has met 
regularly on a monthly basis since its inception in October 1975, under 
the chairmanship of the personnel director. A JSSC meeting was held 
regularly about one week prior to the works council meeting, and in 
practice the larger shop steward body gave a mandate to its representatives 
concerning each of the large number of issues on the agenda of the joint 
committee. 
The content of the procedural agreement was not limited to the 
creation of the works council. It elaborated a four-stage grievance 
procedure, the works council being the final stage of the domestic procedure. 
It also contained a management rights and status quo clause which set the 
pattern of labour relations in these terms: 
The Unions recognize the Management's responsibility for 
efficient planning, organisation and management of the 
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operations of the Company except insofar as this responsi- 
bility is qualified by the terms of this agreement. 
The Management agree to refrain from implementing 
Management decisions affecting employees until mutual 
agreement has been reached or týe procedure laid down 
in this agreement is exhausted. 
In the meantime, the parties had reached an agreement on a new 
payment by results system for production workers. The principles and the 
terms of this scheme were defined in a 22-page agreement between the 
company and the GMWU, TGWU and AUEW. This payment system, which was still 
in operation at the time of the research, was based upon the determination 
of a 'standard minute value'. This crucial change in wage determination 
was dependent upon the introduction of work study on a large scale 
within the company. A great deal of this work measurement took place 
during 1974, and most of the production workers were operating under the 
scheme by July 1976.4 It is worth underlining that the shop stewards 
were very involved in the painstaking task of negotiating the large 
number of standard times. As regards the procedure adopted: 
The value will be issued to the operator who will discuss 
it with his steward. The operator and a single steward 
will then discuss the value with the Work Study Engineer 
and present specific reasons if the value is rejected. ... A Joint Shop Stewards Committee will be held on 
24th November for the specific purpose of ratifying 
the values issued. Subsequently there will ýe a Works 
Council meeting concerning the same subject. 
Another major step forward in the institutionalisation of labour 
relations was the annual negotiation of a comprehensive pay settlement 
3. Procedural agreement, October 1975, section one. 
4. It is interesting to note that between the very fragmented piecework 
schemes referred to earlier and the implementation of this scheme, 
they operated for a short period under a scheme called 'average 
earnings system'. Efforts were then made by management to reduce wage 
drift and regain some control over remuneration; it was a type of 'agreed daywork'. It did not significantly reduce fragmented 
bargaining and the number of anomalies and 'red circle' jobs. More 
importantly for management, it considerably reduced productivity. 
5. Minutes of the works council meeting, November 1975. 
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covering all the manual workers of both plants. Having jointly established 
a comprehensive wage structure, they negotiated annually an increase on the 
basic rates. But the range of bargaining was much broader and, for 
instance, the 1978 collective agreement covered issues such as premium 
rates (for shift and overtime work), the payment by results system, payment 
of apprentices, lay-off pay, holidays (duration and payment), regulations 
on overtime, and flexibility of labour. 
It is interesting to point out that while management would have 
preferred to conduct these annual negotiations with the five senior 
delegates on the works council (in conformity with the 1975 procedural 
agreement), so far it was forced to negotiate with the sixteen members of 
the JSSC. The shop stewards resisted such a delegation of their powers to 
a more central shop steward body for the negotiation of pay and fringe 
benefits. This was an instance of resistance to institutionalisation. 
The forces of sectionalism and the diverging interests between different 
segments of the workforce also contributed to the development of a trend 
which went against centralisation and institutionalisation. This process 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Attention has been concentrated on the most important developments 
in joint regulation. On many issues, however, management felt that it 
could elaborate its policies unilaterally, without involving the lengthy 
process of bargaining with a more or less coordinated trade union body. 
For instance, the company personnel department issued some policy state- 
ments on health and safety (May 1975), training (January 1976), internal 
recruitment (June 1977), and discipline (early 1977). On the last issue, 
the preamble of the 'code of conduct', which became an integral part of 
the individual contract of employment, says that 'the Company has now 
brought together its policies and procedures concerning discipline at work 
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and developed an overall disciplinary policy ... this policy merely 
represents the best practices already established in our plants'. 
6 
A 
four-stage procedure was established for the application of disciplinary 
action: the foremen could not apply any of the formal disciplinary 
sanctions, and suspension and dismissal could only be imposed by two 
directors including the personnel director. 
Another area in which labour relations became more formalised 
during this period is union security and facilities for shop stewards. One 
of management's priorities in this matter was the agreement on the 
respective spheres of union representation (i. e. unions' jurisdiction). 
They had discussed the issue at the works council from the August 1976 
meeting, and they finally reached an agreement as part of the 1978 
collective agreement. In order to achieve such an agreement, management 
was prepared to formalise the post-entry closed shop. 
7 
Hence the agreement 
stipulates that 'all parties agree that post entry Union Membership Agree- 
ments will become a condition of employment when a sphere of influence 
agreement is agreed'. 
8 
In 1973, only GMWU members were paying their 
subscriptions by check-off. At the time of the fieldwork, only the TGWU 
members were refusing these facilities offered by the company. 
The CIR reported in 1973 that no serious problems had arisen on 
the question of facilities for shop stewards (para 34). Nevertheless, the 
parties to the 1975 procedural agreement formalised their relations on 
these matters, following the pattern in the industry. The question of 
payment for shop stewards and safety representatives, however, had been a 
6. Management document, 1977. 
7. An informal post-entry closed shop had previously been implemented by 
the unions on a more or less strict basis. 
8.1978 collective agreement, section three. 
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subject of contention for years. 
9 
During this protracted period of 
negotiation, they had three works conferences on this matter, the last 
one in December 1979 on the basis of a management 'draft agreement', without 
reaching an agreement. It should be pointed out, however, that most 
shop stewards and rank-and-file felt that management behaviour was generally 
fair on this matter. 
In many respects the structural reform has therefore been carried 
out along the lines of the CIR recommendations. However, it should be 
stressed that negotiation about the structural framework remains a 
continuous process: it is never finally stabilised. Hence, in June 1979 
management submitted a document to the shop stewards entitled 'Proposals 
for streamlining procedure agreement'. It pointed out that the role of the 
works council 'has been usurped by the JSSC'. Management argued that 'the 
taking up of a role by the JSSC for which it was not designed has down- 
graded the functions of the works council, and created a negotiating body 
(the JSSC) which is incompatible with speedy resolution of grievances'. 
10 
This dissatisfaction was shared by the AUEW and the EETPU because these 
two unions representing the skilled workers were regularly outvoted on 
the JSSC. A works conference involving management and the skilled unions 
was held specifically to discuss this matter in November 1979. 
These events do not mean that management had modified its strategy 
with regard to the institutional framework: it was rather aiming at going 
further. Hence management wished to strengthen the position of the senior 
shop stewards (an objective shared by management at Firm B) and to reinforce 
the autonomy of the union representatives on the works council (in their 
relations with the broad JSSC), in order to negotiate with such a central 
9. It had been on the agenda of the works council from October 1976 to 
the last meeting we attended in December 1979. 
10. Management document, June 1979, p. 1. 
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shop steward body. 
It is important to stress that the whole structure of labour 
relations was developed at the level of the company. As regards labour 
relations institutions, the two factories were totally integrated. There 
were practical reasons for this, but it was also indicative of management's 
labour relations strategies. First, as was described in Chapter 2, the 
work process of the two factories was highly integrated, from core-making 
in the foundry to final grinding and packing in the machine shops. Con- 
sidering that they could not accumulate a stock of castings from the 
foundry, and that they operated under tight schedules of production, the 
continuity of production was crucial. And the pouring tracks of the 
foundry were probably the area most sensitive to industrial action. There 
was therefore a built-in process towards work discipline, and the task of 
monitoring the relations of production could be better pursued for the 
company as a whole. 
A second factor worth considering here is the segmentation within 
the workforce, which was stressed in Chapter 3. The workers' communities 
of the two factories were distant. Workers were divided in relation to 
their contribution to the work process, and this division was exacerbated 
by stratification on ethnic grounds. The formal unification within a 
single domestic union organisation and the grouping of all shop stewards 
within the JSSC could not really hide, or even attenuate, the effects of 
these objective sources of division. Therefore, in a context where a 
highly segmented workforce was involved in a highly integrated work process, 
the centralisation of labour relations at company level certainly was 
sound managerial strategy. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AT FIRM B 
2.1 Labour Relations Crisis 
In order to understand the developments of the last decade, it is 
necessary to look back to the labour relations context of the sixties. 
In the early 1960s, the Canley factory was similar to what has been 
observed in 1979-80. However, during the sixties a much larger workforce 
was employed in this factory, which was then producing almost exclusively 
for the motor industry. The production was centred upon presswork, the 
main activity in shops no. 1, no. 3 and no. 4. There were also two other 
strategic groups of skilled production workers, i. e. the tinsmiths and 
the NSNM members working in the polishing shop above Press shop no. 4. 
By the mid-1960s, the expansion of the British motor industry had 
begun to falter as the industry was facing growing competition in overseas 
markets. Firm B, which was highly dependent upon these enterprises, began 
to face serious financial problems for which the parent group was showing 
great concern. Hence, in the 1967 Annual Report of the group, the chairman 
reported that the firm under study was 
badly hit both by the 1966 deflationary measures and by 
industrial unrest in the motor industry. These problems 
have persisted throughout 1967, with unpalatable effect 
on the company's operations. I am glad, however, to be 
able to report that this has to some extent been mitigated 
by successful efforts to increase efficiency. These 
efforts are being intensified. 
There is some evidence that the group was following the activities of 
Firm B more closely over this period. Indeed, in its Annual Report for 
the period ending September 1970, the chairman of the group wrote, with 
reference to Firm B, that 'some two years ago a new management team was 
introduced with the objective of restoring profits to an acceptable level. 
A number of changes was necessary, and it was expected that to complete 
the programme would take about two years. ' 
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Such a significant increase in efficiency could hardly be expected 
from the two large groups of skilled production workers to whom reference 
was made above. The market was rapidly shifting away from the production 
of these groups of craftsmen. Not only were they reluctant to accept 
technological innovation but they vigorously preserved a high degree of 
craft control. Both sections were operating under a traditional piecework 
scheme (with no stop-watch and no work measurement) and had collective 
control over speeding-up. The number of polishers declined drastically 
and this department was wound up in the mid-1970s. Of the 200 tinsmiths 
employed at Firm B in 1959, there were 37 jobs left when the fieldwork 
was conducted. 
Consequently, the major improvements in productivity and profita- 
bility for which the new management team was mandated had to come from 
presswork. Attention had to focus on the large group of press operators 
who were then very central with regard to the work process and the company 
position in the product market. It was underlined in Chapter 2 that the 
work process of the press shops put great pressure on management control. 
It necessitated frequent reorganisation of the operations (e. g. assignment 
of labour, work allocation) and caused almost continual bargaining over 
piecework standards, which itself contributed to the development of a 
robust shop-floor organisation. There is strong evidence that during the 
late sixties the management resolutely tried to confront these problems. 
Two elements of this strategy can be pointed out. 
First, there is some evidence that management favoured more 
authoritarian labour supervision. With the financial problems and more 
limited margins in their relations with their customers, management 
realised that some instances of job control, to some degree tolerable 
when they developed during the expansion period, now had to be resisted. 
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And getting rid of 'restrictive practices' could necessitate the use of 
disciplinary power. The management team of the late sixties (a period 
referred to as the 'old days') was perceived by most workers as autocratic. 
The following observation of the TGWU convener was corroborated by many 
workers we talked to: 
It was a very authoritarian management who didn't consult 
before. They implemented their policies and we had to 
fight back, to react when they were wrong. Wel1ere 
treated like second-class citizens, or rebels. 
In discussing the performance of the managing director who was brought in 
to increase efficiency in the late sixties, a production manager in the 
press shops observed that 'his aim was good, but he had one problem: he 
did not know how to handle the men. It developed into confrontation 
with the shop stewards. '12 
The second change, which was more important in its implications, 
was the reform of the piecework scheme. In an effort to reduce piecework 
bargaining, management proposed to change the traditional system of 
money piecework to a standard time system based on work study. The new 
scheme, referred to as the 'press shops productivity deal', was supposed 
to limit piecework bargaining to a minimum, since money would only be 
negotiated on the occasion of periodical increases on the conversion 
factor. And these negotiations would involve shop stewards, not the 
operators. Management's objectives were to regain some control over 
piecework and to contain wage drift. Since a large proportion of all 
manual workers on daywork were then paid under a grading scale based on 
press operators' average piecework earnings (APE), any improvement in 
this respect would have a secondary effect in the stabilisation of labour 
costs. The proposal was rejected by the press operators. Management put 
11. Formal interview, 25 October 1979. 
12. Formal interview, 7 May 1980. 
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it through formal procedure in late 1967 and it went to Central Conference 
at York. 
In fact, the point of contention concerned the rate of effort and 
pay while a standard was in dispute. When there was a dispute on a 
piecework price, operators were paid on a daywork basis of 6s. per hour 
plus make-up. There is some evidence that this practice was imposed by 
the collective organisation in the early sixties. An entry of the TGWU 
press operators stewards' shift book for July 1962 reads: 
On Friday a lot of the lads were talking about stopping. 
I held a meeting tonight to get clear as to what we are 
actually doing. First 6/- to be earned in every 
operating hour, this doesn't include breaks. The 
go-slow is also used on all studies (this was voted for). 
I discovered that some operators earned more than 6/- 
last night and I warned them that if ayý more of this 
goes on I will name the men concerned. 
Nevertheless, in August or September 1963 management formally agreed to 
this procedure called the 'six bob agreement'. As it worked, the level 
of effort offered in such a situation often consisted in a go-slow, which 
forced management to concede prices which allowed for earnings well 
above average in engineering. The chairman of the Local Conference held 
in Coventry in October 1967 noted that 
it was part of the original agreement that the Company 
was entitled to receive from the operators normal working 
effort in return for this 6/- payment. As we know and 
as we have had cause to remind you on numerous occasions as 
a Union all too often, this means that if the operator 
wishes to extract a better price than is justified out of 
the Company, he merely sits back on the job and works it 
at 6/- an hour, hoping that eventually Management may be 
persuaded to improve the price even though no improve- 
13. Dated 9 July 1962; also quoted in Evans (1980: 14). 
I, 
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went is really justified. That would be bad enough, but, 
of course, the man does not even give normally anyth}Rg 
like 61- worth of effort in return for the 6/- rate. 
Many formal interviews with production managers, work study engineers 
and shop stewards who were involved in the press shops in this period 
confirmed that the press operators were then applying extreme pressure on 
management. At times management reacted by excessive supervision, 
disciplinary action and, in a few cases, dismissals. This contributed 
farther to antagonistic relationships at the point of production. 
The issue of the new piecework scheme was taken to Central Conference 
by the company, and it was then referred back for factory settlement. In 
the meantime, the press shops' shop stewards mobilised against the proposed 
scheme. In a leaflet issued to press operators, the press shops' stewards 
argued: 
Why must we fight this attempt? At present we can usually 
get the prices we want, within reason. We don't have to 
kill ourselves working to the offered price, and we don't 
have to go outside the gate to fight the management. And 15 
we have been able to get wage rises, even during a wage freeze. 
The leaflet then took position against strike action, but for resistance 
to the new scheme in taking advantage of the control they had over their 
work. It went on: 'You may be told that the only way is to go on strike. 
... This is just falling into the Company's trap. The best way to fight 
is the traditional method of working normally. If the Company then tries 
14. Extract from the minutes of the Local Conference held on 25 October 
. 
1967. The chairman was director of the Coventry and District 
Engineering Employers' Association. The terms of reference were to 
discuss the operation of the present Press Shop incentive scheme 
and the Company's proposals for a suitable alternative system of 
payment'. 
15. 'A Message From Your Stewards, Past and Present', undated. The 
leaflet was probably issued late in 1967. 
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to cut our wages to day rates, we will just have to work like day workers. ' 
in spite of the operators' resistance, the company showed its deter- 
mination to implement the new procedure for dealing with disputed jobs. 
But the men resented this, as did the unions, and so at a 
mass meeting it was decided to restrict earnings, i. e-. to 
'go-slow' in terms of piecework. Two men were then dis- 
missed for insufficient effort. Since they had only been 
implementing joint union policy, the JSSC agreed that al 16 
employees should withdraw their labour. (Monk, 1969: 38) 
After this strike had lasted nine days in January 1968, 'management 
offered to reinstate the dismissed men on condition that the unions would 
lift the go-slow'. 
The parties finally agreed to a new press shop incentive scheme 
on 10 February 1968. The operators formally renounced the 6/- agreement. 
Clause 3.13 of the new agreement stipulated that 'it is the spirit and 
intention of operating personnel and Management throughout this Agreement 
to maintain the traditional incentive level of production during nego- 
tiations'. However, in the context described here, it is not surprising 
that the application of the new piecework scheme, on which management had 
insisted so much, proved to be a nightmare (Evans, 1980: 17-20). 
17 The 
mechanisms relating to disputed jobs remained the focus of the struggle 
for control, the new scheme being seen by press operators and shop stewards 
as a challenge to the long-standing right to mutuality. In short, the 
implementation of the scheme in Press shops nos. 3 and 4, without the support 
16.. Monk's account of these events was based on interviews with two 
shop stewards and the TGWU branch secretary, which were conducted 
in May 1969. This was done for an MA dissertation at Warwick. 
17. Steve Evans had worked for seven years as a press operator in this 
factory, five of these as a TGWU shop steward, before writing an 
MA dissertation on labour relations at Firm B. I had the opportunity 
to discuss many questions raised in my dissertation with him, a friend 
with information and insight into labour relations. 
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of the operators, intensified conflict on the shop-floor. 
Before studying the ultimate confrontation in the press shops 
(late in 1969), it is relevant to mention an important factor which was 
concomitant to this combative shop-floor resistance of the late sixties. 
A group of militant TGWU shop stewards was then taking the leadership in 
the press shops and, at a later stage, within the whole TGWU shop steward 
organisation. The basis of this group was in the permanent night-shift 
of the press shops. In these areas, labour discontent with management 
action was emphasised by poor communications within the domestic union 
organisation and little involvement with middle and senior management. This 
opposition group within the shop-floor organisation became active in 1968-9 
in trying to get rid of the very moderate and 'management oriented' TGWU 
senior shop steward who was also chairman of the JSSC. In order to take 
control of the shop steward organisation, the militant group had to 
successfully oppose the TGWU convenor who retained the support of the 
representatives of the craft unions (AUEW, NUSMW and NSMM) on the JSSC. 
18 
In the transcript of an interview conducted by Monk in May 1969 with this 
former TGWU convenor who was under pressure one reads: 
There is a current attempt at character assassination, 
because of a group of left-wing militants on the night 
shift who are trying to get rid of the Convenor. He 
says he's fighting two battles all the time, against 
management and men. (Monk, 1969: 7) 
This finally led to the break-up of the JSSC following the dissension of 
press operators over two specific 'productivity measures' negotiated by 
the, JSSC at factory level. By October 1969 the 'right-wing' convenor had 
18. For a comprehensive analysis of this episode, see Evans (1980: 20-26). 
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lost the battle and the leader of the militant group was elected; the 
latter was still convenor at the end of our fieldwork. 
So far, the context and the major issues of the labour relations 
crisis of the late sixties have been studied in some detail. It came to 
a point where a major clash was inevitable. A period of ten months up to 
12 November 1969 could be classified as a running-up period to this 
ultimate confrontation. Table 4.1 provides an account of the nature of 
the issues resulting in stoppages, the scale of the disruption and its 
location. Such a high figure of recorded stoppages is indicative of very 
antagonistic relationships on the shop-floor. Our information shows that 
25 of the 99 stoppages were of less than one hour's duration. Twenty-nine 
lasted between one and four hours, and 45 extended to more than four hours 
(many of them on more than one shift). 
19 As management pointed out, 'it 
cannot be over emphasized that the effect of the disruption to production 
and therefore sales of the hours lost through stoppages is far more than 
the direct proportion of hours clocked'. 
20 
Table 4.1 shows clearly that Press shop no. 1 was the most 
dramatically affected section, while the largest section (Press shop no. 3) 
was relatively free of these unofficial strikes (and surprisingly exempt 
from stoppages over the issue of standard quantity). 
21 
The table also shows 
that more than half of the stoppages (and 46 per cent of the production 
19. All these data are collected from a management document in which all 
stoppages were registered during this period of crisis. This 
important document, which provides detailed supporting information 
on many other aspects, is hereafter referred to as the Company dossier 
on industrial relations in the press shops, 1969-1970. 
20. Introduction to the same document, p. 2. 
21. One should not conclude, however, that there was a lack of solidarity 
and resistance in Press shop no. 3. These operators were involved in 
the largest number of cases of 'sympathy action' and also in eight out 
of the ten stoppages by more than one section. 
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hours lost) originated in disputes over standard quantity. More generally, 
most issues leading to stoppages had to do with the effort bargain. 
It was over such an issue that the six-week strike erupted on 
12 November 1969 when seven men working on line 6 in Press shop no. 3 were 
'sent home for refusing to work at traditional levels of incentive'. 
22 
During the following shifts, the press operators of the other shops and most 
TGWU members walked out in support. After unsuccessful attempts to find a 
compromise with management, 190 press operators decided to carry on the 
strike for an unlimited period. 
23 
The crisis had now reached its ultimate 
point, a rupture having the impact of what Purcell referred to as a 'trauma' 
(1979a: 15). 
Again, the central issue was the minimum level of output which could 
be tolerated while the piecework standard was in dispute. The operators 
were fighting for the 'right to work at standard' (i. e. 100R), a practice 
putting great pressure on management to come to terms with the operators. 
Beyond that, however, it was seen by many as a 'make or break' struggle 
between management and the press operators. It was also the acid test of 
the support for the 'left-wing' TGWU convenor who had just been elected. 
In this respect it should be borne in mind that the other unions did not 
give any support to what they referred to as an 'unofficial strike'. 
The heavy costs of the strike on both sides forced them to resume 
production, management announcing that 'they were prepared to "turn a 
blind eye" to "working to standard" if they would return to work pending 
22. Company dossier on industrial relations, op. cit., p. 11. 
23. The press operators of the Fabricated brake shoe section refused 
to carry on the struggle. Evans (1980: 27) explains how it was agreed 
within the union ranks that ancillary workers (TGti'U) should return 
to work, mainly for strategic reasons. Many of them were laid off. 
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a further works conference' (Evans, 1980: 27). In the short term, the long 
strike had not resolved the labour relations crisis. The issue went 
through procedure on the basis of an employer's reference on the interpreta- 
tion of clause 3.13 of the piecework scheme stipulating that operators 
should maintain 'the traditional incentive level of production' during 
negotiations concerning a disputed standard rate of production. It went up 
to York, where it was agreed to hold a Composite Conference at which 
national officials and domestic representatives of both sides were involved 
in trying to settle the dispute. 
24 This conference, held on 10 March 1970, 
consisted of a very long session of negotiation between nine employers' 
representatives and twelve union representatives. The discussion, reported 
in 54 pages of proceedings, focused on crucial issues of shop-floor control, 
such as worker control over the pace of work and the lowest level of 
effort which may be tolerable while a piecework standard is in dispute. 
The parties finally reached an agreement stating that 'if the standard 
time offered is not accepted the operator will continue to perform the 
operation ... at 135 R performance rating'. 
25 The agreement also con- 
tained improvements on other aspects of the press shop incentive scheme, 
such as the conversion factor and payments for waiting time and work other 
than press operating. Even though any judgment on this matter is likely to 
be subjective, it is relevant to note that people interviewed, from both 
24. Hyman referred to this Composite Conference held at Firm B, as well 
as to the holiday claim put through procedure by the TGWU, in 
Disputes Procedure in Action (1972: 126-8,150). He defined a 
Composite Conference as 'a rare arrangement combining features of 
Works, Local and Central Conferences; it is held at the works, is 
attended by national and local Union and Employers' officials as well 
as domestic management and shop stewards, and is formally recorded' 
(1972: 50). I am very grateful to Richard Hyman who sent me some 
documentary material he collected in connection with these disputes. 
He also provided many insights and thoughtful suggestions for 
improving this chapter, as well as others. 
25. Quoted from the agreement reached at the Composite Conference and 
signed by shop stewards and senior managers on 15 April 1970. 
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sides, thought that the press operators had had the best of this trial of 
strength. 
In the meantime, the press operators were still applying a range 
of sanctions. Hence, from the return to work late in December 1969 to 
the Composite Conference held on 10 March 1970, there were 22 stoppages. 
26 
Moreover, the TGWU went through formal procedure with a claim for payment 
of average earnings during holidays. This specific 'holiday claim' was 
studied by Hyman (1972: 126-8). At the Works Conference, the chairman 
referred to the 'concern felt by the Company about the number of sanctions 
currently being applied generally and more specifically with regard to 
the written threat by the stewards to withdraw labour every Wednesday, 
(day and night shift) until the holiday claim was satisfied'. 
27 In fact, 
the TGWU members followed up their written threat by taking strike action 
on Wednesdays in support of their claim. The issue went up to Central 
Conference where it was referred for domestic discussion, and eventually 
allowed to drop. Hyman concluded that this claim illustrated the 'tactical 
use of procedure'. Although it represented a genuine grievance, 
it appears that the reference entered procedure when it did 
as part of a strategy to exert maximum pressure while 
negotiations took place on the piecework agreement. Once 
the latter dispute was resolved at the Composite Conference 
- on terms which permitted a substantial increase in piece- 
work earnings - the impetus behind the claim was dissipated. 
(1972: 128) 
Nevertheless, the Composite Conference did not put an end to open 
conflict in this factory. According to management, 'the effect of the 
composite settlement was to make a complete round of wage negotiations 
26. Company dossier on industrial relations, op. cit., p. 1. 
27. Minutes of the Works Conference held on 24 February 1970, p. 2. 
This written threat of industrial action, a typewritten document, 
was signed by the TGWU convenor on 12 February 1970. 
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necessary'. 
28 
This led to many stoppages by skilled and indirect workers, 
some of which forced lay-offs of considerable scale. Hence, during the 
six-month period which followed the March settlement, management recorded 
27 stoppages. The most important of these was the five-day strike by 
millwrights (maintenance) in April 1970, during which all the press operators 
and ancillary workers in the press shops were laid off. 
Later in 1970 the managing director resigned (or was forced to do 
so) and his successor came from another of the group's subsidiaries. 
Indeed, in the 1970 Annual Report of the group it is revealed that the 
objective of increasing efficiency and profitability, which had been set 
three years earlier, had not been achieved. And this was pointed out as 
'the major factor in the Group's lower profit last year'. The very future 
of Firm B was then considered and 'following certain changes and assurances, 
the Board has agreed that Firm B should continue in operation. Its future, 
however, must depend on the success of the combined efforts to place it 
on a profitable basis'. 
In this section, we have documented the state of labour relations 
in this factory during the 1960s, especially in the large press shops. 
It was felt relevant to study this period in some detail, notably to show 
the extent of the crisis, before looking at the reform of labour relations 
and its actual impact. This was also presented as evidence of the strength 
of the shop-floor organisation and of the considerable degree of control 
the press operators had over their work. The following section looks more 
specifically at the substantial degree of job control established in the 
press shops before the institutional reform of labour relations occurred. 
28. Company dossier on industrial relations, op. cit., p. 1. 
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2.2 Job Control before the Reform 
In fact, the empirical material presented so far shows the rather 
exceptional control the press shop workers had over the level of effort 
and the effort bargain more generally, and that is the heart of the 
struggle for control on the shop-floor. This section stresses how job 
control was widespread in the whole Presswork division and discusses some 
characteristics of the pattern of work relations which prevailed in the 
factory. 
In the press shops, worker control over effort was made possible 
by the development of collective norms, enforced by collective discipline 
at the levels of work groups and sections. This social process often took 
the form of overt worker resistance, a situation in which the foremen and 
section managers were not powerful enough to withstand the pressure from 
the shop-floor. Indeed, on many issues these supervisors did not even 
have a say in the decision-making. The following instances of collective 
discipline in the enforcement of ceilings on earnings provide a good 
illustration of this. In a document signed by the divisional manager, 
it was reported that 'the union members in Press Shop 1 informed 6 members 
that they should not work on the afternoon of 17th August 1970 as a 
punishment for booking a higher standard than the shop floor agreed'. Here 
is the way such a decision was reached: 
On Thursday 13th August the men were prepared to work 
in line with the women with the proviso that the women 
restricted their earnings to 150 R. 
On Friday, the line comprising 3 men and 4 women 
produced work entitling them to 197% bonus. 
The Press Shop 1 Operators had a meeting in the 
morning of 17th August and recommended that 6 people 
on the line should lose half a shift by ceasing work 
at 12: 30 p. m. ... A meeting was held between the divisional manager 
and the steward for Press Shop 1... 
Management stated that the type of restrictive action 
as proposed was completely against the current working 
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agreement which is payment for performance achieved. The 
shop steward stated that he would address the shop at 
12: 15 p. m. with the view of rescinding the decision. At 
12: 25 p. m. he reported back that the decision should 29 
stand and the people concerned would go home at 12: 30 p. m. 
A few days later, the deputy director of the Coventry employers' association 
wrote a letter to the TGWU district organiser in which he referred to 
the measure taken on 17 August 1970 and complained that 'this incident 
was repeated yesterday when nine men went home again on the instructions 
of other work mates who said they had produced too much work. I understand 
that on this occasion the stewards spoke to the section concerned, but 
that this did not prevent the action being taken'. 
30 Again on 9 September 
1970,21 press operators took strike action for a complete shift in protest 
against six operators who exceeded a 150 per cent bonus ceiling and then 
refused to go home in compliance with the sanction imposed by the section. 
31 
The documentary sources on this period show that although this type 
of shop-floor control focused on the effort bargain, it was also applied 
on a much wider range of issues. For instance, the introduction to the 
Company dossier on industrial relations in the press shops presents 'the 
main requests of management' in October 1970: 
b) There should be more mobility of employees without having 
an argument or dispute whenever an attempt is made to 
operate more effectively ... 
29. Company dossier on industrial relations in the press shops, 1969- 
1970, Industrial relations diary of events, Issue 2, p. 2. 
30. The employers' association representative added that 'this response 
from your members gives little hope that they appreciate the serious- 
ness of the situation or that they intend to try to co-operate with 
the Management in putting things right. I would sincerely hope that 
you use'your influence to try to prevent this sort of thing from re- 
occurring. ' Letter dated 20 August 1970. 
31. Company dossier on industrial relations, op. cit., Issue 3, pp. 5-6. 
The deputy director of the employers' association again wrote a 
letter to the union official with reference to this. 
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c) It should be possible to work overtime in those 
sections where it is necessary without having either 
an absolute ban imposed or a one in, all in, attitude 
adopted. ... 
d) It should be possible to introduce operating methods 
without facing a refusal backed by either a demarcation 
argument or a 'what is worth' attitude. 
e) It should be possible to move materials and sometimes 
tools as required by the pressures of business without 
threats and without non co-operation. 
Such a definition of management objectives over issues such as labour 
mobility, overtime distribution, changes in methods of production, and 
layout of equipment certainly is indicative of the range of worker 
controls achieved over the years. 
The management's diary of events also indicates that such a 
degree of worker control had not developed only within the large group 
of press operators. For instance, there are reports of 'restrictive 
practices' by fork-lift drivers not allowing a new piece of equipment to 
be used in the toolroom (July 1970), and of the despatch workers refusing 
mobility between different sections (September 1970). In October 1970, 
another group of pieceworkers - the guillotine operators - stopped work 
because a work study engineer 'had stood by the operator for approximately 
hr. without making his self known to the operator'. Their shop steward 
informed management that they 'were not having this particular Work 
Study Engineer on the section'. Being a 'fairly new employee', the work 
study engineer had not followed the proper procedure and 
Management took full responsibility for the Work Study Engineer 
action and stated that the man's actions will change immediately. 
The man was acting in ignorance of certain factory customs and 
practices. After discussion lasting 2 hours the TGWU agreed to 
accept the Work Study Engineer back on the section after a 
cooling off period of 4 days had elapsed. Management agreed to this. 
32 
32. Company dossier on industrial relations, op. cit., Issue 4, pp. 6-7. 
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The empirical material presented in this section and the preceding 
one has many implications as regards the state of labour relations at Firm B 
prior to the institutionalisation of labour relations. Our intention here 
was to document the range and degree of job control. In many ways, we 
found that workers were doing more than imposing restraints over the way 
their labour power was utilised by management - which is our operational 
definition of job control. On many crucial issues they were exercising 
a type of workshop control akin to self-government. 
The evidence presented so far also draws attention to some pecu- 
liarities of the pattern of control which prevailed in this workplace, 
and most probably in many other engineering factories, under the 'informal 
system' of labour relations. To start with, the type of fragmented work 
process which predominated in this factory was conducive to sectional 
militancy. For instance, the non-automatic machines gave the press operators 
favourable conditions for imposing their control over the pace of their 
work. They also worked on production lines the composition of which had 
to change frequently because of small batches. This fostered cohesiveness 
within, as well as between, the work groups composing each section. 
This shop-floor cohesiveness was most important because this type 
of contemporary job control was much more dependent upon social organisation 
at the point of production than traditional craft control. Job control 
at Firm B was related to the militancy of the shop steward organisation, 
especially in the press shops. But in fact the strength of the workers' 
organisation did not appear to come so much from the shop stewards them- 
selves. It was more an instance of direct democracy, where decisions were 
taken by all constituents at the most decentralised level. In most cases 
the shop stewards were not the instigators of issues, and the evidence 
shows that they were frequently overruled by their section. 
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In this workplace there are indication that management at the time 
felt that the situation was out of its control. For instance, on the 
occasion of a formal interview in May 1980, the current managing director 
was asked about the most striking industrial relations problems when he 
arrived at this factory in 1972. He mentioned the 'anarchy which existed 
in the presswork piecework scheme, especially in Press shop no. 4'. He 
insisted that 'it was not so much that workers had too much power, it was 
that management did not have any power: the balance of power was dramatically 
distorted'. It was in this context that management, through the intermediary 
of the employers' association, made frequent appeals to the officials of 
the Transport and General Workers' Union, enjoining them to intervene and 
help restore 'normal labour relations'. In fact, the TGWU district 
organiser was frequently involved, and higher levels of the union hierarchy 
also took part in various joint meetings with the view to improving work- 
place relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Hence at a Local 
Conference held in October 1967 the chairman referred to 'a very big two- 
sided investigation done on the rash of unconstitutional strikes in the 
early part of last year, in which your Union co-operated fully in the 
shape of yourself (district organiser] and Mr. Lregional secretary]'. 
There were also several full-time officials at the Composite Conference of 
March 1970, including one TGWU national officer. Apart from these joint 
meetings, we have already referred to letters from the Coventry and 
District Engineering Employers' Association to the TGWU district organiser, 
most often with reference to unconstitutional action being taken. We have 
got copies of many of these letters, mainly for the period August and 
September 1970. Writing to the TGWU district organiser on 17 September 
1970, the deputy director of the local employers' association referred to 
six of these letters mailed between 25 August and 10 September, and 
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complained: 
Each of the above letters has dealt with an incident of 
unconstitutional action by your members, which illustrates 
the lack of co-operation which the Company felt was leading 
them into serious difficulties. No improvement seems to 
have been forthcoming in your members attitude at the 
Company, and I must protest that our approaches to you 
do not seem to produce any results. 
We have not received any replies to our letters ... 
In fact, it will be noted later in this chapter that the full-time officials 
of the TGWU and other unions represented at Firm B played a role in the 
establishment of the new industrial relations structures of the early 
1970s. 
But the position of the TGWU officials was problematic. On the one 
hand, they saw their members resorting frequently to unofficial and 
unconstitutional strikes, and many shop stewards were apparently seen by 
union officials as rebels with little concern for the formal engineering 
procedure. On these matters, however, the mediating role the union 
officials were asked to play by employers was obviously not an interesting 13 Y2 e 
one. Nevertheless, it seems that TGWU officials were genuinely concerned 
about the poor labour relations at Firm B, notably because they were 
worried about the effect of disputes occurring in this factory on employ- 
ment in related engineering workplaces. Hence, during the six-week strike 
of 1969, 
at the weekly meeting at Transport House, the operators were 
made aware of the growing impact of their action on the motor 
industry. The convenor of the Standard Triumph Factory 
intervened to warn of the impending lay-offs of his members 
because of lack of components from the press shops. 
(Evans, 1980: 27) 
On the other hand, the TGWU full-time officials actually had little control 
over the activities of the rank-and-file in this factory. Clearly, this 
was an autonomous and robust shop-floor organisation. And indeed, too 
much intervention by the outside union in trying to change the relationships 
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between the domestic union and management would have exacerbated the 
critical attitude of many TGWU shop stewards and members towards full-time 
officials. Such a feeling, which appears to have developed during the 
period under discussion, could be observed in many ways during our field- 
work. In the late 1970s the TGWU district organiser had little influence 
on union policy at Firm B, while for the craft unions relations between 
outside officials and shop stewards were much closer. 
33 
In the next section attention is focused on the recovery strategy 
adopted by the new management during the seventies, dealing first with 
the constraints which had to be considered in the elaboration of the 
reform policy. 
2.3 Management Strateev for Recover 
Within the objective conditions which have been outlined so far in 
this chapter, it is argued that some courses of management action were 
precluded. Considering the very bad labour relations climate, any room 
for manoeuvre was rather limited. 
The first constraint was the company position in the product market. 
In the early 1970s Firm B was almost totally dependent upon a single 
product market, i. e. components for the motor industry. The profit margin 
for presswork production was low and the delivery problems had badly 
affected the credibility of the firm with its customers. 
Secondly, the parent group, which had to support the company's 
deficits for six consecutive years from 1969-70, was keeping a very close 
33. For instance, during the 1979 national engineering strike the full- 
time officials of the craft unions were very influential in getting their 
members' support, while the TGWU district organiser did not try to 
influence the membership to do so. The TGWU members refused to support 
the two-day strikes of September (Chapter 7). In interview with us, 
the TGWU district organiser, who had been the union's official representa- 
tive at Firm B since 1959, pointed out the autonomy of the local union 
and sectional autonomy as the peculiarities of labour relations in this 
workplace. Formal interview, 12 December 1979. 
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eye on this factory, the new managing director reporting directly to the 
group's managing director. The option of a closure was considered but 
rejected mainly because of the anticipated consequences of such a drastic 
course of action for the entire business activities of the parent organisa- 
tion within this industry. At that time, a closure would have halted the 
operations in part of the motor industry and the group could not have 
withstood the pressure from the large customers. 
34 
Moreover, as Evans 
has argued, 'the size of their assets tied up in the Company made closure 
too costly' (1980: 30). Evans also pointed out that, before succeeding in 
1980, the group failed to sell the factory in 1971,1975 and 1978. Since 
Firm B was a risky business, if not the 'money loser' of the group, the 
credits available for capital investment or any costly reorganisation were 
very limited. This financial situation restricted management discretionary 
margins in two different ways. First, the option of technological innova- 
tion and work reorganisation in the press shops, which could have removed 
the basis for job control, was excluded whatever the feasibility of such 
a course of action. Second, the option of 'buying off trouble', a policy 
consisting of trying to secure worker commitment by a substantial increase 
in monetary compensation (including fringe benefits), was hardly more 
consistent with their market and financial situation. 
Two other constraints upon management strategy need little expla- 
nation at this point. One (the third constraint) was the nature of the 
existing technology, which was likely to generate job control. For 
instance, the operators were working on machines which gave them a great 
deal of influence on the quantity produced and a relatively high degree 
of autonomy on the shop-floor. It is one of the main reasons why most 
34. Interview with the company's managing director, 13 May 1980. 
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production managers felt that the press shops could only be managed under 
piecework (this being in itself a constraint of some importance). 
The fourth constraint was the relatively substantial degree of 
job control which had already developed in the press shops, as underlined in 
the preceding sections. Job control took the shape of limitations to 
management freedom of action at the point of production, and these limitations 
were protected by an autonomous and vigilant shop-floor organisation. 
These reasons suggest that the option of regaining control over work 
relations by authority and coercion, which would have involved a direct 
confrontation with the shop steward organisation, was not open to manage- 
ment. Indeed, the hard line had proved to be disastrous in the late 
sixties. But more than that, even if the conditions for such a radical 
course had been right, it was not consistent with the philosophy of the 
management team which was in command during the seventies. Their management 
style was characterised by a strong ideological commitment to consultation 
and involvement of workers' representatives in decision-making. To some 
extent this could be related to the fact that some influential managers 
had been associated with what is known as the 'Glacier school of manage- 
ment'. The managing director who took office in 1970 had previously been 
a director of the Glacier Metal Co. Ltd., which was part of the same 
industrial group. Over the following years, several top managers were 
brought in from the same factory located in Scotland. At the time of our 
fieldwork, the managing director (who had been at Firm B since 1972), 
another executive director, and the industrial relations manager had been 
associated with the 'Glacier school'. Two of the central tenets of this 
approach were a particular model of worker participation, based on a works 
council structure, and a change from piecework to timework (Brown, 1962; 
Brown and Jaques, 1965). 
Having outlined some very serious constraints on management action, it 
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is now possible to analyse the strategy which was effectively adopted. It 
is useful to make a distinction between three aspects of this programme. 
These are the re-structuring of production, a greater control over labour 
costs, and a structural reform of labour relations, which is our main 
concern and the subject of section 2.4. 
Around 1971-2 it was decided to reduce the importance of presswork 
within the company operations and to shift the emphasis to non-automatic 
heat transfer production. It appears that the board of the parent group 
was, to say the least, very much in agreement with this policy. In the 
section relating to Firm B, the 1972 Annual Report stated: 
During the past two years we have decided that its future 
growth lies mainly in the field of heat transfer technology, 
particularly industrial heat exchangers, space and process 
heating. The losses of the last two years basically represent 
the cost of setting up in these comparatively new fields and 
reorganising and concentrating the press work activities into 
those specýglist areas where the Company has part cular 
expertise. 
Evidence that the shop stewards seemed to have had some information about 
the future of the press shops is provided in the TGWU shop stewards committee 
Minutes books for the period 1971-3. For instance, at the meeting held 
on 11 September 1972 the convenor informed the stewards of a forecast of 
sales for the following years. The sales of presswork were to go down 
from £5 million in 1971-2, to £4.25 million in 1972-3, down to £3.75 
million in 1973-4.36 These developments were creating a feeling of 
35.1972 Annual Report of the group, p. 13 (emphasis added). 
36. During the same period of two years, the total turnover of the 
company was to increase from £8.85 million to £10.65 million. 
The convenor got this information from the site information 
meeting with the managing director. 
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insecurity among the workforce in the press shops. 
37 
Independently of the 
quality of this strategic decision, the way management proceeded affected 
relations with customers. They implemented dramatic price increases on 
many components without much discussion with the customers. Before the 
strategy produced the expected effect on orders (and jobs), some customers 
had to live with the increases before turning to an alternative supplier. 
38 
Formal interviews indicate that the rationale for this strategic 
decision was primarily based on market considerations. 
39 
The market 
for industrial heat transfer seemed very bright in the early seventies. 
The directors of the group also wished to extend their range of activities 
and customers. Heat transfer production, with relatively low capital 
investment, offered promising possibilities in overseas markets (e. g. 
equipment for power stations in the Middle East). Second in importance as 
a causal factor was the poor state of labour relations in the presswork 
department. Worker resistance had come mainly from the press shops, where 
operators were working under piecework. 
By 1976, the economic context had changed and it appeared that the 
assessment of the market potentials for heat transfer production had been 
over-optimistic, if not outright wrong. Market conditions had been 
reversed. Some workers in the Power plant heat transfer unit (PPHT) were 
made redundant. Others applied successfully for presswork jobs. 
40 
Indeed, 
when the current managing director was promoted to this job in 1976, it 
was decided to regenerate the production of presswork in the belief that 
37. In the TGWU shop stewards committee Minutes book for 1972 there 
are frequent references to the possible closure of Press shop no. 4. 
38. Interviews with the personnel director (2 May 1980) and a production 
manager in presswork (7 May 1980). 
39. Interviews with managing director (13 May 1980) and personnel director 
(2 May 1980). 
40. TGWU shop stewards committee Minutes book, June and July 1976. 
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it represented financial stability for the firm. At the time of the field- 
work, the position of the Heat transfer division (HHTD) had deteriorated 
to a subsistence level, while the demand for presswork was relatively 
high in spite of the deepening recession. A customer newsletter issued 
by Firm B in the autumn of 1979 focused on this reversal of fortunes, 
putting emphasis on the market successes of presswork. Looking back at 
the situation which existed when he took over this function four years 
before, the managing director was quoted as saying with reference to 
presswork: 
Although no-one had said specifically that the business 
was ending, there was an implication that it was being 
chopped. Our customers were actively engaged in re- 
sourcing their requirements, among them two big customers 
who represented 80 per cent of our turnover. 
There were indications of redundancy and the likely 
closure of one of the press shops and we had got as 41 
far as working out the costs of re-locating presses. 
One of the major consequences of this re-structuring of production in 
the early seventies, and the dramatic reversal in priorities that followed, 
is the gradual reduction of the workforce over the decade. There were 
redundancies in every year, with major programmes in 1971-2,1975,1979 
(for HTD) and 1980. 
The second aspect of management strategy was to pay greater 
attention to the control of the pay structure. Here is a management 
account of this: 
In 1973, the Company was pursuing a policy to rationalise 
the hourly rated wage structure. At that time there were 
41. Contact, customer newsletter, issue no. 2, October 1979. 
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approximately 150 different wage rates ... The 
broad objective of the Company policy was to eliminate 
all non work study based piecework schemes and to 
struct45e all daywork payments into a Company pecking 
order. 
Much in line with the 'Glacier school' principles, management wanted to 
get away from piecework but could only reduce its impact in the factory. 
Hence the new production in heat transfer would-be managed under a flat 
rate payment system. When work started in the Copper core section in 
the mid-seventies, for instance, it was conditional to a shop stewards' 
commitment that it would be on flat rate. Although the bulk of press 
operating had to stay on piecework because of the work process, part of 
this production was also put on agreed daywork in 1974.43 
In addition, two important aspects of the reform of the pay 
structure were part-of the 1974 agreement. First, it ended the system 
of average piecework earnings (APE), by which the earnings of 228 manual 
workers in 38 occupational groups were directly determined by the piece- 
work earnings of the press operators. 
44 
Such a system was said to be 
inflationary and it was also unduly dependent on a piecework scheme 
characterised by fractional bargaining and wage drift. These groups, 
along with other dayworkers, were integrated within the flat rate wage 
structure, the second of the major modifications. The skilled and other 
42. Report and award of an ACAS arbitration between the NUSMW and the 
Company, August 1977, p. 2. This quotation is an excerpt from the 
managing director's evidence at the hearing. In another management 
document, dated January 1974, there is a listing of 119 occupational 
groups with 67 different rates of pay. 
43. It applied to work on heavy components, mainly in Press shop no. 4. 
The results were rather disastrous for management, as will be shown 
in Chapter 7. 
44. Management document dated 11 January 1974; see also Evans, 1980: 32. 
This group included the 57 toolsetters, the inspectors, the storemen, 
and many smaller groups. 
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indirect workers were ranked in six grades of 'technical service operatives' 
(TSO) (mainly maintenance workers) and five grades of 'production service 
operatives' (PSO); there were three grades of production workers. This 
wage structure was in operation until 1980 when differential problems 
and claims for upgrading forced management to negotiate a new structure 
which further reduced the number of grades. 
These changes were greatly facilitated by the reinforcement of the 
structure of labour relations. It is to this reform of labour relations 
institutions that attention is now directed. 
2.4 Reforming the Structure of Labour Relations 
The driving force behind labour relations reform in this factory 
was the need to regulate the antagonistic work relations described at 
length in the preceding sections. Management sought to institutionalise 
workers' representation so that responsible senior shop stewards could 
help contain sectional militancy. But there were also other institutional 
factors which may have given an impetus to the reform of workplace 
labour relations. Hence the Coventry employers' association was engaged 
in an effort to improve labour relations in this company, seeking to 
involve the full-time union officers in a joint approach on this matter. 
In addition, from the termination of the old engineering procedure in 1971 
to the 1976 agreement, there was a vacuum in formal procedure (Clegg, 
1979: 86-9; Storey, 1980: 42-4), and in federated firms this may have had 
some influence in fostering the development of domestic procedures and 
mechanisms to fill this gap. 
As in the other firm, the first priority was put on the creation 
of a joint shop stewards' committee (JSSC). There was a tradition of 
union autonomy and rivalry (essentially between the general union and the 
minority craft unions). The JSSC had existed for only a few years when it 
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broke up in 1969. In 1970 the company hoped to involve the unions in 
rescue operations. A proposal to set up a working party 'to examine the 
problems facing the Company' could not be implemented because of the refusal 
of the TGWU convenor 'to join in any kind of meeting with the senior 
stewards of the other unions involved except as part of the Joint Shop 
Stewards Committee'. The TGWU insisted on proportional representation 
45 
on the JSSC and negotiating rights corresponding to its membership, while 
the other unions considered these demands unreasonable. 
46 
In October 1970 the company publicly threatened to close down the 
factory, giving trade union rivalry as one of its major problems. This 
forced the calling of two joint union conferences involving national as 
well as local union officers, the second resulting in an agreement in 
January 1971.47 The new JSSC was to be the representative body on factory- 
wide issues, each union retaining its autonomy on domestic matters. The 
compromise on representation within the committee meant that the five 
members of the minority unions (two AUEW shop stewards and one from each 
of the other unions) could not be outvoted by the five TGWU representatives. 
Following the union withdrawal from the 1922 Engineering Procedure 
Agreement in 1971 after the failure to agree on the status quo procedure, 
negotiation was referred back to the domestic level. In this firm agreement 
was reached in July 1972 on a comprehensive disputes procedure which is 
based on the following status quo clause: 
45. Letter from the local employers' association to the TGWU full-time 
official, 16 September 1970. During the same period, all the TGWU 
stewards''refused to sit down around the table with the stewards of 
other unions' to listen to management proposals to reduce factory 
activity. Company dossier on industrial relations, op. cit., Appendix V. 
Issue 3, p. 4. 
46. TGWU shop stewards committee Minutes book, January 1971. 
47. TGWU shop stewards committee Minutes book, January 1971; also a 
formal interview with the NUSMW shop steward, 15 October 1979. 
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Any decisions which alter employees' established wages 
and conditions, arrangements or other changes to 
contract, including dismissals or redundancy, will not 
be implemented if the employees concerned object, 
until the procedure has been exhausted. 
The counterpart, that there should be no industrial action and no sanction 
or restriction applied before the stages of procedure had been exhausted, 
was no less important. Both the shop steward leadership and senior 
management were fully committed to this dispute procedure. In the inter- 
views some shop stewards raised the point that their status quo agreement 
was more comprehensive than the 1976 engineering agreement. It covered 
disciplinary cases, in which there was no distinction between 'gross 
industrial misconduct which necessitates instant dismissal' and dismissal 
with due notice (national engineering agreement, art. 5). Although 
status quo originally was a trade union demand, management also wanted it 
as the basis on which more rational resolution of disputes could be 
developed. Indeed, managers raised status quo (i. e. its counterpart) 
more regularly than the union side did. And there were occasions where 
senior managers showed that they were prepared to accept the constraints 
this might place on the company, to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
disputes procedure. In the words of the industrial relations manager: 
Status quo is the key element of industrial relations at 
Firm 47. It means that one side does not act unilaterally 
against the other. This is the ingredient, the single thing, 48 
which is instrumental in making sure the procedure is respected. 
Another important step forward was the establishment of a structure 
for. disclosure of information and negotiation. The managing director 
made it clear that the type of structure he had in mind was nothing less 
than a works council on the lines of what he had experienced at Glacier 
48. Interview, 31 October 1979. 
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Metal Co. The current managing director and his predecessor shared the 
view that they should have 'one central consultative and negotiating body 
responsible for all aspects dealing with the terms and conditions of 
employment'. 
49 
There is evidence of proposals for the setting up of 
'works committees' in 1971 which met with outright refusal from the unions. 
50 
In July 1973 the managing director came back with a formal proposal for 
a works council which was turned down by the unions without much discussion. 
It appears that the main reason for union opposition was that such an 
authoritative body was incompatible with the principles of union and sectional 
autonomy. 
51 
Having to accept that such a decision-making body, with 
representatives of all manual and staff groups within the company, could 
not be set up, management had to be content with a less ambitious structure. 
However, in developing this framework on a gradual basis, management did 
not renounce completely its ultimate goal of a unique and integrated 
structure at company level. 
52 
The first provision for regular meetings at company level was the 
site information meeting which was held regularly on a monthly basis. There 
the managing director provided a substantial flow of information on sales, 
productivity and other general matters to the JSSC and the Joint Staff 
49. Interview with managing director, 13 May 1980. 
50. One entry in the TGWU shop stewards committee Minutes book reads: 
'Re: the statement about Works Committees. The N/S [night-shift] 
fully endorse the D/S decision to reject all overtures on this subject 
and it should be pointed out to management that we now consider this 
matter dead and buried'. Meeting held on 8 December 1971. 
51. Interview with TGWU convenor, 12 May 1980. It is worth noting that the 
Glacier Metal Co. works council was 'a multi-sided, totally representa- 
tive policy-making body' where the rule of unanimity voting prevailed. 
See Brown and Jaques, 1965: 29-37. Obviously, this has nothing in 
common with the works council in operation at Firm A. 
52. They have opted for 'a slow but steady progress ... to reach to that 
point progressively'. Interview with managing director, 13 May 1980. 
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Committee. Under the influence of the current managing director, this 
became the occasion for better communications with workers' representatives 
on labour relations matters (as well as on the mutual impact labour 
relations and market issues have on each other). The JSSC-Management 
meeting established in 1973 was another monthly occasion where the managing 
director discussed with the shop stewards a broad range of issues. While 
it was seen by many as a negotiating meeting, it was in fact something of 
a 'progress meeting' (or 'quasi-negotiation' meeting) where the JSSC members 
could raise issues with top management. 
53 
Indeed, there was an element of 
continuous bargaining, but it was bargaining of a very particular type 
since it was not really supported by the ultimate threat of industrial 
action. It was therefore comparable with the works council meeting at 
Firm A. At the meetings which I attended as an observer in 1979, this 
body dealt with issues as varied as lay-off pay, harmonisation (between 
manual and staff employees), prices at the canteen, holidays, clocking, 
redundancy payments, and so on. 
Regular information meetings were also held at divisional and 
(with less regularity) unit levels. From the minutes of these meetings 
between production managers and shop stewards it appears that discussion 
focused mainly on production and market issues (e. g. output, sales, state 
of the order book, and particular aspects of relations with customers) and 
health and safety. This was also the appropriate medium for management to 
implore the stewards to pass on the message about the vital need for better 
labour productivity. Taking account of the regular meetings dealing 
exclusively with health and safety at company level, this means that the 
structure of labour relations was particularly complex at Firm B. 
53. Informal interviews with personnel director (12 July 1979) and 
industrial relations manager (8 August 1979). 
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Another major development in this institutional reform was the 
annual negotiation of a comprehensive wage agreement, a procedure similar to 
that in Firm A. As in the other firm, there had been much resistance to 
the centralisation of bargaining. Indeed, there was more resistance at 
Firm B, mainly because of a tradition of sectional autonomy. The usual 
pattern was that negotiation started with the JSSC at factory level 
before developing into fragmented bargaining at sectional or occupational 
level. Significant progress was made in 1980 when the wage agreement was 
accepted on a union by union basis, with the usual distinction between 
pieceworkers and flat rate workers. 
The first comprehensive wage agreement for manual workers was 
negotiated in 1974, when management succeeded in getting rid of the APE 
system and introducing the pecking order. There was much less room for 
negotiation in 1976 and 1977 because of incomes policies. From 1978 the 
negotiations were broader in scope and also more protracted. The 
productivity scheme which had operated since 1974 was then consolidated 
into the base rates and part of the wage increase also had to be 'funded 
by changed working practices coupled with a resultant reduction in head- 
count'. 
54 
Many issues involved in the 1979 and 1980 negotiations will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
As in the other company studied, this structure was not static 
and some proposals for improvements came from management at the time of our 
fieldwork. In the brief section which follows, attention is focused on 
a comparison of the patterns of labour relations problems which developed in 
these two firms and the process of institutionalisation which followed. 
54.1978 hourly rated wage settlement, art. 1.5. It should also be noted 
that a new added value bonus scheme was established in 1979. This 
involved the creation of productivity improvements groups comprising 
production managers and shop stewards at different levels. 
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3. TWO DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF CONFLICT 
From the empirical evidence presented so far in this chapter, it 
is now possible to set out a brief comparison of the labour relations 
conditions which led to institutional reforms in both firms. 
Starting with the trends which were common to these two firms before 
the reforms, the decayed payment systems were a major defect. Most 
production workers were paid on the basis of traditional piecework schemes, 
the standards being much more the result of fragmented bargaining than 
proper work measurement. Such bargaining pressure generated wage drift, 
differential problems, and disruption at work group or sectional level. 
More than anything else, the lack of a coherent structure for conducting 
labour relations impeded any major improvement in pay determination or 
other work relations issues. In both workplaces, the bargaining structures 
and the disputes procedures were dysfunctional. This was exacerbated 
by problems of union structure and representation, the major unions 
refusing to work on a joint basis in the two cases. 
The shortcomings of the institutional framework meant that bargaining 
and job regulation were decentralised, putting great pressure on junior 
management. The, line of authority of these supervisors was not clear and 
they often lacked the training an man-management skills to control labour 
efficiently. Unco-ordinated decision-making on their part frequently 
led to spontaneous sanctions being applied by the shop-floor. 
Again in both companies the 'labour problems' were seen as a cause 
of serious financial difficulties. Both firms experienced several years 
of deficit and the possibility of closure was seriously considered at 
Firm B. In a good number of the firms studied by Purcell, labour relations 
crises also had affected the customers' confidence and put the future of 
the enterprise at risk (1979a and 1981; see also Department of Employment, 
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1971: 11-13). 
But the conditions prevailing in the two firms prior to the reform 
were found to be fundamentally different in many ways. First, the shop 
steward organisation was much stronger at Firm B. A robust and autonomous 
shop-floor organisation offered a high degree of resistance to management 
in the late sixties. This was particularly the case for the press 
operators, the tinsmiths, the polishers, and the toolmakers. Such a degree 
of union organisation and worker resistance never existed at the other 
company. 
Second, all the evidence gathered shows that there was a much more 
substantial degree of job control at Firm B, an aspect documented in detail 
in this chapter. The shop-floor had forced encroachments into management 
action on many aspects of labour utilisation. Obviously a high degree of 
job control was found in the craft areas, but some material was presented 
to show that press operators also had a considerable degree of control 
over mobility of labour, overtime distribution, work pace, and other 
related issues. The available information does not suggest that a 
comparable degree of job control was to be found at Firm A. 
Partly as a consequence of the differences just described, Firm B 
experienced a much higher frequency and intensity of industrial action. 
The labour relations crisis in the press shops culminated in a period of 
'trauma' in 1969. Purcell (1979a: 15-18) argued that such an experience may 
generate 'feelings of coercive dependency' and trust and hence represent 
a highly influential factor in making possible successful reforms. There 
was also some disruption at Firm A, involving blacking, overtime bans and 
some stoppages of work, but the scale of this was in no way comparable 
to Firm B. 
It appears that at Firm A worker opposition was mainly (though 
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not exclusively) concentrated on pay, and this was exacerbated by an 
inadequate structure of labour relations for dealing with pay issues. In 
1971-2,90 per cent of the recorded disputes concerned pay (CIR, 1973: 
16-17). Without endorsing Maitland's general argument with regard to the 
origin and impact of 'disorder', the following account seems to correspond 
to the situation then prevailing at Firm A: 
In attempting to exploit its power to force a resolution 
of its own grievances, each individual group contributed 
to the further disorganisation of the pay system as a 
whole, thus creating a new generation of anomalies. I am 
suggesting, then, that it was the breakdown of management 
control that provoked workers' attempts to assert their 
own control; and, in the process, workers completed 
another cycle in the destruction of management control. 
(Maitland, 1980: 359) 
Maitland found the origin of disorder in the 'demoralisation' of the pay 
system coupled with the breakdown of management control. And he added 
that 'this sort of breakdown of management control over a P. B. R. system 
... is almost endemic in British industry' (1980: 359; see also Maitland, 
1983). 
However, such an explanation would not square with the situation 
which prevailed at Firm B in the late sixties. The problem was more 
complex. Shop-floor action was not a reaction or adjustment to weak manage- 
ment control; rather it was a case in which shop-floor resistance contributed 
to weakening an authoritarian management. An autonomous organisation 
developed to resist management action and improve wages and working 
conditions. Work relations in the press shops were depicted as a struggle 
for. control on the shop-floor between a strong and militant shop-floor 
organisation and authoritarian management. It is true that conflict was 
also focused upon pay and the wage-effort bargain. But, in contrast 
to Firm A, it generated some inroads into management freedom on many 
other aspects of labour utilisation. Piecework bargaining in the press 
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shops helped to reinforce the shop-floor organisation and broaden the 
scope of job control to an extent which never existed in the machine shops 
at Firm A. 
Independently of these two different patterns of conflict, the 
managements of both firms saw the structure of labour relations as the 
major problem. They implemented institutional reforms which are in many 
ways comparable. Indeed, this institutionalisation of labour relations may 
be typical of the developments which took place in engineering and more 
generally in the manufacturing sector of British industry over the decade 
following the publication of the Donovan Report. Chapter 5 focuses on 
managerial objectives and strategies, and in particular on the impact of 
the reforms on management and the shop-floor organisations. 
CHAPTER 5 
IMPACT ON MANAGEMENT AND THE SHOP-FLOOR ORGANISATIONS 
Having in mind the modifications in the labour relations framework 
over the previous decade, this chapter focuses on the impact of the reform 
on management and labour organisations. Before going more deeply into 
these matters, a first section deals with managerial strategies in both 
firms. 
1. MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIRMS 
There are two dimensions to the institutional frameworks developed 
in the two firms: the setting up of a bargaining structure at company 
level, and an integrated grievance and disputes procedure. They correspond 
with the general strategies of reducing shop-floor bargaining and 
restraining conflict within proper boundaries. 
Attention was first directed to pay bargaining, which was seen by 
many managers as the source of the problem. Hence the management of 
Firms A and B involved the new JSSC in the negotiation of a wage structure, 
something which did not really exist in its proper sense prior to the 
reform. From then on, wage increases were to be negotiated annually at 
company level, integrating the two plants in the case of Firm A. Managers 
also put great effort into trying to improve their control over the piecework 
schemes covering production workers. Such a centralised bargaining structure 
also created the conditions for the negotiation of fringe benefits (e. g. 
improvements in holiday, sickness benefits, lay-off pay at Firm A, etc. ) 
and productivity bonus schemes in both cases. 
The other major development was the introduction of the grievance 
and disputes procedures through which the disputes arising at the shop-floor 
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could be channelled. In both cases this included a status quo clause and 
made no distinction between disputes of right and disputes of interest. 
1 
One of the functions of such a structure was to improve consistency in 
management decision-making and reduce spontaneity in labour resistance. 
For instance, the rationale of such a procedural framework meant that 
organised workers were not to apply any form of industrial action before 
the senior shop steward(s) and the personnel director (as well as the 
managing director at Firm B) had been involved and the procedure was 
exhausted. Greater formalisation and codification would also foster the 
development of case-law within the enterprise. In another respect, manage- 
ment strategy consisted of taking some pressure off the level of production, 
the management of labour conflict becoming another staff function within the 
management organisation. In contrast with the old engineering procedure, 
it also had the 'advantage' of fostering more autonomy from the outside 
unions. 
As part of the management strategy, two preconditions were necessary 
to facilitate the implementation of the structural reform and the emergence 
of the conditions which could make it successful. Briefly, both sides had 
to centralise power within their respective organisation. In the words of 
Purcell (1979a: 16), 'the negotiators on each side had to gain some control 
over their organisation in order to become a trusted bargaining partner' 
(see also Terry, 1979: 385,387). 
If they were to overcome the financial difficulties referred to 
earlier, managers had first to reinforce the control structure at the top 
of their organisation. This was also essential if labour relations reforms 
1. This last point is an essential feature of Clegg's 'common law model' 
of labour relations (1979: 117), which characterises this industry. 
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were to be successful: 
Weak control systems also make formal central negotiation 
difficult by making a coherent management industrial relations 
policy impossible. Any central negotiation is likely to become 
undermined if the various supervisors within the factory continue 
to operate as independent policy makers. (Brown, 1973: 156) 
Indeed, senior managers had identified the weakness of junior management 
as a serious cause of disruption. They felt compelled to limit further 
the sphere of discretion of these supervisors and consolidate control at 
a higher level in the hierarchy. 
It was also part of management strategy to foster a parallel reinforce- 
ment of power at the centre of the domestic organisation. Management wished 
to negotiate with a central shop steward body representing the collective 
interests of the workforce. The shop steward leadership should be 
sufficiently autonomous to make deals with management and influential in 
selling it to the membership. 
2 Management accepted that agreements had to 
be ratified by the rank-and-file, but this should be done on the broadest 
possible basis (i. e. for the manual workforce as a whole, or on a union- 
by-union basis). 
A related element of this strategy consisted of encouraging the 
development of conditions in which the collective voice of the workforce 
would predominate over sectional interests. The potential for disruption 
by sectional groups had to be neutralised. To some extent, this could be 
achieved by relating sectional demands to the priorities of the whole shop 
steward organisation on the one hand, and to the financial and economic 
situation of the enterprise (i. e. 'what it could afford') on the other. 
2. From this managerial perspective, a production manager at Firm B 
portrayed the ideal shop steward as the 'non-militant leader'. Hence 
he should combine the independence (in relation to his/her members) of 
a leader with the quality of being a moderate. Interview, 3 October 1979. 
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The whole managerial approach to shop stewards was summarised by 
the industrial relations manager (Firm B): 'we are not trying to reduce the 
power of the shop stewards, we want to change its direction'. 
3 It is 
possible to outline four aspects of this strategy which were common to both 
firms. The first principle was the improvement or consolidation of the 
procedural position of the unions and their elected representatives within 
the workplace. Secondly, the management of both firms strongly encouraged 
the formation of a JSSC. A third element, which emerged later in the 
decade, was management's attempt to develop the conditions to reinforce the 
power of senior shop stewards in relation to the other stewards and the 
rank-and-file. Finally, it was the policy of labour managers in these two 
MJ firms to strengthen the autonomy of the shop stewards in their relations 
with the full-time officials. Management realised that such a relative 
autonomy, which had developed prior to the refort, could be integrated as 
an asset within the broad strategy presented here. 
4 
On this point, Terry 
(1983: 81) suggested that 'by encouraging the development of independent 
steward organisations capable of operating without full-time officials ... 
management assisted in a process of increasing shop steward authority within 
a developing situation that could be seen as the first moves towards a 
form of "company unionism"'. 
Before looking at the results of this strategy in more detail in 
sections 2 and 3, two general observations should be made at this point. 
3. Interview, 31 October 1979. This appears to be typical of management 
strategy in many workplaces; see Terry (1983) and Purcell (1979b). 
4. It is interesting to note that of the classic Flanders observation about 
bargaining being 'largely informal, largely fragmented and largely 
autonomous' (1975: 169), only the last feature was compatible with 
the new approach to workplace labour relations. 
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The first point is that centralisation, which is of the essence of institu- 
tionalisation, is also very much a characteristic feature of'management 
rationale. Hence, following the institutional reform, the structure of 
bargaining and grievance resolution is, at least in principle, much more 
in line with management structure and hierarchy. 
Referring to an analytical distinction put forward in Chapter 1, 
the development of this structure of joint regulation may also be seen 
as a reinforcement of the political structure (superstructure), the 
object of which is to lessen conflict at the point of production. This 
was to be achieved by channelling economic conflict (conflict over work 
relations) through the political process (the structure of labour relations). 
2. IMPACT OF THE REFORM ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN MANAGEMENT 
A major feature of the institutionalisation of labour relations was a 
process of centralisation. Indeed, management had to centralise control 
within its organisation as a necessary condition for the implementation and 
success of the reform. It was also to be expected that the centralisation 
of the bargaining structure and greater adherence to the disputes procedure 
would cause a further reinforcement of power at the centre on both sides 
(Purcell, 1981: 241). Such an effect was effectively observed in Firms A and 
B. However, management control was more centralised at Firm A in the sense 
that operations were more tightly controlled by a relatively small network 
of senior managers. 
It was also widely recognised in the two cases that the reform 
brought about other changes in the distribution of power within management. 
One obvious effect was the improved status of personnel and industrial 
relations managers (a staff function) in relation to production managers 
(line) within the hierarchy. To some degree, this corresponded with a 
noticeable shift from decision-making and bargaining on the shop-floor to a 
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higher level within the procedural framework, where labour relations 
specialists were more likely to be involved. Personnel and industrial 
relations managers were also pointed to as the specialists who had the task 
to devise and implement a procedural framework which was capable of over- 
coming the labour problems. Consequently, they were put in the 'driver's 
seat' as far as labour relations were concerned. 
This professionalisation and increased estimation of the personnel 
and industrial relations function was shown by the higher status of the 
personnel directors. For instance, here is the evolution at Firm A: 
Until 1969 personnel matters were handled by a director, 
now retired, who also had production responsibilities. 
In 1969, the company recruited its first personnel manager 
mainly to take over from line managers the tasks of negotia- 
tion. The job title was broadened to personnel and 
industrial relations manager when the present managers 
joined the company. (CIR, 1973: 3) 
The latter change occurred in 1972; since then, the same manager had 
been promoted to staff director. The personnel director at Firm B was 
a senior executive director sitting on the main board. In both cases, 
therefore, there was a senior manager whose sole responsibility was 
personnel and industrial relations. There was also an increase in the 
staffing of the personnel department, especially at Firm A. In this case, 
this broad managerial function also included the production engineering 
department where the manager was very influential and much involved in 
devising the production control system based on work study. 
5 
This rise in influence and status of personnel and industrial 
relations managers within the companies aroused some rivalries between 
managers. More importantly, many production managers were sceptical, if not 
cynical, about the reformist approach. A typical coument was that labour 
5. On the broad trend of specialisation of personnel and industrial 
relations management in the manufacturing sector, see Brown (1981: 26-31). 
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relations specialists were 'too soft' with shop stewards, being always 
prepared to have meetings and to negotiate, and that such a 
strategy had 
negative effects on management control at the shop-floor and on productivity. 
A production manager (unit level) at Firm B argued that management 
obsession with industrial peace following the crisis of the late sixties 
had now created a situation in which they were 'suffering of being too 
democratic'. 6 Such scepticism was common at the intermediary level of 
production management in both cases, and it was also expressed by the senior 
production managers of the two factories at Firm A. 
7 
In the other company, 
the strong personal commitment of the managing director to the objectives 
and the whole process of reform meant that the strategy was more widely 
understood and accepted at senior management level. Nevertheless, there 
were some signs of scepticism and reluctance by line managers with regard 
to the reform, which was noted by Ogden (1981: 35-6). He observed that 
within the ranks of line managers, 
few were prepared to countenance the formal extension of 
joint regulation to 'managerial relations', i. e. the 
organisation of work and the utilisation of labour ... 
Little credence was given to Flanders' dictum about 
regaining control by sharing it. The notion of sharing 
power (if taken literally) assumes common interests 
between managers and workers. Such an assumption was 
at odds with line managers' everyday experience of 
conflict with the shopfloor. They perceived this in 
power terms and believed the shopfloor already had too 
much power. (1981: 36) 
If personnel and industrial relations managers were generally 
recognised as being more influential as a result of the institutional 
reforms, other researchers have noted that it was junior management who lost 
6. Interview, 5 October 1979. 
7. Formal interviews with two production managers (19 December 1978) 
and the personnel director (21 December 1978). 
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most in terms of influence and power (see, for example, Terry, 1977: 80-88; 
Purcell, 1979a: 4; Maitland, 1980: 360). The bulk of the following section, 
therefore, deals with the impact of the reform on the position of the 
foremen in the firms where observations were conducted. Since our major 
concern is the study of job control, it is relevant to look more closely 
at the behaviour of management representatives on the shop-floor. 
2.1 Eroding the Influence of Foremen 
Much of the discussion of this section is relevant, to the situation 
of the first two layers of the management structure, which may be referred 
to as the supervisors. However, the discussion focuses mainly on the 
activity of foremen. Marsh's observation (1979: 117) that 'the precise 
status of the foreman varies from one company and factory or workplace to 
another' is relevant to the cases studied here. Thus the foremen in 
the machine shops at Firm A worked regularly as setters. At Firm B, the 
foremen would certainly not be allowed to do any setting or other similar 
work. 
Blackburn and Mann (1979: 197) wrote that 'foremen and supervisors 
generally have two roles, that of organisational intermediary, ensuring 
that the correct flow of materials reaches their section, and that of 
coercive overseer, ensuring that the men actually do what they are supposed 
to'. These two roles correspond to a similar distinction between the 
'technical' and the 'labour control' functions of management where the 
latter consists of 'a structure of authority which ensures the compliance 
of subordinates, many of whom do not share the interests of management' 
(Hill, 1981: 16). Going back to the distinction drawn in Chapter 1, these 
are the functions of control over the work process and control over work 
relations. 
To put it simply, the foreman's role consists in maintaining 
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production, or getting the best level of production from a given ratio of 
capital and labour in particular circumstances. He must be sufficiently 
flexible to adapt to changing conditions (breakdowns, short delays in 
production, etc. ). In order to carry out the labour control function 
effectively, the supervisor should have the capacity to generate the two 
crucial managerial assets of motivation and discipline. As a general rule, 
a balance of motivation and discipline is necessary to ensure that sub- 
ordinates agree, by consent or coercion, to transform their labour power 
into labour in the work process. At the foreman level the emphasis is 
likely to be on discipline because foremen are involved at the point of 
production, where industrial conflict originates, and also because they 
have to make sure workers comply with variable factory conditions. More- 
over, as stressed by R. Edwards, the type of management control (or 'top- 
down coordination') which 'characterizes capitalist workplaces' requires 
a degree of coercion (1979: 16-17). 
From this perspective, it is interesting to look at the sphere of 
decision-making of the foremen in the late seventies. Here it is relevant 
to consider four general aspects of work relations where foremen could, 
in principle, develop a bargaining relationship with work groups and shop 
stewards. Starting with pay and fringe benefits, it was obvious in both 
case studies that under the new pattern of labour relations foremen had 
little direct influence. Pay bargaining had been centralised and fringe 
benefits were negotiated at central level. In piecework areas, however, 
their rigour or slackness with respect to clocking had some influence on 
pay. 
8. Edwards (1979: 17) put some emphasis on the distinction between co- 
ordination, which is required in all social production, and control, 
which is 'required in all class-based shocial systems'. a.. 
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A second category of issues where the reform had further limited the 
range of decision-making by supervisors is internal mobility (permanent 
transfer, promotion within manual work, etc. ). This had been made very 
formal at Firm A, where the strict application of the internal recruit- 
ment policy meant that supervisors had very little say in the 'promotion 
of good workers'. Although the procedure was less rigid at Firm B, foremen 
were no more influential in this matter. 
It was on a third category of decisions, involving the assignment 
of labour, work allocation, and other issues closely related to the work 
process, that the influence of foremen was still most significant. The 
volume of shop-floor decisions was comparatively smaller at Firm A because 
the proportion of large batches was more important and the work process 
generally more stable. At Firm B, however, the foreman's sphere of 
decisions was more severely constrained by worker control. Nevertheless, 
the importance of the foreman's range of choices concerning production 
should not be minimised. The utilisation of labour in the work process 
naturally requires frequent reorganisations and changes, and it is in this 
day-to-day decision-making that the highest discretionary margin for junior 
management is found. Indeed, the institutionalisation of labour relations 
has a much stronger impact on the regulation of remuneration and the 
conditions of labour utilisation than on issues concerning the way labour 
is utilised. It is therefore on this third category of issues, which are 
more specific and variable and consequently more difficult to regulate at 
factory or company level, that the foreman retains some discretion. 
Finally, the application of disciplinary sanctions represents a 
crucial aspect for our concern here. The evidence was quite clear on this 
account: in both firms the power to impose disciplinary sanctions had been 
totally removed from the foremen. And in fact the influence of the second- 
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line supervisor was more formal than real in this respect. The personnel 
director had ultimate control over any disciplinary sanction at Firm A. 
In Firm B the status quo clause applied and was strictly interpreted; it 
effectively meant that nobody could be suspended or dismissed until the 
procedure had been exhausted. Indeed, a worker might have been dismissed 
by a production manager and carried on working until the Works Conference 
met. For instance, an operator in Press shop no. 3 was sacked by the unit 
manager during the first week of February 1978 for refusing to work 
normally and insubordination. He went to work until the Works Conference 
on 22 March. 
9 
Commenting on this procedure at Firm B, Evans (1980: 94) 
pointed out: 
Because of the time, effort and interruption to 
production this involved, it acted as a disincentive to 
lower management from bringing disciplinary charges. 
... between 1972 and 1979, there were only 2 cases 
where workers received suspensions from work (and a 
further 4 employees were invited to resign without the 
issue going on their references). For managers, having 
to continue to work with employees on this basis 'devalued' 
their authority and further discouraged pursuing disciplinary 
action. 
In interviews, many junior managers expressed the feeling that they 
would need a 'perfect case' to go through procedure with a real chance 
of success. They and the shop-floor workers were aware of how severely 
this had affected the junior managers' position and this was true irrespective 
of how frequently disciplinary action was taken by these managers. The 
fact was that they had completely lost the power to impose ultimate 
sanctions, to retaliate. In the words of a TGWU shop steward, 'foremen have 
little power, they cannot sack anybody but we can make life miserable for 
them% 
10 
9. Sources: TGWU shop stewards committee Minutes book; interview with 
TGWU convenor, 25 October 1979. 
10. Informal interview, 22 August 1979. 
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It was noted above that the sphere of influence of foremen had 
been restricted in many ways and that, in these two case studies, their 
authority to act had been eroded. It is worth stressing that foremen had 
little to offer with regard to means by which to motivate workers. For 
instance, in both cases they only had limited influence on remuneration 
and internal mobility. But if this observation is correct, what did manage- 
ment expect from foremen with respect to labour control following the 
reform? Basically, it appears that their function had to do with two 
general aspects of work relations. One was the organisation and control of 
labour in the work process. They were expected to develop the conditions 
for the highest level of productivity from a given ratio of capital and 
labour. The second function was labour supervision and discipline in its 
broadest sense: enforcement of rules regarding time-keeping, clocking, 
volume and quality of production, and a great number of workshop regulations 
and practices. Because of the objective basis of conflict at the shop- 
floor, there was a need for a layer of management at this level to apply 
some degree of coercion and 'police' the system. Even the best overall 
structure of job regulation and accommodation could not operate without 
a system of supervision and discipline at the shop-floor level. 
2.2 The Strategic Position of the Foremen 
On the evaluation of the foremen's record regarding labour supervision 
and discipline, those interviewed on both sides gave answers which were 
fairly similar for both firms. It was felt that foremen had become too weak 
and powerless to fulfil this aspect of their function with authority. 
11 
This certainly was the version of middle and senior management. It was 
also observed that labour relations specialists were more critical than 
11. This view was also expressed by Evans in his research into labour 
relations in Firm B (1980: 78-9). 
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production managers in their evaluation of the foremen's performance. This 
may be explained partly by their tendency to undervalue the foreman's role 
as regards the work process. Although most managers felt that the insti- 
tutional reform was the main causal factor explaining the impotence of 
the foremen, this analysis was not accepted by all the informants in Firm B. 
For example, the current managing director argued that the impotence of 
foremen stemmed from the late sixties (i. e. before the reform), the period 
referred to as the labour relations crisis. He described this period 
as being 'real anarchy, a situation where management had completely lost 
control over any aspect of discipline'. 
12 
At Firm A, however, the personnel 
director held the view that, as a result of the reform, foremen could not 
count on the power assets they used to have. Having in mind the earlier 
situation, he added this comment: 'I don't like it, but it would be 
disastrous if they were strong'. 
13 
From interviews with foremen and second-line supervisors at Firm B, 
there is no doubt that they were very aware of their loss of authority. 
Indeed, a high degree of demoralisation was observed among their ranks. 
while some expressed feelings of frustration for having lost the 'right to 
manage' and not being 'backed up', others appeared to have adopted an 
attitude of 'demobilisation', in the sense that they had 'given up'. 
14 
" 
In both firms, shop-floor workers also held the view that foremen had 
become weak and useless in many respects. In the machine shops (Firm A), for 
instance, most machinists were skillful and autonomous enough to produce 
without much involvement of the foremen. When the Firm B managing director 
12. Interview, 13 May 1980. 
13. Interview, 21 December 1978. 
14. At Firm B, structured interviews were conducted with two supervisors of 
each of the following three production units: the Automotive heat trans- 
fer unit, the toolroom, and the no. 3 shop. A toolroom section manager 
who expressed strong feelings about the supervisors' loss of authority 
said bitterly: 'I think the gaffers should run the place and it's not 
the case at the moment'. 
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directly addressed the shop stewards and then all the employees in October 
1979 in order to inform them of the company's poor financial situation and 
of the urgent need for improvements in productivity, the counter-argument 
which was expressed most often by the stewards and manual workers was the 
excessive number of staff employees and the impotence of junior management. 
They blamed the weakness of foremen and section managers, particularly as 
far as enforcement of discipline and organisation of work were concerned, 
for many of the problems the company was facing. 
15 
Indeed, although everybody agreed on the impotence of supervisors, 
there was a debate within the ranks of the TGWU shop stewards at Firm B 
about the appropriate trade union strategy in this respect. Although the 
majority uncritically held the view that it was 'management's job to manage', 
others argued that it was a wrong trade union principle to advocate a 
reinforcement of the foremen's position. They stressed that it should be 
remembered 'what the bastards could do when they were stronger'. The 
most outspoken of those holding this latter view was the TGWU convenor. 
He argued that there was a need for self-discipline and that shop stewards 
should assume some of the responsibility in this respect, in order to 
'fill the gap' created by weaker supervision. 
16 This was based on the trade 
union principle that the more workers gain control, the more they must 
enforce collective discipline and act in 'a responsible manner'. This 
view was held strongly by the old guard of shop stewards who had been 
through the struggle for control against management. With a further erosion 
15. It was possible to attend the managing director meeting with all 
the day-shift shop stewards as well as two mass meetings with the 
whole workforce (which had been divided into three large groups). 
16. Interview with TGWU convenor, 25 October 1979. The convenor liked 
to repeat, half seriously, that 'the solution was to get rid of the foremen'. 
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of the collective spirit in the late 1970s, this became an issue discussed 
within the shop-floor organisation. 
The main argument of this section is that the foremen's strategic 
position within the workplace might contribute to an explanation of their 
lack of commitment to rule enforcement. In order to achieve results in 
carrying out their functions, as defined in the preceding section, they 
needed shop-floor co-operation. A basic degree of accommodation was 
necessary for an acceptable level of production to be maintained. Probably 
the most crucial asset in this respect was flexibility of labour. This was 
most needed by junior management when there were urgent modifications in 
the work process, or any unforeseen circumstances. More concretely, these 
were cases such as breakdowns or changes in production lines as a result 
of lack of material or short delivery targets. 
Conversely, what might be most detrimental to the achievement of 
the foremen's objectives was the whole range of collective and individual 
sanctions which could be applied on the shop-floor. Although lack of 
co-operation could take many forms, most pervasive sanctions against shop- 
floor management related to the way labour power was transformed into the 
work process. Labour mobility, job content and demarcation, and intensity 
of effort were highly sensitive. Depending on their contribution to the 
work process and their degree of job control, a variable range of sanctions 
were available to work groups and sections. 
17 
In the press shops, for 
instance, the fact that operators had to intervene at every cycle (say, 
four hundred times an hour) meant that the individual, the work group or 
the section could easily enforce a limitation of effort. It was also in 
17. For instance, a work-to-rule was likely to have a much stronger impact 
in the case of workers with a very high degree of job control. 
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this area that sabotage occurred most frequently, as compared with all 
other production areas within the two companies. 
18 
More generally, there 
were plenty of opportunities for working without enthusiasm and resorting 
to 'restrictive labour practices'. These were the forms of worker resistance 
to which foremen were likely to be responsive. Hence Batstone, Boraston 
and Frenkel (1978: 41) observed that 
the limitation or withdrawal of co-operation could be 
particularly effective in relation to more junior manage- 
ment, and therefore it tended to be used over issues 
negotiated with them which could not easily be raised at 
higher levels of the management hierarchy. 
Indeed, these sanctions were more detrimental to the foremen's position 
than strike action, overtime bans and other forms of overt industrial 
action. The latter were more likely to come within the responsibility of 
labour relations specialists and higher levels of line management. More- 
over, the bargaining and dealings related to the second type of sanctions 
tended to be channelled through the structure of conflict regulation. 
Although many sanctions such as restriction of output incurred some 
costs on the part of the workers in piecework areas, it is nevertheless 
the case that these more subtle and intermediary forms of sanction had 
many advantages from the workers' viewpoint (Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 
1978: 41). One of them was the possibility of excerting real pressure without 
overt struggle. Indeed, the workers' side had control over the duration and 
intensity of the sanction. They could put on the pressure and then relax 
it, as part of the bargaining process (Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1977: 
18. It was not possible to get hard evidence on the frequency of such action. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the participants did not refer 
to it as sabotage, a concept with a strong emotional and ideological 
charge. Usually it was simply referred to as 'mislocation', a practice 
which might have the effect of breaking a tool or tools on the press. Supervisors knew that some of the mislocations of components were deliberate acts, though it was difficult to prove it; some final 
warnings were given for this practice in 1978 and 1979. Sabotage 
occasionally occurred when an operator could not find any other way 
out of a bad job. 
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241-2). This type of opposition was also more frequent than overt industrial 
action: it was an integral part of the process of control on the shop-floor. 
An interesting problem for our purpose is the question of the power 
assets at the disposal of the foreman in this process of control. What 
did he have to offer, or on what basis could he develop a bargaining 
relationship? It seems that one of the key elements in this was precisely 
the ability of being lenient or indulgent in the enforcement of rules. It 
was reported at the beginning of this sub-section that the foremen in 
both firms displayed a high degree of indulgence in their function of 
labour supervision and discipline. 
One of the issues on which foremen generally had some discretion 
was time-keeping (starting and finishing time, duration of tea breaks, etc. ). 
This included the shop practices on lateness and also the usual period of 
time-wasting at the beginning of the shift. For pieceworkers, the whole 
question of clocking practices was a central part of their preoccupations. 
In the press shops, where foremen had to sign when operators clocked off 
the jobs but not when they clocked on, the practice of fiddling the clock 
was tolerated to a considerable extent at the time of the fieldwork. This 
could have some impact on the intensity of effort and the pay packet of 
the operator. At Firm A, supervisors were also indulgent in signing the 
piecework card for down time. By looking at production control reports 
which were produced on a weekly basis and studied by some managers, it was 
possible to find out the extent of down time for all groups under the 
premium system. Over a six-week period ending on 1 December 1978, the hours 
lost on down time represented 21.5 per cent of all clocked hours. For a 
similar period ending on 7 December 1979,23 per cent of all clocked hours 
were lost on down time. 
19 This was a cause of concern for senior managers 
19. Management documents: production control summaries. The proportion 
of down time quoted here is calculated on the basis of the number of 
clocked hours over the last week of reference. 
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at the time of the fieldwork. 
The practice of banking, which consists in building up a small 
reserve of work done, was also observed in the machine shops (Firm A). The 
supervisors were well aware that many operators and machinists kept such 
a reserve of components, usually in their locker, 'in case the situation 
goes wrong'. It was also usual for the foremen in both firms to turn a 
blind eye on the practice of speeding-up (or 'rawhiding'). Indeed, a 
degree of worker autonomy on the continuity of effort over the whole shift 
was seen by many supervisors as a natural characteristic of piecework and 
a vested right for pieceworkers. In the press shops, the slackness if 
not the abdication of authority by the foremen in the whole area of 
clocking and supervision certainly had a part to play in the decay of the 
piecework scheme, an issue studied in some detail in Chapter 7. The 
attitude of leniency also applied to the question of discipline. It was 
noted above that foremen resented the fact of having lost all authority 
as regards disciplinary sanctions and that many of them had 'given up'. 
So far attention has focused on instances where foremen failed to be 
strict on supervision. Brown (1972) showed that such a pattern of omission 
may in itself be a rule-making process. But supervisors were also involved 
in more positive concessions which, from then on, could not be withdrawn 
without this being interpreted as an infringement of shop-floor rights. 
Evans (1980: 83) gave an example of such a concession won by the shop-floor 
at junior management level in Firm B: 
No. 4 shop first secured all their waiting time at 182 R 
(labouring rate); the other shops could only negotiate 
individual situations. Lower management and work study 
were promptly instructed to cut back payment to the other 
shops while an investigation took place on the reasons for 
the deal. 
An interesting example of close co-operation was observed in Press 
shop no. 3 where one of the foremen was making 'deals' with some press 
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operators about a given level of production in exchange for some time 
clocked off the job (e. g. on waiting time at 175 R). 
20 
These deals were of 
two types. The most important one could involve a group of pieceworkers 
in a production line for one shift or part of it. The 'deal' would fix 
a priori a production target as well as a specified period of down time, 
on the understanding that 'you do that and don't bother with the clock'. 
This meant that the operators could produce a higher output (and bonus) than 
usual without being involved in the hassle of clocking on and off for 
waiting time, breakdowns, etc. Such a form of co-operation also had many 
advantages from the foreman's point of view; he could reach a relatively 
high production target as well as having a freer time on the shop-floor. 
The 'deals' of the second type were minor ones which might occur 
on a 'one-off basis' when one operator or a work group faced a specific 
problem. In the case of a minor breakdown, for instance, the foreman would 
say: 'Don't clock off, I'll help you to arrange it quickly and you carry 
on. I'll give you 20 minutes on the clock. '21 Hence the foreman could 
help the operator to make up for the time lost on breakdown and achieve 
a good performance. On the face of it, everybody gained by such under- 
standings. However, in 1979 this foreman had to tell the men that he could 
no longer do it because he was under pressure from middle line management. 
It appears that the two other foremen in the shop had complained to the 
unit manager who reproached the foreman in question for his behaviour. 
20. Formal and informal interviews with the foreman (10 October 1979); 
informal interview with Press shop no. 3 steward (12 October 1979). 
21. Informal interview with Press shop no. 3 shop steward (12 October 1979). 
Interestingly, Brown (1973: 108-9) observed some practices which were 
similar to this second type of deal in other engineering firms in the 
Midlands. 
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The other foremen could not support this unfair competition with regard 
to production targets. Obviously, the unit manager could not legitimise 
such a practice; the foreman had contributed to a further deterioration of 
the piecework scheme. This example nevertheless illustrates how a foreman 
and some press operators found mutual advantage in isolating each other 
from bureaucratic control. 
Before concluding the discussion on the place of the foreman within 
the factory, some additional points ought to be made on social relations 
on the shop-floor. First, it should be stressed that while foremen had no 
direct influence on piecework bargaining and remuneration in general, an 
important resource which they could bring to bear was their management of 
time. The preceding discussion demonstrates that time control had an 
immediate consequence for piecework wages. This was one of the reasons why 
shop-floör workers were not indifferent to the foreman's co-operation. 
Secondly, inasmuch as they had a degree of discretion on this and other 
issues, foremen also had the possibility to withdraw their co-operation and 
to retaliate. By 'being awkward' on time-keeping, clocking, and rule 
enforcement in general they could make life more difficult for everybody 
on the shop-floor. Hence the foremen's capacity to get on the offensive 
and inflict sanctions should not be underestimated. In this section it is 
merely suggested that most foremen adopted an attitude of accommodation 
rather than a conflictual one. Thus, flexibility of labour and loose super- 
vision were the two poles of the pattern of co-operation which predominated 
in the factories studied. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that this attitude of leniency observed 
in our case studies has much to do with the situation Couldner referred to 
as the 'indulgency pattern' (1955: 18-26). This also corresponds broadly 
with the findings of Brown (1973: 107-11) and Terry (1977: 80-86) who conducted 
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some research into British engineering firms. Brown certainly had a good 
point when he observed that it was under conditions where 'labour forces 
are in a strong bargaining position and disciplinary powers are weak' 
that 'management is likely to lean towards being indulgent in seeking the 
cooperation of workers' (1973: 107). An effort was made here to explain 
this pattern of behaviour by suggesting that the foremen's range of choices 
was rather limited because of their strategic position in the workplace, 
especially following the labour relations reform. Their range of options 
was limited in the first place by their own appreciation of their strategic 
interests, and secondly by the many constraints which had the effect of 
weakening their position in the balance of power. A brief analysis of 
these two trends will complete this section. 
Looking first at the strategic interests of the foremen, it should 
be stressed that a strict attitude with respect to labour supervision and 
discipline might impede the achievement of the high degree of accommodation 
required in order to obtain their objective in terms of production. Terry 
(1977: 86) observed that 'these dual responsibilities can come into conflict'. 
He went further in arguing that 
encountering such realities can lead to the abandoning 
by foremen of any attempt to use the powers at their 
disposal through the formal rules ... This process 
also speeds the onset of informal concessions, since this 
is all that is left to foremen if they abandon some of 
their disciplinary powers. In interview, foremen justi- 
fied this behaviour by commenting that disciplinary 
procedures were not much use to them because they 
concentrated exclusively on punishment as a means of 
control. Almost unanimously, foremen expressed the view 
that, in practice, reward is the only effective tool. 
Indeed, from the foremen's perspective, it would not be an attractive job 
merely to punish while having little to offer in terms of rewards. Ogden's 
case study, too, provides evidence of line managers who valued the dis- 
cretionary margin they had in authorising bonus 'because it provided them 
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with a source of financial reward which they had some influence over and 
which they deemed necessary to secure co-operation from the workforce' 
(1981: 34-5). 
The above argument goes some way towards explaining the lenient 
attitude of most foremen observed in our case studies. The few who adopted 
an authoritarian or more offensive stance were referred to as 'bastards'. 
Hence the following comment was typical of shop-floor feeling: 'foremen 
are like everybody else, they want a quiet life'. 
22 
Two other factors 
contribute to this argument on the strategic interests of the foremen. 
First, foremen should not be expected to show the highest degree of commit- 
ment in enforcing rules which had been developed above them, either jointly 
through the institutional framework, or unilaterally from a higher level 
of management. The authorship of rules is important, as can be seen in 
the discussion developed in some detail by Terry (1977: 78,83-5). 
23 Second, 
it is a point of some relevance that foremen had been promoted from the 
ranks of shop-floor workers, usually after many years of service within 
the company. 
24 
In the press shops (in Firm B) and in the machine shops 
(in Firm A), the usual promotion line for a foreman's job was to work first 
22. Informal interview (22 August 1979) with former TGWU deputy convenor, 
who was promoted as setter in 1979. 
23. Terry gave evidence to support the hypothesis 'that a rule will carry 
the greater authority with the group or individual who fought for, 
negotiated, or guarded that rule. This implies that groups or individuals 
further away from the authorship or care of such rules will be more 
prepared than the authors or guardians to challenge such rules' 
(1977: 78). 
24. Of all the supervisors in Firm A, only one superintendent had not been 
promoted internally. At Firm B, a toolroom supervisor had been in 
the Company for only twelve months at the time of our interview. 
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as an operator (or machinist) 
other side'. This means that 
all the shop rules; moreover, 
links with some of their subo 
their tendency towards a high 
The second fundamental 
and then as a setter before passing 'on the 
foremen knew the 'shop-floor mentality' and 
they were likely to have established social 
rdinates. This may have also contributed to 
degree of co-operation with the shop-floor. 
reason why the foremen's range of options was 
limited concerns their relative power. In other words, to what extent did 
they have the power to be really effective on supervision and discipline 
had they wished to do so? It was pointed out that following the institutional 
reform, the influence of the foremen on many aspects of work relations had 
been eroded. They were not involved in most of the bargaining conducted 
through the institutional framework. Because the power basis of foremen was 
not strong enough, much of the attention of senior shop stewards was 
directed towards higher levels of management. The following observation is 
relevant in this respect: 
A strong bargaining relationship rests upon a broad balance 
of power between the two persons involved. Unless the other 
person has a degree of power, there is little attraction in 
giving him confidences and support, for little will be gained 
in return. It is for this reason that shop-floor convenors do 
not have bargaining relationships with any foremen. (Ratstone, 
Boraston and Frenkel, 1977: 171) 
In the case of the ordinary shop stewards, a much greater proportion of 
their bargaining activity was still carried on with their foremen, although 
they also had plenty of opportunities to upstage them. Moreover, the fact 
that in both cases foremen were not satisfactorily informed about the whole 
process of job regulation further contributed to their isolation. Finally, it 
was explained earlier how the loss of the foremen's authority to impose 
disciplinary sanctions and their circumscribed discretion on remuneration 
had affected their power. 
Much of the evidence presented in this section suggests that the 
- 145 - 
labour relations reform contributed to weakening significantly the position 
of foremen in the two engineering firms. In principle, this could have 
had important implications for the degree of job control. It appears, 
however, that the impact on job control was different in the two firms, 
notably because of marked differences in the structure of management control 
and in the strength of the shop-floor organisations. 
3. IMPACT OF THE REFORM ON THE SHOP-FLOOR ORGANISATIONS 
3.1 The Wider Debate on Workplace Union Organisation 
The essence of Clegg's theory of trade unionism is that many 
aspects of union behaviour can be explained by the structure of collective 
bargaining. This holds that 'the level of bargaining is the primary 
explanatory variable' in the study of the distribution of power within 
unions (1976b: 54). Since 'this proposition applies to workplace organisation 
as to other levels of union government' (1976b: 67), the theory would 
suggest that the centralisation of workplace collective bargaining would 
contribute to a corresponding centralisation of power within the domestic 
organisation. This is one of the central themes of this section. 
Indeed, many writers have suggested that such a degree of centrali- 
sation within shop steward organisations did actually occur in British 
manufacturing industry during the 1970s. Terry (1979: 385-8) and Hyman 
(1979b: 57-62) discussed the consequences of this development, and although 
Batstone expressed many points of disagreement with their analyses, he 
nevertheless accepted that 'the "professionalism" and centralization of 
steward organization therefore appears clear' (1979: 12,16). He argued that 
a form of 'broad-based democratic centralism' was necessary and desirable 
if workplace organisations were to go beyond sectionalism and 
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parochialism (1979: 14,17,31). 
25 
The period of post-Donovan reform was also marked by an extension of 
hierarchy within shop steward organisations in which the most remarkable 
change was the sharp increase in the number of full-time shop stewards (see 
principally Brown, 1981: 62-7; and Brown, Ebsworth and Terry, 1978: 143-5). 
Analysing the possible consequences of this trend, this latter group of 
researchers wrote: 
It is probable that as bargaining expertise becomes more 
concentrated, the potential for united action is increased, and 
organised responses to management become faster. At the same 
time increased hierarchy may make senior stewards more securely 
entrenched and more distant from the rank-and-file membership. 
It should be stressed that we use the word hierarchy here merely 
to indicate some sort of grading without any necessary implica- 
tion as to the pattern of control in the organisation. (Brown, 
Ebsworth and Terry, 1978: 143) 
Hyman goes a step further in arguing that this development of a 
hierarchy coincided with two other trends. One was 'a centralisation of 
control within stewards' organisations', along with a reinforcement of the 
disciplinary powers of the joint shop stewards' committee (1979b: 57; see 
also Hyman, 1980: 74). The other development, 'a significant degree of 
integration between steward hierarchies and official trade union structures' 
(1979b: 57), is not so relevant to the focus of this research. This argument, 
along with Terry's paper (1979), set the background for the debate on the 
'incorporation' or 'bureaucratisation' of shop stewards. 
26 
Hyman accepted 
25. Hyman also accepted that 'the centralisation of workplace organisation 
is both inevitable and desirable' (1979b: 62; also 59-60). 
26. See also Batstone (1979: 11-19). At some point in his 1979 paper, Hyman 
wrote: 'Against this background it is not fanciful to speak of the 
bureaucratisation of the rank and file' (p. 58). It is with this 
part of Hyman's argument in particular that Jeffereys took issue (1979: 
44; also 35-6). He sought to dismiss Hyman's argument on the basis of 
an historical interpretation of shop-floor resistance of 'job-based 
trade unionism' (1979: 35-6,43-5). However, he did not consider the 
many facets of Hyman's argument. 
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that 'it would be unrealistic to deny the need for both leadership and 
discipline within shop-floor organisations' (1979b: 60), but he argued 
that too great an emphasis on control within the organisation (or control 
'over' the members) could shift dramatically the balance from autonomous 
to incorporated workplace union organisations. His point was that 
the resources of discipline and control which are a precondition 
of effective collective struggle contain the potential to be 
turned back against trade union members in the interests of 
capital; channelling and containing workers' resistance to the 
exploitation of their labour power, facilitating and 
reinforcing managerial control over the labour process. 
(1979: 60) 
In contrast, the essence of Batstone's counter-argument was that 
while it was undeniable that centralisation had occurred, 
there is little evidence of stewards in the present era 
being any more incorporated - at least for any period 
of time - than they have been in the past ... 
In addition, ... it is not the case, from the 
available evidence cited previöusly, that this has led to 
a reduction in the lgyel of bargaining among 'normal' 
stewards. (1979: 31) 
It is against this background that attention now focuses on the 
actual impact of the reform on the government of our two workplace union 
organisations. 
3.2 The Institutionalisation of Trade Union Action 
Institutional security. Brown (1973: 151) has observed that 
by formalising plant level negotiations management effectively 
deepens the recognition it gives to its employees' trade union 
organisation. It reinforces the procedural position of the 
stewards and, if any plant agreements negotiated between them 
are written down, the stewards' position is reinforced further. 
27. England (1981) also focuses on a critique of some aspects of the 
'incorporation thesis', especially the question of national union 
government; see also Terry, 1983: 88-90. 
- 148 - 
This generalisation is supported by the processes which developed in the 
two firms during the seventies; the unions' institutional security was 
consolidated. The closed shop had existed for many years at Firm B and 
was formalised in Firm A in 1978, and a check-off agreement was also 
granted in both firms. The procedural position of accredited shop 
stewards, too, had much improved. For example, there were more regular 
shop stewards' meetings during working hours. Besides the regular JSSC 
meetings in both plants, there were weekly meetings of the shop stewards 
of each union at Firm B. In some production areas regular section 
meetings were also held on a weekly basis during working hours, a practice 
seen by many experienced stewards as a sharp contrast with the situation 
prevailing in the sixties. 
28 In both cases, the shop stewards had plenty 
of opportunities to meet on a more informal basis during working hours 
to exchange information and discuss strategy. The facilities afforded to 
shop stewards had improved over the last ten years, much in line with the 
pattern in the industry. For instance, it was widely known at Firm B 
that the press operators' shop stewards earned, on average, significantly 
more than the operators. 
Because of the developments presented in Chapter 4 joint meetings 
between shop stewards and senior managers became much more frequent, 
signifying an improvement in the procedural position of the stewards. 
However, it must be stressed that the workers' representatives at Firm A 
gained more from the changes in the shop steward-management relations, 
because their degree of involvement in labour relations was lower, and their 
28. Such meetings were chaired by the shop steward (and in some cases the 
shop committee men). They were observed mainly in the Heat transfer 
division. In the case of production workers in the other large 
division (presswork), the permissiveness of the piecework scheme 
offered better opportunities for holding informal shop meetings. 
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collective influence weaker, before the reform. At Firm B, sectional 
shop steward organisation was already solidly based before the reform 
began. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that during the sixties 
workplace organisation in Firm B corresponded broadly to the pattern 
observed by Turner, Clack and Roberts (1967: 192-223). 
29 What happened 
during the following decade arose from a fundamental shift in management 
policies and strategies towards the shop stewards. This suggests that the 
two shop steward organisations were not equally indebted to the institu- 
tional reform, a fact which might foster different levels of commitment 
to it. It is nevertheless the case that at the time of the fieldwork both 
had acquired a degree of institutional security and recognition which 
compares well with the general pattern in the engineering industry. 
Centralisation. It was noted that a degree of centralisation 
within the shop-floor organisation was a precondition for the effective 
implementation of the reform. But it must also be stressed that the 
centralisation of pay bargaining and a greater adherence to procedure 
produced, in turn, a further reinforcement of power at the centre of the 
shop steward organisations. This was observed within both organisations. 
The bargaining skills and expertise in procedural as well as substantive 
matters tended to become more concentrated at senior shop steward level. 
This was manifest in the case of the two majority unions where the number 
of stewards was important and the convenors were on union duties on a 
29. This research team gave a good account of the organisational complexity 
and the 'considerable hierarchy' which had existed for some years 
within shop steward organisations in the motor industry (1967: 192-211). 
They also observed in the sixties a significant trend towards a 
degree of institutionalisation of workplace union action, at least 
in the large factories of the major motor companies (1967: 212-23). 
Firm B also operated in the vehicles sector, within the Coventry labour 
market, and its workforce was organised by the predominant unions 
in the motor industry. Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel (1977: 281-9) 
gave an interesting account of the history of a shop-floor organisation 
also containing these three characteristics. 
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full-time basis (or almost full-time basis at Firm A). The trend was 
also reinforced by the particularly long periods of office of both 
convenors: the TGWU convenor at Firm B had occupied this function since 
1969, while the GMWU convenor at Firm A also had had long experience as 
a convenor when he was re-elected to this position in 1979.30 The 
senior stewards' influence was particularly significant with respect to 
one of the aspects of power identified by Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel 
(1977: 9), i. e. 'the initiating and directing of issues', or 'the ability 
to influence the "terms of debate"'. 
The reinforcement of power at the centre was further encouraged 
-m because negotiation at company level created the need for onlyini 
co-ordination of action within the shop-floor organisations. The role of 
the senior shop stewards was crucial in preserving the balance between 
two union principles: the recognition of sectional (or local) autonomy 
and the defence of collective interests. Although not necessarily 
contradictory, these principles of workplace union action were not easily 
reconcilable in practice. Hence the unity of the collective organisation 
might be at risk when sanctions affecting larger groups of workers were 
applied by sectional groups. It was in order to deal with this problem 
that the TGWU organisation at Firm B adopted a rule to the effect that 
the convenor had to be allowed to meet a section before it could take 
industrial action, 
31 
as the following extract from a TGWU shop stewards 
committee meeting held in March 1975 indicates. 
30. The latter had been GMWU convenor for about twelve years and shop 
steward for approximately eighteen years before resigning for 
personal reasons a few years earlier. He had not really been 
replaced as a convenor in the meantime. 
31. Evans (1980: 82) points out that this union rule was adopted 
subsequent to the current convenor's election in 1969. 
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Convenor put his personal views on what a convenor's 
function should be, as he felt that recently he was being 
used in a minor capacity and when sections were advocating 
strike action, he wasn't being invited to hear the pros and 
cons of the argument and also to put points of view in a 
broader context ... After a long discussion, unanimous 
agreement was reached that Convenor should talk to sections 
before any Industrial Action was implemented. (Minutes 
book, 26 March 1975) 
Of course, one of the justifications for such a degree of 'coordination' 
was the need to inform other parts of the membership and eventually seek 
their support. Hence 'the shop stewards procedure agreed some time back 
is that the convenor is called in before any section walks out so he can 
hear the views of the section in case he needs to inform any other section 
who might be affected'. 
32 
The preceding references to TGWU policies suggest some of the 
reasons why the management of both firms acted in a way designed to give 
more power to the senior stewards in their relations with ordinary stewards 
and members. This objective, however, was only partially attained 
because the senior stewards lacked the will and confidence to systematically 
concentrate more power at the centre. Considering the tradition of 
fractionalism, this would have put more pressure on them, with some risks 
of a more co-ordinated opposition within the union ranks. Moreover, 
there was in both cases a considerable shop-floor resistance to any loss 
of autonomy, a subject discussed later in this chapter. 
Institutionalisation had a discernible but moderate influence on 
hierarchy within the shop-floor organisations. At Firm A, the JSSC 
regrouped all the shop stewards, but the elected posts did not lead to 
32. TGWU shop stewards committee Minutes book, 26 April 1978. In 
another entry, dated 1 June 1977, it is reported that 'Convenor 
stated that he was seeking meeting with setters to explain they 
had not yet had a works conference, and would have to meet him if 
they were to ask for the support of other sections'. 
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much more influence within the organisation. 
33 
Influence on the committee 
depended much more on personal leadership, on the steward's standing 
within his union, and on the nature and size of his constituency. The 
five shop stewards on the works council could be considered as an 'executive 
committee' (Brown, Ebsworth and Terry, 1978: 143), although it was stressed 
that they had little autonomy in relation to the whole shop steward body. 
Obviously, size is extremely important with respect to hierarchy, 
and institutionalisation contributed to the development of a more elaborate 
hierarchy in Firm B. Apart from the distinctive pattern within each 
union (hierarchy was more sophisticated in the case of the TGWU), there 
were two levels of delegation within the factory. The JSSC was a ten- 
member committee which held regular monthly meetings, had joint meetings 
with senior management (also on a monthly basis), and engaged in bargaining 
during the annual pay negotiations. It had a limited degree of autonomy 
in the sense that it actually initiated bargaining on many issues and 
developed strategies. To be effective, however, the action of the JSSC 
would have required more extensive support from the individual unions, which 
were jealous of their autonomy. The senior shop stewards constituted a 
more select body of representatives which met top managers on an ad hoc 
basis. It could be compared to an executive committee within the broader 
legislative body. The major difference between these two shop steward 
bodies was that in the smaller one the experienced TGWU convenor was on his 
own to represent the majority of manual workers. When a particular problem 
occurred, management had the option of convening one representative body 
or the other, depending on the strategy adopted. Evans (1980: 88) suggested 
33. The chairman of the JSSC was the only EETPU steward in the company; 
his election represented a compromise between the two rival unions 
PMWU and TGWU). None of the elected jobs was held by the majority 
union (GMWU) at the time of observation. 
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that 'where identifiable problems required specific remedies, the tendency 
was to approach the senior stewards before the JSSC. Where the problem 
had broader and still less-defined implications, the JSSC would be 
expected to carry the message back to the membership. ' We noted, however, 
that in the case of domestic bargaining on the issue of the engineering 
strike in September 1979, management initiated the discussion on principles 
with the senior stewards and then went further, with more detailed 
proposals, to the JSSC with whom they reached an agreement. 
This brief discussion on hierarchy has centred so far on the formal 
structure within the union organisations. It is relevant to note that 
there also existed in Firm Ba close network of experienced stewards who 
represented the dominant influence within the TGWU organisation. From our 
observation it appeared that a group of four moderate shop stewards had an 
overwhelming influence in defining the orthodoxy of the TGWU organisation in 
terms of policies and strategy. All were working as press operators in 
the late sixties and they were also very involved in the militant action 
which characterised the period. They had been shop stewards for all (or 
most) of the period since. The convenor was the leader and he could rely 
on the complete loyalty of the other members of the group as well as a 
majority of the other TGWU shop stewards. At the end of the fieldwork, two 
other members of the group were deputy convenor and secretary of the TGWU 
shop stewards' committee (as well as branch secretary). Hence they 
occupied three of the five TGWU posts on the JSSC. While the fourth shop 
steward was not so involved and influential within the steward body, he had 
been the branch chairman for some years. These stewards, who had developed 
close personal links over the years, were also part of the small nucleus of 
members who regularly attended the branch meetings. 
While there were significant political differences between these 
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four shop stewards, they shared similar trade union principles, which 
could be characterised as a moderate but independent form of trade union 
action. For various reasons, several of the more militant TGWU stewards 
left the Company in 1979 and 1980 (and one renounced his steward's 
credential in 1978). But the majority had always been likely to follow 
the leadership of the moderates. The strong bargaining relationships of 
this moderate leadership with middle and senior management helped to keep 
those not 'falling in line' out of some of the discussions and to limit 
what they could achieve on substantive matters. It could be argued that 
the TGWU leadership and management had a mutual interest in isolating the 
minority of militant stewards, or at least in making sure that their 
position would not be supported within the organisation. 
Constitutionalism. The two shop steward organisations invariably 
gave full support to the new procedural framework and saw major benefits 
in working within it. This support of the 'rules of the game' came 
mainly from the 'centre' of the organisations. This meant, first, that 
there was an overwhelming belief within the ranks of the shop stewards of 
the majority union (as opposed to those of the 'skilled workers' unions') 
in each factory that the new set of procedures (especially the disputes 
procedures and status quo) had benefited the workforce. Secondly, the 
commitment to the structure of labour relations was likely to be stronger 
within the group of shop stewards and union officials that had been most 
involved in the negotiation of this institutional framework. In short, 
there was strong evidence that the authorship of rules (Terry, 1977) had 
a positive influence on the subsequent commitment to procedural as well as 
substantive rules. For instance, at a GMWU branch meeting in Firm A in 
October 1978, nobody supported a shop steward from the foundry when he 
was disciplined by the Regional Officer for submitting a petition of his 
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members asking for a foundry differential and claiming separate nego- 
tiating arrangements. The full-time official used this type of authoritarian 
argument: 'We have signed a procedural agreement with the Company and I 
will not tolerate a breach of agreement ... Any shop steward who tries 
to go against an agreement with the Company will face a Regional 
Committee. ' Such a process was also observed by Purcell (1979a: 17-18): 
Once the reforms were achieved, it was noticeable that 
the negotiators felt they were the 'custodians' (as some of 
them put it) of the new order. There was a preparedness to 
defend the system in the event of action by a minority group. 
In four cases, the JSSC put extensive pressure on management to 
dissuade them from negotiating on unauthorised sectional pay 
claims. They indicated that, if management did so, the new 
framework of industrial relations would be shattered ... In 
two cases, the majority trade unions and their members appeared 
willing to allow management to sack a militant shop steward who 
had sought to render the new scheme unworkable. 
With such a high degree of 'constitutional' commitment to the 
procedural framework, the unions' representatives contributed to the 
legitimacy of the process of decision-making over work relations and 
reinforced the position of the senior shop stewards, the 'masters in 
procedure'. In the TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes books (Firm B) 
there were references indicating that the convenor repeatedly insisted on 
the need for shop stewards to act within procedure. 
34 
At a meeting held 
in September 1978, 
Convenor reminded stewards that'they were bound by the 
Procedure Agreement and had in this case been in breach 
of it. He felt, aside from the merit of the case, too 
many stewards are not following procedure. It is a good 
agreement that has protected the members' jobs in some cases, 
and continuity of work in others. Several stewards expressed 
the opinion that the Company also used it to drag out arguments 
and not to be in any hurry to resolve them. That stewards 
34. Here is a typical entry: 'Bro fconvenor7 stressed the need for 
shop stewards to honour and work within the procedure agreement. ' 
Minutes book, meeting held on 8 April 1974. 
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were not wrSRg in bending agreements to suit them whenever 
they could. 
The final part of this quotation suggests that there was some discussion 
within the shop stewards' committee on this issue. It appears, however, 
that, as was often the case on other issues, the convenor considered such 
a critical position on the part of some of the TGWU stewards as a challenge 
to his personal leadership. The following extract from the Minutes 
book illustrates this point: 
Bro [convenor] spoke of sections denying him his 
rights as Convenor, and also of setters' steward by- 
passing recognised procedure. After a long discussion 
on proper procedures being adhered to and recognition of 
the Convenor position in these procedures, a ungTximous 
vote of confidence was afforded Bro [convenor,?. 
Such an allegiance to procedure within the shop steward organisation 
was also observed at Firm A where sectional groups and individual stewards 
had little chance to get the support of the broader organisation if they 
were in breach of procedure. Two further effects of this strong commitment 
to procedure are relevant. First, it involved the shop stewards, and 
especially the senior stewards, in the process of 'sparing' the use of 
sanctions. Here is evidence of this occurring at Firm B: 
Copper Block Section had said that no more setting would 
be done as a protest against ranking in the Pecking Order. 
Senior stewards talked to the men and said that procedures 
were beiß g broken. After discussions, working returned to 
normal. 
External transport drivers in dispute due to Company 
not upholding an agreement in relation to transport and 
Exhold Depot. After meeting Senior Management, problem 
resolved. Convenor pointed out to Section if Procedur58 
had been used correctly, men would not have lost time. 
35. TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book, meeting held on 
13 September 1978. 
36. ibid., meeting held on 6 November 1972. 
37. ibid., meeting held on 1 April 1974. 
38. ibid., meeting held on 11 February 1976. 
- 157 - 
This type of senior shop stewards' involvement in the regulation of conflict, 
which was observed in both firms, was generally based on two major argu- 
ments, besides the intrinsic value of acting in conformity with the 
structure of joint regulation. These were the advantages of not losing 
money (the argument of the costs of sanctions referred to in the above 
quotation), and protecting unity within the organisation, considering 
that 'any sectional strike action could endanger the organization's unity 
and strength' (Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1978: 61, also 57). 
The other effect of constitutionalism arose from the status quo 
clause. The general commitment to this principle effectively contributed 
to reducing the frequency of spontaneous stoppages. Indeed, several shop 
stewards from Firm B argued in interviews that, apart from naturally 
perishable issues (mainly concerning health and safety), the need for 
spontaneous action no longer existed as it did before. The following are 
short extracts from these interviews: 
The beauty of the procedure agreement is that when 
there's disagreement on a job, they will9normally find 
.: -alternative work to do in the meantime. 
Technically you should never have to go on strike 
because Eben when a man is dismissed ... he carries on 
working. 
In the two case studies there was also some evidence of a cause and effect 
relationship between strong bargaining relationships and the reduction 
of the frequency of strike action and other overt sanctions (Brown, 1973: 
134-5; Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1978: 38-9,44). It could be 
r 
suggested, however, that the relationship may also be turned around, in 
39. Interview with Press shop no. 4 (TGWU) shop steward, 3 October 1979. 
A similar viewpoint was also expressed by the TGWU shop steward of 
the Copper core section (20 September 1979). 
40. Interview with TGWU convenor, 25 October 1979. 
0 
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the sense that a successful record with respect to conflict regulation 
may represent a good asset for a shop steward to develop strong bragaining 
relationships. 
Control and discipline. It has been shown that an increasing degree 
of centralisation of power within the organisations as well as the emergence 
of a form of constitutionalism followed the industrial relations reforms. 
It is now necessary to explore whether the development of the new institu- 
tional framework coincided with the emergence of a higher degree of control 
and discipline within the shop-floor organisations. There was little 
evidence of this change in Firm A. Power was diffuse within the organisation 
and the lack of co-ordination and leadership was obvious on many occasions 
during the fieldwork; for example, during the 1979 pay negotiation as well 
as during the skilled workers' strike in February 1979. The JSSC was a 
fragmented and fragile body, a fact most shop stewards were very aware of. 
41 
The shop stewards had only worked together since 1974, they had had a long 
tradition of union rivalry, and the JSSC regrouped representatives of two 
factories with significant differences concerning the working conditions 
and the characteristics of the workforce. In such a context, rigorous 
control and discipline were hardly possible within the organisation. What 
sometimes occurred, however, was that some of the shop stewards brought 
pressure to bear on a few rebel shop stewards. In addition, the GMWU 
convenor occasionally directed a verbal attack against an individual or a 
small group of shop stewards. 
The situation was different at Firm B. The operation of the different 
41. It was possible to attend many JSSC meetings during the 1979 
negotiation. There was little reference to internal procedure, no 
proper recording of minutes, and the lack of co-ordination impeded 
the elaboration of collective policies and strategies. There is no 
doubt that this organisation did not constitute an integrated shop 
steward body as defined by Brown (1973: 139). 
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structures within the shop stewards organisation (JSSC, TGWU and AUEW 
shop stewards committees, NUSMW shop committee meetings, etc. ) facilitated 
a greater respect for internal procedure. There appeared to be a strong 
tradition of collective discipline and co-ordination. It must be stressed, 
however, that the JSSC was not a strong and united shop steward body in 
this workplace either. Interviews with senior representatives of the 
TGWU, AUEW, and NUSMW demonstrated that the JSSC remained a fragile 
body which had to cope with a long tradition of union autonomy and rivalry. 
42 
The friction existed mainly between the TGWU and the 'skilled unions'. 
Besides the tinsmiths (NUSMW), who were a small but very independent group 
of trade unionists, the resistance to a collective definition of union 
action came mainly from the toolmakers (AUEW). Individual interviews with 
the shop steward and three other members of the toolroom committee clearly 
showed how little commitment they had to JSSC policies. 
43 They felt very 
strongly about their skilled status and saw little identity of interests with 
the TGWU members, and especially with the large group of press operators 
(the stronghold of the latter organisation). For instance, they would 
certainly not accept a pay deal imposed on them by a majority vote of the 
whole shop-floor organisation. 
Within the TGWU organisation, however, a degree of internal control 
and discipline was observed. The shop stewards' committee weekly meeting 
offered the convenor the opportunity to discipline any shop steward who 
had broken a union rule or principle, usually with the support of other J TPwAR3s, 
42. Interviews were conducted on 23 October, I November and 15 October 1979. 
On two occasions in 1979 the very existence of the JSSC amounted 
to very little, i. e. during the pay negotiation and later during 
the national engineering strike. 
43. The structured interviews with the three shop committee members 
were held on 17 and 19 September 1979. Several informal interviews 
were conducted with the toolroom shop steward. 
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At one meeting we attended in August 1979, the shop steward of the Dravo 
section (Heating division) was reprimanded for having spoken against the 
collective position of the shop stewards at a factory meeting on the 
question of the support for the engineering strike. The account of this 
event is worth quoting at some length: 
There followed a long discussion in which Bro Lconvenor] 
pointed out that as stewards we represent more than our own 
immediate members, we also have a responsibility to the union 
and its policies. Bro he steward concerne47 repeated the 
point he made at the factory meeting that he felt we should 
be asking the officials for dispensation for Firm B]. He 
was strongly criticised by Bro E for speaking against the 
shop stewards' recommendation to which he was party, and on 
a subject he had received no support for when he raised it 
the previous meeting. Bro convenor] said that as shop 
stewards we have no option but to recommend support. Bro C. 
said that shop stewards can have their say at the stewards 
meeting, 4ýd vote, but they must then abide by the majority 
decision. 
Two union principles which were widely shared within the TGWU shop steward 
organisation are referred to in the above quotation. The first was that 
shop stewards did not only represent the section which elected them, they 
were also part of the domestic organisation and accredited representatives 
of the broader union movement. This may be called the principle of double 
allegiance. The second was the principle of collective responsibility. 
It meant that once the majority decision had been taken, the minority had 
to rally behind the collective decision, with no right to dissent at mass 
meetings or in front of management. 
45 Here is some evidence showing that 
44. TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book, meeting held on 
29 August 1979. 
45. In the case referred to here, the TGWU shop stewards' committee had 
voted 16 for, 15 against, with one abstention, on the proposal to 
support the national strike movement. At the mass meeting held one week 
later, the workforce voted by a strong majority against the JSSC 
recommendation to follow the strike call. On the crucial importance 
of the shop stewards' support for the national engineering strike, and 
the loyalty of most stewards to their national union in spite of workers' 
reluctance, see Edwards and Scullion (1982b: 58-63). 
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this rule existed as far back as 1971: 
Complaint of stewards who are part of a recommendation 
speaking against it at a mass meeting. It was felt that 
once a vote had been taken at stewards meeting all stewards 
should be a party to that decision. It was proposed that 
after a vote the meeting should then endorse that decision 
so that when a recommendation by the stewards was passed 46 
unanimous, then no steward should speak against the decision. 
From the information presented so far in this section, the general 
trend was one of centralisation within the shop steward organisations and 
of institutionalisation of workplace union action. In the following 
section, the attention focuses on the opposite or contradictory trend, 
with particular consideration of the forces which fostered decentralisation 
and resistance to institutionalisation. 
3.3 Resistance to Institutionalisation Within Workplace Organisations 
Members' control over the organisations. Michael Terry has suggested 
that within workplace union organisations in the engineering industry 
'there has been a shift of analytical emphasis from what Hyman terms control 
for workers to control over workers'. 
47 
This proposition is not supported 
by the findings of the two case studies. The evidence presented in this 
chapter shows that these two dimensions of control effectively existed 
in the workplace organisations, but the emphasis had not been reversed to 
control over workers. The organisations were still primarily 'a medium 
of power for workers to exert control over their jobs' (Hyman, 1975: 73). 
Indeed, the relatively high degree of members' control over their 
domestic organisations represented one of the main factors of resistance 
46. TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book, 2 March 1971. One 
also finds reference to this rule in the minutes of the meeting 
held on 11 January 1971. 
47. Published in Sociologie du travail (1979: 389). Hyman's argument on 
discipline and control within organisations, which was presented 
at the beginning of section 3, broadly corresponds to the 
proposition quoted here. 
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to the institutionalisation of union action. In both cases, although 
more significantly in Firm B, this resistance came from below. In this 
respect one should not overlook the many facets of the shop steward-member 
relations (Batstone, 1979: 12-19). The two shop-floor organisations had 
preserved a strong commitment to the democratic rule, with ideological 
references to the principles of delegation from below, sectional autonomy, 
and even to direct democracy. At micro level, members' controls over the 
elected representatives were both spontaneous and manyfold. 
48 
More 
important than the electoral process is the fact thal all shop stewards, 
except for one at Firm B, worked on the shop-floor and were very much in 
touch with members' feelings in their own constituency. Therefore shop 
stewards' autonomy from the rank and file should not be exaggerated, at 
least from the evidence of these two engineering firms. Moreover, it will 
be shown later that shop-floor workers generally protected their job 
control and shop rules against any joint or management incursion from above. 
On this point Evans' account (1980: 109) corresponds with our own 
observation in the same firm (case B): 
Management strategy demands a more centralised control 
over the membership, and a more effective response to this 
strategy necessitates such control. But the leadership is 
ambivalent about assuming this authority. The main reason 
for this, we have seen, is the continuing resistance by workers 
to surrendering whatever autonomy they have within their 
relations with management and other workers. 
The local basis of shop steward action. In spite of the reforms in 
the structure of labour relations, the representative function of most 
shop stewards was performed mainly at the level of their section or 
48. Hyman's argument on the two-way process of control was illustrated 
with reference to union officials (1975: 73). Hence he pointed out 
that 'they are the employees and the servants of the members, who 
are thus in appropriate situations entitled to exert control over 
them'. Arguably this dimension of the control system is even more 
significant if applied with reference to the shop stewards. 
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( )constituency. It dealt primarily with job control, 'the rate for the 
job', and working conditions. Although the scope of bargaining had 
increased at factory and company level, there was still a lot of bargaining 
going on at the shop-floor where the ordinary shop steward finds his power 
basis. As Batstone pointed out, 'workplace bargaining is still dominantly 
an informal activity' (1979: 19; see also Terry, 1977), because of the need 
to adapt to specific work processes and working conditions. Indeed, if a 
greater adherence to procedure favours centralisation and the elaboration 
of universal and more formal rules, the need to adapt to the specificity 
of the work process fosters decentralisation and informality. This suggests 
that in looking at the impact of institutionalisation on the shop steward 
organisations, a distinction must be made between the centre of the 
organisations and the ordinary shop stewards. 
At Firm B, two poles of shop steward representation had developed 
which broadly corresponded to the levels of bargaining. On the one hand, 
the senior shop stewards and the JSSC negotiated a floor of rights through 
the institutional framework at factory level. They tried to co-ordinate 
union action so that collective interests would predominate over sectional 
ones. On the other hand, the principle of sectional autonomy was recognised 
for the protection of job control and other shop-floor matters, in relation 
to specific contributions to the work process. The distinction was not 
so clear in Firm A because the shop steward organisation was weaker at 
shop-floor level and the hierarchy less developed within the stewards 
ranks. 
The persistence of sectionalism. In the two firms the most serious 
impediment to the institutionalisation of labour relations was the 
predominance of sectionalism. A large part of shop-floor action to develop 
and preserve job control was still conducted on a sectional basis. An 
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attempt is made here to illustrate how the pervasiveness of sectionalism 
caused serious problems of co-ordination within the union side and could 
impede the smooth working of the institutional framework at company level. 
To this end, brief reference is made to particular events which occurred 
in the two firms during the 1979 pay negotiations. 
The negotiations had followed the usual pattern at Firm A when 
the majority of manual workers voted for the acceptance of the company's 
final offer (it was the third round of mass meetings, held on 16 January 
1979). However, the majority of AUEW and EETPU members (at a separate 
meeting) rejected it, being particularly dissatisfied with the proposals 
on the indirect incentive scheme. With the tacit support of the GMWU 
and TGWU stewards, management insisted that the rule of the overall 
majority should prevail, and the company implemented the new conditions. 
This eventually led to a seven-day strike by a group of about 
seventy AUEW and EETPU members in February 1979. The other unions refused 
to give any support to the strike. Since the AUEW and EETPU did not 
represent all skilled workers (and few of them at Factory 1), the impact 
of the strike on production was minimal. Interestingly, management 
insisted on discussing the issue with the whole JSSC and not exclusively 
with the strikers' representatives. Management's argument was that the 
two general unions also had members covered by the indirect incentive 
scheme and, more importantly, that the JSSC was the institution representing 
the workers' collective interests within the company. This meant that 
thirteen shop stewards representing members refusing to give any support 
to the strikers were involved in two days of negotiation, together with 
the three stewards directly involved and management. Our informants 
explained that the 'neutral' shop stewards did not really put pressure on 
the company but helped to formulate a possible compromise, i. e. a reference 
to ACAS for arbitration. The outcome did not solve any of the skilled 
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workers' problems: the dispute never reached the stage of an arbitration 
hearing because the four unions could not agree on the terms of reference 
under which they could collectively go to arbitration. When the AUEW 
requested to go to arbitration on its own, management categorically 
refused. 
Apart from being a rather extreme example of lack of union co- 
ordination and solidarity, this was also a case in which management succeeded 
in channelling a sectional dispute through the institutional framework. 
By doing so management also protected the authority of the JSSC at a time 
when the shop-floor organisation was paradoxically showing a lack of 
collective spirit and solidarity. This last point of strategy was also 
observed at Firm B during the national engineering strike, when manage- 
ment took all possible measures to prevent the collapse of the JSSC. It 
must be pointed out, however, that in the case of a more robust shop-floor 
organisation (as in Firm B) it is much more difficult for management to 
integrate sectional disputes within the structure of labour relations at 
company level. 
The 1979 pay negotiations at Firm B also provide some evidence 
of sectional resistance to institutionalisation. Although according to 
procedure the JSSC was mandated to negotiate the pay deal, it did not have 
the strength and autonomy to achieve an agreement without sectional 
bargaining being conducted with particular sections and occupational groups. 
The JSSC was not able to submit a collective claim, indeed the stewards 
could hardly agree on a collective demand even within the TGWU ranks. 
Consequently they negotiated on the basis of management's terms. 
49 Another 
49. To quote one of the leaders of the JSSC, 'you're pleased when you 
see an offer to discuss'. Interview, 25 October 1979. 
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interesting characteristic of the bargaining process at Firm B was the 
mode of acceptance of the agreement which, up to 1980, was done on a 
sectional or occupational group basis. 
50 
Hence, the TGWU might hold a 
mass meeting to inform the members, but the votes were taken within the 
sections. Indeed, it was on the basis of such votes within each section 
that the JSSC recommendation to accept management's proposals was turned 
down by the members in April 1979. At a later stage, many sections and 
occupational groups accepted the pay deal while a minority of sections 
(and of the members) were waiting for a Works Conference to be held on 
6 June. 51 In the meantime, it was jointly agreed that the groups which 
had settled would be paid according to their new rate, as was the practice 
in this factory (a situation which obviously further reduced the 
bargaining power of the minority sections). In the course of 1979, 
nineteen different upgrading claims went through procedure (Evans, 1980: 
52), many of them reaching the stage of Works Conference. They had little 
support from the TGWU convenor and the JSSC, and none of these groups made 
significant progress. Later in 1979, differential problems became so 
acute that management took the initiative to give 'every section within 
52 the Company ... the opportunity to state a case for a differential review'. 
50. In a document prepared by the personnel director for the attention of 
JSSC members in December 1979, it is stressed that 'for the 1980 
settlement and thereafter, acceptance of any general pay deal or change 
in terms and conditions of employment will need to be on a union by 
union basis (and not section by section - or, as in 1979, sometimes 
a motley collection of sections). It would be better to make all such 
issues decided by a ballot of the total workforce, but this may be 
seen as conflicting with individual Union autonomy. ' Management 
document, 19 December 1979, p. 4. 
51. A management source confirmed that this Works Conference had been 
arranged mainly in order to give the JSSC more power in relation to 
the sections refusing the deal. Interview, May 1980. 
52. Management document, 19 December 1979, p. 1. 
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As a result of this, six of the twenty-nine sections who had argued for 
a better ranking within the wage structure got some improvement. 
The source of this sectional resistance now deserves some attention. 
Why did the identification with sectional interests predominate over more 
collective ones? The analysis of Steve Evans (1980), based on research 
conducted at Firm B, is used here as a starting point as it explored the 
resurgence of sectional interests and the lack of collective strategy and 
resistance. Two steps in his argument can be distinguished. First, it 
is observed that in a situation where the objective conditions fostered 
and required a more collective response (p. 106) the shop stewards failed 
to ensure the predominance of these collective interests (pp. 58,77,85). 
Secondly, it is suggested that the procedural reform significantly 
contributed to limiting further the identity and representation of 
collective interests. One of the ways the institutional reform did so, it 
is argued, was in reducing the intensity of conflict at the shop-floor. 
Here is the most explicit statement of this: 
As result of management's encouragement of an improved 
bargaining relationship, the stewards came to play a greater 
role in the organisation of production. This had the effect 
of restricting the coercive aspect of supervision and 
protecting the 'autonomy' of the operators within the work 
process. The reduction in conflict this produced, fragmented 
the collective cohesiveness of the operators and their 
stewards. (Evans, 1980: 85; see also 84) 
The first part of the argument corresponds totally with our own observation, 
while the second is more open to discussion. Although it is quite true 
that the reform did not produce a higher degree of shop-floor cohesiveness 
at Firm B, it does not necessarily follow that it fostered a higher 
degree of fragmentation. Before the reform shop-floor resistance was 
also very sectional. 
Evans correctly put emphasis on major attitudinal causes for this 
lack of cohesiveness. Most important were the limited perspective of the 
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operators and their dominant preoccupation with 'making the job pay' 
(pp. 63,85,107), as also the lack of strategy and leadership within 
a group of shop stewards 'essentially responsive to events' (p. 91; also 
109-10). It may be suggested, however, that Evans gave too little 
attention to the structural causes of sectionalism. These objective 
factors, over which the shop-floor organisations had little control, were 
independent of the institutional framework. 
Only a brief reference to these structural causes, which are not 
the specific focus of our case studies, is relevant at this stage. The 
first point is that the fundamental cause of the division between workers 
lies in the division of labour. The structures of trade unionism and 
labour relations, as well as management policies, are some of the factors 
which may reduce or exacerbate this division (between workers). It is 
nevertheless the case that the definition of sectional interests within 
the workplace usually corresponds to the worker contribution to the 
work process. In the companies studied, two factors contributed signi- 
ficantly to sharpening the division between different groups of workers. 
One was the payment systems and the related problems of differentials. In 
these two organisations, the different sections of the workforce were 
particularly preoccupied with their respective positions in the internal 
wage structure. The other factor was multi-unionism. Although the unions 
worked much more closely with each other as a result of the reform, the 
evidence presented in this section shows that multi-unionism remained an 
important factor of division. The point is that each union represented 
particular segments of the workforce (with union jurisdiction corresponding 
to different shifts and factories at Firm A). The principle of union 
autonomy was still very significant, especially at Firm B. 
The pattern of shop steward representation prevailing at Firm B. 
where shop stewards represented a group of workers performing a particular 
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type of task (usually within a specific section) was also a very important 
contributory factor to the persistence of sectionalism. The shop steward 
was the guardian of the interests of workers performing specific functions 
and his power was based on sectional interests. As has been suggested in 
Chapter 3, this pattern may be more appropriate for the protection of job 
control. Hence the paradox is that while trade unionism is about the 
reduction of the division between workers in order to defend collective 
interests, it appears that an efficient organisation for the defence of 
these interests at the point of production is bound to reflect the 
division of labour and sectional interests. 
This pattern of shop steward representation based on the decomposition 
of labour did not exist at Firm A. This factor is seen as one of the main 
reasons why the resistance to institutionalisation was weaker at Firm A. 
Yet it does not follow that there was less sectionalism within the shop- 
floor organisation in the latter case. There was another specific factor 
which reduced the cohesiveness of the organisation. It was the fact that 
members of the same domestic union organisation worked in separate factories 
on different sites. The integration of the workforce of the two factories 
for trade union and collective bargaining purposes represented a strategic 
advantage for management because of the close integration of the work 
processes. As for the workers' side, however, the working conditions were 
quite different and there were little mobility and few community links 
between the foundry and the machine shops employees. This social distance 
was also enhanced by the characteristics of the workforce. A majority of 
the foundry workers were immigrants, while the immigrant population 
represented no more than 10 or 12 per cent of the workforce at Factory II. 
To sum up, the argument of this sub-section is that sectionalism 
was predominantly caused by objective conditions which were independent of 
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the institutional reform. Hence it is suggested that sectionalism had 
not intensified as a result of the reform. Indeed, the overall influence 
of institutionalisation might have slightly reduced its intensity within 
these workplaces. The point is, however, that the reform had made it 
more manifest because it was in sharp conflict with the rationale of the 
new management strategies and policies. 
4. CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO RATIONALES FOR DECISION MAKING 
This chapter has emphasised the contrast between managerial 
strategies to institutionalise labour relations and the strong commitment 
of shop-floor workers to sectional autonomy. Management rationality stemmed 
from the broad objectives of institutionalising conflict and achieving 
greater control over work relations. By contrast, shop-floor rationality 
was defined in relation to the workers' objective of consolidating and 
preserving relative control over the utilisation of their labour at the 
point of production. To achieve this, the power basis of these shop steward 
organisations was mainly grounded on sectional interests. This model of 
shop-floor democracy was particularly adequate to protect the specific 
working conditions of particular groups of workers. This analysis is 
consistent with the argument of Kahn-Freund (1979: 3-26), who placed much 
emphasis on the notion of 'direct democracy'. From a different perspective, 
Harrison (1981: 55) also stressed that 'sectionalism is one of the oldest 
traditions of the British trade union movement'. Regardless of the impact of 
sectionalism on job control (a question studied at a later stage), such a 
degree of fragmentation within the workers' organisation was certainly 
detrimental to the management strategy for reform and indeed to management 
control in general. It was an element of destabilisation in the sense that 
it did not fit into the new management approach to labour relations. In sum, 
r 
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the workforce resisted the institutionalisation of workplace relations on 
two grounds. Workers were certainly unwilling to give up the relative 
control over labour utilisation they had acquired locally and gradually. 
But they were also reluctant to accept a high degree of centralisation 
and control within their own organisation, notably because this would have 
been inconsistent with the pattern of union government which had developed 
in well organised engineering factories. 
To put this argument in simple terms, management wished to rein- 
force control (over work relations) from above while the shop-floor was 
committed to the protection of its relative control from below. Two 
contrasting models of organisation correspond with these rationales for 
decision-making. Management structure follows the principle of devolution 
of authority from the top (hierarchical model) while the shop-floor 
organisation elects and mandates with circumspection its delegates from 
below (democratic model). 
One of the consequences of institutionalisation is the centralisation 
of decision-making along the lines of management hierarchy. While this 
is an advantage from a management viewpoint, shop-floor democracy is more 
compatible with decision-making at the most decentralised level. It was 
also seen that the preoccupation with job control and other conditions 
related to the work process fosters decentralisation. Consequently, it is 
suggested that institutionalisation of workplace labour relations goes 
against some of the fundamental principles of this model of shop-floor 
democracy. Decision-making through the institutional framework progressively 
attacks the workplace union organisation at its weakest point and puts 
pressure on union democracy and solidarity. Within this perspective, the 
lack of strategy and collective outlook of the shop-floor organisations 
observed in these case studies may be explained to some extent. Indeed, 
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this suggests that their organisational basis precluded the development of 
a much stronger degree of cohesiveness at company level. 
CHAPTER 6 
WORKER CONTROL OVER DEPLOYMENT OF LABOUR 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the empirical study of job control following 
the institutional reform, the main features of which were presented in the 
two preceding chapters. The main purpose is to portray and analyse the 
importance of worker control over different aspects of work. To achieve 
this, and contribute to the central arguments of the dissertation, three 
more precise objectives are set out at this stage. 
The first objective is to confront the difficult task of drawing 
an outline of the frontier of control. In his classic study conducted 
in 1919-20, Goodrich stressed this central question in these terms: 'what 
is the present extent, and what are the boundaries, of workers' control? ' 
(1975: 51). The following passage is indicative of his conception of the 
notion of 'frontier of control': 
At what point does the employer say - beyond this there shall 
be no discussion, the rest is my business alone? The line 
is a hard one to draw; the issues are rarely thought out in 
the abstract and rarely presented dramatically. The real 
frontier, like most lines in industry, is more a matter of 
accepted custom than of precisely stated principle. (1975: 56) 
Proper appreciation of the frontier of control rests on information on 
both the range and the degree of control. The question of the degree of 
control, while more difficult to investigate and assess properly, is the 
most crucial if one is attempting to gauge the real extent of the incursion 
of shop-floor workers into decision-making on labour utilisation. Conse- 
quently it deserves more careful attention in this research. The second 
objective of Chapters 6 and 7 is to compare the frontier of control in 
the companies studied and seek to explain the different patterns which 
were observed. This should be possible by studying carefully the forces 
-174- 
which appear to be most influential on the pattern of control, notably 
the work process, the shop-floor organisation, and the managerial 
structure and strategies. Finally, the third objective is to provide 
much of the empirical data on the impact of the institutionalisation of 
labour relations on job control, the primary question of this dissertation. 
Before presenting the information on control over deployment of 
labour, the first section of this chapter deals mainly with analytical 
considerations related to the concepts of job control and work process. 
The intention is to develop the tools which are necessary to conduct 
empirical research and analysis on this matter. 
1. ANALYTICAL TOOLS FOR THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JOB CONTROL 
1.1 The Contours and Definition of Job Control 
In the analytical framework presented in Chapter 1 some emphasis 
was put on the centrality of the notion of control in industry and on 
the significance of the issue of job control in contemporary labour 
relations in Britain. The need here is to develop a more precise 
definition of job control, one which may be conducive to observation in 
the workplace and analysis. 
The concept of job control, which holds some historical significance, 
encompasses two related but distinct aspects of trade union and shop-floor 
action. The first aspect is control over access to jobs and their protection, 
i. e. the question of the supply of labour, while the other is control over 
the utilisation of labour in the work process, once it has been hired. In 
fact, the distinction corresponds to 'the two elements of the employment 
relationship - the sale of labour power and the control of the labour 
process' (Hyman, 1980: 304). Before going further on the basis of this 
distinction, it is important to stress how these aspects are closely linked. 
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On the one hand, trade union devices for control over labour 
supply, whatever their rationale, contribute to reinforcing the power basis 
of the workforce in the relation of subordination. On the other hand, it 
was observed that one of the justifications for some form of shop-floor 
control over deployment of labour, manning levels, job demarcation, and 
intensity of effort is the protection of the volume of labour in a 
particular trade, section, or department. Indeed, in this perspective, 
lay-off and redundancies may be considered as the ultimate threat to all 
forms of job control. According to the analytical framework presented 
in Chapter 1, the workers' need to carry on selling their labour is one 
of the objective bases of the structural interdependence between the 
parties, which is itself conducive to accommodation. In theory, one would 
therefore expect that the important reduction in the labour force of these 
two enterprises in the late seventies, in the context of increasingly 
high levels of unemployment, would foster accommodation and attenuate 
conflict over labour utilisation in the work process. 
It is interesting to recall that the classic work of Perlman on 
the theory of trade unionism and job control focused on control over the 
supply of labour. Hence the 'consciousness of scarcity of opportunity' 
fostered a type of job control very much centred upon access to jobs, its 
protection and what he termed the 'rules of occupancy and tenure' (1928: 
6-10,237-69). It appears that the sophisticated control of the Inter- 
national Typographical Union over labour supply also constituted the power 
basis of their members as regards the determination of wages and various 
aspects of labour utilisation, a secondary objective of the model of 
unionism advocated by Perlman. Although the author is vague and unspecific 
on this point, there are interesting references to "khop rights", which, 
to the workingman at the bench, are identical with "liberty" itself, - 
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- since, thanks to them, he has no need to kowtow to foreman or boss, 
as the price of holding his job' (1928: 275). 
In his important work on job control in the United States, Herding 
adopts a definition which is broad enough to cover the two elements of 
the distinction. He writes: 
Deviating from a narrow use of the concept that would only 
include control over access to the job and its security, 
I shall imply in the term as well any control of the work 
content ... So 
'job control' will refer to all devices 
of labor union influence on the existence of, the access 
to, and the performance of operations at particular work- 
places in industry. (1972: 2) 
In his lectures to the British Academy, Kahn-Freund put great emphasis 
on job control, one of the 'two centrally important characteristics of 
British labour relations' (1979: 3). He also worked on the basis of a 
distinction between 'the regulation of the volume of output, the allocation 
and distribution of work among workers and categories of workers, and 
the closely linked regulations of the supply in the labour market and of 
access to jobs' (1979: 35,32-9). 
While giving proper consideration to the close relation between 
these two aspects of job control, the position adopted in this research 
consists of placing the emphasis on control over labour utilisation in 
the work process. It certainly is a complex area to investigate. However, 
it has the advantage of directing attention to the crucial problem of the 
transformation of labour power into effort in the work process. This was 
pointed out as the real object of the struggle for control in the workplace, 
and the structural basis of conflict (see also Edwards and Scullion, 1982a: 
1-9). From a different perspective, and starting from the distinction 
between market and managerial relations (Flanders, 1975: 88; Fox, 1966: 6-7 
and 1971: 158), it may be pointed out that the utilisation of labour once it 
has been hired is the area in which management is likely to resist worker 
interference most convincingly. The following excerpts are clear expressions 
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of this reality: 
In general, managements have been far readier to negotiate 
on 'employment contract' norms than on 'utilization' norms. 
In other words they have been readier to negotiate with 
employees about the terms on which they are to be hired 
than about how they are utilized and deployed once they 
have been hired. (Fox, 1971: 158) 
When unionism meets managerial prerogatives there is a 
clash of 'rights'. If unionism confines itself to the 
regulation of wage rates (the price at which labour power will 
be sold or leased), then this clash can be averted. But 
when organized labour seeks to influence the way in which 
labour power is utilized then it confronts the essence of 
managerial function: the planning, commanding and controlling 
of factors of production. (Storey, 1980: 19) 
It follows that worker inroads into the area of labour utilization 
represents a strategic point of observation. However, it still encompasses 
a reality which is too broad to constitute an adequate working definition 
of job control. A classic distinction put forward by the Webbs in 
Industrial Democracy will suggest how the focus of our analysis may be 
narrowed down. 
The interminable series of decisions, which together make 
up industrial administration, fall into three main classes. 
There is, first, the decision as to what shall be produced - 
that is to say, the exact commodity or service to be supplied 
to the consumers. There is, secondly, the judgment as to the 
manner in which the production shall take place, the adoption 
of material, the choice of processes, and the selection of 
human agents. Finally, there is the altogether different 
question of the conditions under which these human agents shall 
be employed - the temperature, atmosphere, and sanitary 
arrangements amid which they shall work, the intensity and 
duration of their toil and the wages given as its reward 
(S. and B. Webb, 1902: 818). 
1. This is a central distinction in the concluding chapter on 'Trade 
Unionism and Democracy', first published in 1897. The Webbs' argu- 
ment is that 'the special function of the Trade Union in the 
administration of industry' has to do with the third class of decisions, i. e. working conditions (pp. 820-22). This discussion is reproduced in the concluding section of the 1920 edition of their History of Trade Unionism (pp. 752-63). 
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Although the decisions of the second category obviously have an impact on 
working conditions (a point considered by the authors, p. 820), it seems 
that the classification still remains fundamental. This is particularly 
so for the distinction between 'the choice of processes', or 'how' to 
produce, and the decisions relating to working conditions. Starting 
from this, it is useful to draw an analytical distinction between the way 
labour power is utilised in the work process and the conditions of 
utilisation which include, for instance, the physical working conditions. 
Again, it may be stressed that the way labour is utilised by management 
constitutes the most problematic area with respect to the frontier of 
control. Indeed, the Webbian prescription that this category of decisions 
should be left 'to the expert knowledge of the directors of industry' is 
indicative in this respect (1902: 819-20). 
2 
Hence, in this research, job 
control is defined as the restraints imposed by workers on the way their 
labour power is utilised in the work process by management. 
In this dissertation, attention focuses mainly on issues such as 
labour mobility, job demarcation, manning levels, and many questions related 
to the effort bargain. This leads to the question of the intensity of 
effort during labour time, a crucial area of research on which it is, 
however, very difficult for the outside observer to get evidence. Neverthe- 
less, starting from an analytical distinction between immediate work pace 
and continuity of effort, a number of shop rules and practices will be 
discussed. In many workshops these practices amount to a significant 
degree of worker control over effort. 
Hence our study is directed mainly at issues related directly to the 
2. The authors noted, however, that this prescription was 'subject to one 
all-important qualification'. Since the democratic state was interested in the conditions of the working lives of manual workers, 'the bias 
of the directors of industry in favor of cheapness has, in the interests 
of the community, to be perpetually controlled and guided by a determi- 
nation to maintain, and progressively to raise, the conditions of 
employment' (1902: 819-20). 
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labour process as opposed to other interesting issues such as hiring and 
firing, and redundancies. In spite of the importance of and interest in 
the latter type of issues, they are not so central to the working definition 
of job control adopted here. And for more pragmatic reasons we had to 
focus on a relatively limited range of issues to reach the depth which 
is necessary to develop the general argument of the dissertation on the 
impact of reformism on control over labour utilisation. 
1.2 The'Concept of Work Process and Empirical Research 
One of the main characteristics of the conceptual framework developed 
in Chapter 1 is the identification of the work process as the starting- 
point for the study of workplace labour relations. It was suggested that 
the structure of labour relations (the subject of Chapters 4 and 5) could 
be viewed as a superstructure with reference to work relations, itself 
defined as the relational aspect of the labour process. Before proceeding 
to the empirical data on job control, it is therefore appropriate to be 
more specific on the use of the work process as a tool of analysis. 
Regardless of the merit of the argument about the importance of the 
work process, the difficulty of using it in empirical research remains. 
In other words, the task is to give it a value for operational purposes. 
For instance, technology is not a useful concept in this respect. The 
latter is actually a confusing term, since 'it may refer either to the 
pieces of machinery within a plant or to a broader set of factors which 
include technical knowledge and social organization as well as the physical 
equipment employed' (Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1978: 27). In contrast, 
a piece of machinery or equipment, or the integration between different 
work stations, may be observed. Therefore, an effort is made here to 
single out four concrete indicators (or characteristics) of the work 
process, before going on to assess their real impact on job control. These 
- 180 - 
are the method of production, the type of machinery, the integration of 
production, and the decomposition of labour. 
3 
A primary characteristic of the work process is the basic method 
of production. It refers to the distinction between unit fabrication, 
small batch, large batch, mass production, and process production. 
Differences in the methods of production in operation in the three 
factories studied were pointed out in Chapter 2,4 and these are expected 
to have a significant impact on the pattern of control over production. 
The second characteristic to which attention is paid is the type of 
machinery. In the foundry, machine shops and presswork production observed, 
most manual workers were using the tools of their trade or operating 
either non-automatic or semi-automatic machines. A related indicator which 
is worth considering in this respect is the degree of specialisation (and 
the period of training) required to operate a specific type of machinery. 
Thirdly, in using the concept of integration of production, we have in 
mind two specific aspects of work. One is the degree of integration 
between the various operations on the product which are carried out within 
the plant or between the different factories of the same enterprise. The 
other point of attention, which deserves much consideration, is the 
integration between different work stations. The researcher may find 
separated work stations, where indirect labour has to handle the components 
from one work station to the other, or linked work stations, where a 
conveyor belt or any other mechanism transfers the components between 
3. For this part of our work some of the researches carried out in France 
and Britain by Pierre Dubois and other members of the Groupe de Sociologie 
du Travail have been of invaluable help. These have been useful at 
the conceptual level and also as an indication of particular aspects 
deserving observation and analysis. The following publications are 
particularly helpful: Dubois, 1978; Dubois and Monjardet, 1979. Dubois, 
1980 and 1981. 
4. It has to be noted that some illustration of each of the four indicators 
of the work process was given in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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stations (Dubois, 1978: 175-6). The fourth aspect to which attention is 
directed is decomposition of labour. 
5 Basically, this refers to a 
distinction between the different types of'tasks involved in production 
(Dubois, 1978: 175; Dubois and Monjardet, 1979: 5-7). These are maintenance, 
setting, production, quality control, and material handling. Reference 
to this distinction was central in the argument about the different 
patterns of shop steward representation which was presented in Chapter 3. 
Comparative research by the Groupe de Sociologie du Travail already has 
provided interesting results on the impact of decomposition of labour on 
the different patterns of job control in France and Britain, in four 
industries other than engineering (Dubois and Monjardet, 1979; Dubois, 
1980 and 1982). 
1.3 Strategy for Research and Analysis 
It seems appropriate to make explicit some of the choices of 
research strategy which we made and which are now guiding us in the 
selection and analysis of the data collected. The first of these principles 
is that attention is focused on a limited number of crucial issues. It 
was indicated earlier in this chapter that our first preoccupation concerns 
the degree of job control, as opposed to the range of issues under worker 
influence. To this purpose, it was felt more appropriate to pay relatively 
close attention to particular aspects of work relations rather than attempt 
to gather information on every aspect of shop-floor control in a factory. 
Secondly, and for similar reasons, it was felt more fruitful to concentrate 
the observation and interviewing on particular areas of production within 
5. Decomposition of labour represents one of the two main aspects of the 
technical division of labour, the other being 'parcellisation' of 
labour. For the object of this research, it is felt that decomposition 
may be a more fruitful and significant tool of analysis than the 
parent concept of 'parcellisation' of labour. This is so notably 
because the variation between different patterns of decomposition is 
relatively easier to assess by observation. 
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each enterprise. Accordingly, much of the discussion in these empirical 
chapters concerns departments and sections where it was possible to gain 
a better insight into work relations. At Firm B, these productive units 
are the press shops, the toolroom, and the Automotive Heat Transfer unit 
(AHT). At Firm A, much of the observation and interviewing was done in 
the large machine shops, and it will also be possible to make references 
(although in a less systematic way) to work relations in the toolroom and 
the foundry. 
Moreover, in order to gain the most accurate account of the degree 
of worker control, particular attention is paid to two aspects of decision- 
making. One is the exact nature of the decision over which workers have 
some control. The point is that every general issue (such as assignment 
of labour, labour mobility, overtime, redundancies, etc. ) includes many 
aspects of decision-making. The intention is to circumscribe, as much as 
possible, the real object of the challenge to management control. The 
other aspect needing careful attention is the method of worker control. 
In this respect, the objective is to look at the actual method by which 
workers impose some limits to management freedom on a specific subject. 
These constraints may result from unilateral regulation by the workforce, 
but they are more frequently the result of some form of joint or customary 
regulation, the line between different methods of regulation being commonly 
blurred in the process of control, which is essentially a power relation- 
ship (a rapport de force). As an illustration of this analytical considera- 
tion, it may be underlined that it is not an easy task to assess the actual 
extent of unilateral worker regulation. One of the difficulties is that 
what may appear to the researcher as unilateral worker control may be the 
protection of strategic gains obtained through collective bargaining at an 
earlier stage and under different conditions. For instance, the application 
of the 1974 agreement on a daywork system in Press shop no. 4 gave way to 
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the development of unilateral protective practices, where the shop-floor 
was sticking to the letter (if not to the spirit) of the agreement. 
The possibility of gaining some insight into these two aspects of 
decision-making, i. e. the exact nature of the issue and the method of 
worker control, may be seen as one of the main advantages of the case study 
method for studying the frontier of control. 
2. SHOP-FLOOR CONTROL OVER DEPLOYMENT OF LABOUR 
In the remainder of this chapter, attention focuses on control 
over deployment of labour. It has to do with the constraints upon manage- 
ment freedom as regards the allocation of workers to jobs within a specific 
working area, and the whole issue of labour mobility within the plant. This 
empirical material is presented in three sub-sections. 
For practical reasons which were set out in the opening chapter of 
this dissertation, the information on job control is broader in scope and 
somewhat more substantial in the case of Firm B. In order to make the 
best use of the data collected for analytical purposes, it seems appropriate 
to present at greater length the information collected in this firm. On 
most issues, it is possible to compare it with the situation prevailing 
in Firm A, which is often used as a contrasting case. 
2.1 Assignment of Labour 
The concept of assignment of labour is used here in the precise 
sense of allocation of labour to jobs and tasks within a particular working 
area. In the case of Firm B, this refers to the geographical boundaries of 
a section. In other words, assignment of labour encompasses the question of 
deployment of labour and mobility within the section. These decisions 
have traditionally been considered as a managerial function. Most production 
managers felt that they should dispose of the specific assignment of the 
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labour force under their jurisdiction. Indeed, this was still the general 
principle which underlay the management position on this issue in the 
factories studied. In day-to-day management, this position of principle 
was substantiated by an insistence on the need to respond to the pressure 
of the product market. For instance, the elaboration and application of 
the schedules of production remained very much within the scope of manage- 
ment control. It was also widely accepted within the workforce that the 
determination of the priorities in production remained a management 
responsibility. The situation got more problematic, however, when this 
planning had to be made effective in terms of labour assignment and work 
allocation. 
Systematic interviews with shop stewards and production managers in 
ART revealed that management was generally allowed to move workers freely 
within a section. It was also accepted that there was no need for management 
to consult the shop steward before asking a worker to move. This was 
the situation prevailing in each of the three sections making up the ART 
unit, which were the tinsmith, the Fitting and Welding no. 2 and the 
Copper Core sections. As a general rule, the duration of the assignment 
was much shorter in the third section, where a high degree of flexibility 
was accepted by the workforce. The situation in this Copper Core section 
in 1979 was that workers were co-operating fully with management in order 
to keep the section running (and save their jobs) by making the best of 
an important contract on the American market. In the tinsmith area, a 
comparable degree of flexibility was formally agreed by indirect labour in 
1978, as part of a bargain for upgrading. In a memo to senior management 
and shop stewards, the section manager reported: 
It has been agreed with the above operatives that they 
will be interchangeable at management discretion to cover 
each others job in the event of any absenteeism for what- 
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ever reason and in any overload situation on production 
and in doing so will be upgraded to P. S. 0.3 LProduction 
service operative-grade 31. 
It was in the toolroom and the press shops in Firm B that management 
power to assign labour to jobs was most severely curtailed. Interviews 
with managers and the four members of the toolroom committee illustrated 
how a comprehensive body of rules had developed at workshop level on 
this type of issue. The general spirit of their understanding was that 
toolmakers, as a collectivity, would man every machine and job, but that 
none of them might be forced to move in a particular situation if he 
objected to this. Before asking a skilled machinist or fitter to move to 
another work station, a manager had to consult the shop steward. If 
after consulting the steward a toolmaker refused the request of management, 
the shop steward got involved in trying to solve the issue through 
discussion with the worker and work group concerned. Another worker might 
be interested in the job under contention for a while. But in all cases 
the unit manager admitted the right of any toolmaker to refuse a move 
at the end of the procedure. 
The primary rationale behind this form of shop-floor control was 
to prevent management from taking arbitrary action against a particular 
worker in forcing him to take a job he did not have the ability to hold or 
simply objected to for any reason. It also gave the shop-floor collective 
control over the frequency and extent of flexibility of labour required by 
the toolroom management. Indeed, one of the characteristics of this type 
of regulation was the central role played by the shop steward. He was 
fully informed on the whole issue of labour assignment within this large 
workshop (93 toolmakers in 1979). The steward might be involved both as 
6. Agreement with track loaders, gillers and material handlers in AHT, 
signed by section manager, 10 May 1978. Source: management files. 
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a union negotiator and as a mediator between management and any recalcitrant 
worker. This collective control over the situation also set the strategic 
conditions for the shop-floor organisation to apply collective sanctions 
on such an issue, for instance by blacking a job or a machine. 
The counterpart, and what made it acceptable to management, was that 
this procedure generally assured management of a satisfactory degree of 
internal mobility and little conflict over this matter. Hence there was 
no restriction on mobility between the sections of the toolroom7 and no 
more limitation in terms of scope (such as a 'fitter to fitter' type of 
rule). The toolroom manager also explicitly stated as an example of 
co-operation the fact that the shop steward had recently renounced a 
custom and practice rule that there should be no move of less than one 
shift duration. The manager explained how the AIJEW steward had accepted 
the point that such a shop rule was unrealistic and counterproductive. Two 
of the other members of the toolroom committee were not aware of any 
compromise on this matter at the time of the interview. 
Shop-floor workers had developed a high degree of control over 
assignment in the press shops. While it is not intended to get into all 
the intricacy of these procedures, it is relevant to show the nature of 
worker regulation and the different patterns in operation in the two largest 
sections, i. e. Press shop no. 3 and Press shop no. 4. 
An experienced TGWJ shop steward recalled the origin of collective 
control over assignment as a result of a 'struggle which occurred eighteen 
years ago' about the discretionary power of foremen in distributing the 
good and the bad jobs. 
8 It has to be remembered that, because of the pre- 
7. In the toolroom of the Components Factory, Edwards and Scullion 
observed that 'the shop was divided into sections comprising lathes, 
drilling machines, and so on. It was an absolute rule that there was 
no movement between sections' (1982a: 210). 
8. Interview with a setters' shop steward, Press shop no. 4,31 August 1979. 
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dominance of small and medium batches, it was often necessary to reorganise 
the production lines and assign labour to new jobs many times during a 
single shift. In Press shop no. 4, no operator could claim to work on 
'his own press', or his own work station. From the list of jobs running, 
which was presented by the foreman, the shop steward drew the operators' 
piecework cards, in a system where the first name took the job on top of 
the list. At the beginning of the shift, the typical arrangement was 
that one of the two main production lines would run, as well as a few 
individual presses. The workers whose piecework cards had not been drawn 
out were placed on waiting time ('on the clock') and paid at 175R (175 per 
cent performance). They had priority when the next change in production 
lines occurred during the shift, the determination of the other members 
making up the working team (and those going on waiting time) depending 
again on a draw out of the pack of piecework cards. Every time a reorganisa- 
tion of production and assignment was required during the shift, it 
followed this basic principle. Moreover, except for the start of the 
shift, the draw over the composition of the production line often had to 
be followed by a second draw to establish the respective position (or 
work station) of everybody on the line. 
Over recent years the Light section, which was a small section of 
the press shops with a high level of worker cohesiveness, had developed 
shop rules which were similar to those described above. In contrast, the 
operators of Press shop no. 3 had devised a procedure of assignment of a 
different kind. First, each operator was allocated to 'his own press', 
on which he was systematically assigned if it ran at the start of the shift. 
9 
9. The exact procedure by which a worker could get priority on a press 
was not made clear to the writer. But this certainly appeared to be 
under shop-floor control. It was pointed out in interviews that 
older operators tended to prefer the production lines which were 
operating under the daywork system (especially the lines 3 and 4) as 
opposed to the piecework payment system. 
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Consequently, only the operators whose presses were not planned to work 
took part in a draw. The process was also made more complex by the fact 
that the operator whose press was not running had priority for job assign- 
ment on the line (there were ten of them), and then on the sub-section 
(of which there were three) within which his press was located. The 
operators used to have the possibility of going back to their press at any 
time it was allocated work during a shift. Obviously this practice created 
problems since they would have to stop production lines going at various 
times, to enforce the priority right. It was therefore agreed by the 
operators that the priority rule would apply until the first break of the 
shift, after which nobody could claim his allocated press or production line. 
Afterwards the margin of discretion left to the foreman in assigning 
the 'good' and the 'bad' jobs was limited but nevertheless significant as 
compared with Press shop no. 4. 
In both cases the discretionary power of shop management with 
regard to labour assignment was further limited by the regular rotation 
of jobs between operators on the same line. This practice, referred to as 
'swopping', was of general application in the press shops. Workers 
systematically moved on the line every time a given number of components 
(usually 200 or 300) was produced. Years ago, management resisted this 
practice, but it was now plainly accepted. It did not break the line or 
affect production in any way. Besides limiting the discretionary margin 
of supervision with respect to labour assignment, the practice was 
advantageous to the operators in many ways. First, it permitted them to 
share the good and the bad jobs on the line, to diminish boredom and to 
give some rest when on the easiest jobs (e. g. the job of oiler). Second, 
it offered the possibility for the work group to 'protect' a workmate who 
was ill, or had any problem with management, if it was felt fair to do so. 
Third, it reduced the resources of management with regard to control and 
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discipline. It did so by making it more problematic to get information 
on who had done something wrong (e. g. an intended mislocation or any other 
act of sabotage) and also as regards the following step of applying 
individual sanction or retaliation. 
Interviews with two shop stewards and one foreman in Press shop 
no. 3 also made clear that another variant of 'swopping' was usual and 
widely tolerated in this shop. If an operator was assigned, following 
a draw, to a job he was not willing to do, he could swop with someone on 
another line who preferred this type of job. This happened, for 
instance, when an operator who did not mind harsh work and better money 
got an assignment on an agreed daywork job. It was usually possible to 
swop since some press operators looked for the 'stability' of agreed 
daywork. As long as production was done properly, the foremen did not 
bother about this type of arrangement between the workers. Although this 
practice was less important than the systematic job rotation on the 
production lines, it nevertheless increased the range of choice of operators 
and confined the foreman's discretion to a certain extent. It is 
appropriate to put some emphasis on the impact of the whole process of 
job rotation between workers on the development of labour cohesiveness and 
the erosion of management control. The main consequence is that relations 
with management on important issues such as standard quantity, manning 
levels and work allocation developed more and more at the collective level 
of the work group or the section, as opposed to an individual type of 
relationship between an operator and his supervisor. 
Some of the causes for this high degree of shop-floor control over 
assignment of labour in the press shops may be found by looking at the work 
process. The method of production, which was mainly batches of small 
and medium size, was one of the reasons why the composition of the working 
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teams had to be changed many times during a single shift. The high degree 
of flexibility in labour assignment which was required precluded a permanent 
division of labour within the ranks of the press operators of one section. 
This effect was reinforced by the use of a type of machinery which needed 
little specialisation on the part of the operator. In other words, the 
fact that the period of training necessary for moving from one press to 
the other was minimal (and non-existent after a while) created the 
conditions for interchangeability. These objective conditions were very 
much reinforced by the high degree of integration between the work stations 
in Press shops nos. 3 and 4, a factor which definitely had a positive 
effect on labour cohesiveness. It has to be emphasised that it is the 
combination of these characteristics of the work process which may have an 
impact on control over the issue under discussion here. The writer does 
not seek to argue that these structural factors may constitute a full 
explanation of worker control over assignment. The argument is, however, 
that this particular work process set the necessary conditions for such 
a process to develop in a context where the shop-floor organisation was 
strong enough to resist management at shop level. 
It would not be possible, either, to explain satisfactorily the 
differences in regulation between the two press shops by referring exclusively 
to structural variables. Nevertheless, part of the explanation for the 
higher degree of cohesiveness and collective control in Press shop no. 4 
lies in the fact that it was a more integrated unit as compared with the 
ten production lines of the large Press shop no. 3.10 Evans, a former 
press operator in the Light section, also observed that 'the more compact 
lay-out of the presses in no. 4 and the predominance of working "in-line" 
10. The Unit manager for Press shop no. 3 pointed out that there were at least twenty items (product specifications) being worked on in this 
section at any one time. Interview, 7 May 1980. 
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or groups made it easier for the workers themselves to observe each other 
more closely, and so exercise discipline more collectively' (1980: 65). A 
major consequence of the difference in the patterns of job control over 
assignment in Press shops nos. 3 and 4 is the fact that they adopted a 
more collective stance with respect to bargaining over standard quantities 
and manning in the latter case. The priority rule in operation in Press 
shop no. 3 also meant in practice that operators made deals with the work 
study men which concerned 'their' press or line, without involving other 
operators who may occasionally have to work on this basis. Evans 
describes this situation: 
Those working more regularly on a press, or group or line 
of presses would be more likely to negotiate prices acceptable 
to themselves; those who came onto these jobs only irregularly 
would be inclined to compare the new requirements of 'making the 
job pay' with those they were familiar with, and would possibly 
be critical of the job standards. In nos 1 and 3 shops, then, 
the work group tended to centre round the 'line' or 'press 
grouping' rather than the whole shop as in no 4. (1980: 66) 
It should now be clear that press operators had developed a 
relatively high degree of labour autonomy. It also has to be stressed that 
most of these shop rules over assignment were the result of unilateral 
worker regulation. Decisions were taken at section meetings, where the 
shop steward had no more than a leadership role, the majority rule being 
decisive. 11 The shop steward informed the section manager of the shop- 
floor decision. There was certainly room for discussion, although local 
management did not really have a veto on these matters. In short, management 
resistance would have created bad feelings and problems. A Press shop no. 3 
shop steward confidently told this researcher: 'I can't remember of a time 
11. Such a meeting comprised the press operators on the same shift in 
one section. Most shop rules applied to both shifts of the same 
section, which were rotating on a four-week basis. Most dealings 
with management were conducted on day shift and one of the means 
of communication between the shifts was the shop stewards' book. 
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they objected to a rule we made' . 
12 
Indeed, management tolerance of this type of regulation certainly 
contributed to its development. Production managers found some advantages 
which compensated to some extent for the loss of discretion and authority. 
In a formal interview, the section manager for Press shop no. 3 put 
forward the two main ones. 
13 First, rules for job assignment were needed 
anyway and the clearer they were, the better the chances that it worked 
properly and quickly at the beginning of and during the shift. Hence his 
comment that 'as long as work is done properly, I don't bother'. The 
belief which underlay this position was that assignment of labour was not 
in itself conflictual. And it is true that, at the beginning of the 
shift, the preoccupation on both sides was to find some work for everybody 
so that they could reach their standard and 'get in front'. 
The second advantage from the local management point of view was that 
the application of the rule became very much the responsibility of the 
shop-floor. Collective discipline meant that everybody had to submit to 
the majority rule. The role of the shop steward was crucial in this 
respect. Interestingly, it was mainly in Press shop no. 4, where job 
control over assignment was found to be greater, that problems of collective 
discipline were encountered. On at least two occasions in 1978 and 1979, 
resistance from dissident workers forced the intervention of the TGWU 
convenor. The following extracts from the TGWU shop stewards' committee 
Minutes Book are sufficiently significant to be quoted at length. 
Convenor was called to no 4 shop about an incident when one 
operator was complaining about the working method on the 
line. He refused to work in the same way as the rest of 
the men had traditionally done. They, in turn, voted to 
12. Informal interview, 11 October 1979. 
13. Interview held on 4 October 1979. 
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refuse to work with him. The ldissidentJ agreed to 
return to work on the majority's term 14but requested 
a meeting about the working practice. 
Problem in no 4 press shop where 5 operators on day-shift 
opposed the practice of moving around the presses. A 
majority of the section voted to continue this practice 
and refuse to work with the 5 if they persisted. The 5 
operators argued they were not breaking any agreement with 
the Company. Convenor had reluctantly become involved. 
He contacted the district official who advised him that if 
the union couldn't insist on how the men work the system, 
leave it to the company to insist. Convenor felt the 
company would prefer the men not to move around. He advised 
the 5 to move, for their own interest because they could 
find they end up on a bad job as easily as a good job. But 
he had to advise the majority that the 5 man were not breaking 
any agreement, so he could not instruct them to move round 
if they are unwilling. If they refused to work with them, 
they technicall would be at fault. Bra Lshop stewarO 
reported that 
Lunit 
managet) had agreed to iget himself, and 
one operator from each side in the morning. 
The above quotations raise many interesting questions relating to work- 
shop politics. The observation under consideration here is that the higher 
degree of collective control over labour assignment also commands a higher 
degree of collective discipline. As a corollary, it brings some relief to 
supervision and junior management who do not even have to get involved in 
this type of conflict within the ranks of labour. Moreover, the greater 
involvement of the shop-floor and their shop steward in labour management 
is not in itself detrimental to production, a point developed by Edwards 
and Scullion, especially with reference to the Small Metals Factory (1982a: 
202-5,211-14). What is more problematic, however, is the real impact of 
worker control over assignment on management control in general. Job control 
over assignment may have an instrumental effect, in the sense that it may 
set the basis for shop-floor control over other aspects of the work process. 
14. Minutes of the meeting held on 25 January 1978. 
15. Minutes of the meeting held on 15 March 1979. In the minutes of the 
stewards' meeting held a week later, one reads on this issue; 'Convenor had attended meeting with [unit manager, who wanted the men to stay on the presses as allocated at the start of the job. No further news. ' (21 March 1979), 
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It has been stressed earlier in the dissertation that, in Firm A, 
the section did not represent a geographical area of real significance with 
respect to labour relations. Hence the realities of assignment of labour 
within a working area and of temporary transfer of labour between these 
were not clearly dissociated. In such a case, these aspects are 
encompassed in the whole issue of flexibility of labour, as opposed to 
the different issue of mobility of labour on a permanent basis, which is 
discussed in a later sub-section. It is therefore appropriate to continue 
with the evidence on job control over transfer of labour between sections 
at Firm B, and then compare this with the situation observed in the 
other case study. 
2.2 Transfer of Labour 
The issue of mobility had been one of the most serious matters of 
contention for many years in Firm B. The problem arose particularly in 
connection with the large group of semi-skilled production workers who 
were on daywork, and also with reference to the press operators. From 
a formal viewpoint, the 1975 collective agreement appeared to leave 
considerable flexibility to management. However, it has to be looked at 
in its entirety. Here are the most relevant paragraphs: 
It is essential that the Company is able to respond to 
changes in the work mix within the Factory and capable of 
re-allocating resources in response to short term overloads 
or bottlenecks. Within reasonable constraints management 
must have the facility to manage. 
Management requires that personnel are mobile between various 
roles within their own Unit, consistent with the individuals 
being capable (both physically and mentally) to discharge 
the tasks involved. Where necessary, training will be 
initiated to make the mobility possible ... 
Any issue arising in the operation of this policy w1Eld be 
dealt with within the existing procedure agreement. 
16. Agreement entitled 'Hourly rated wage increases applicable from 
April 1975', Appendix II, section 2. 
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The last paragraph actually meant that mobility was subject to the procedure 
agreement of July 1972 which incorporated a status quo clause. In practice, 
whenever shop-floor workers wished to resist a managerial proposal to 
transfer labour from one section to another, they insisted on the issue 
being put through procedure. In practice, this gave a veto power to 
the shop-floor. Evans reported that this particular situation 
was identified by management as the most serious obstacle 
to their developing a more flexible response to customer 
demand. Because of the nature of production and work 
schedules, by the time negotiations had been held and 
temporary transfers arranged, very often the demand for 
more labour in a particular department had dropped. It was 
a disincentive to managers matching their manning levels 
to production requirements, and consequently, a contributory 
factor to what managers called 'unrealistic' levels of 
manpower. 
... Even in times of redundancy and short-time working, 
many used this clause as a delay tactic in expectancy of an 
improvement in the work load. While a degree of temporary 
transfers did take place, in the flat-rate areas during such 
periods there were no cases of agreement to transfer at short 
notice without the coercive support of short-time working. 
(1980: 93-4) 
This observation summarises well the respective control achieved by both 
sides over this specific issue. Transferring labour between sections was 
not impossible. However, voluntary acceptance of it was likely to be 
difficult for management to achieve without the pressure of the labour 
market, i. e. a concrete threat of a shorter working week or redundancies. 
The pressure of the product market only, in terms of specific production 
requirements, was not so decisive an argument. 
In formal interviews, shop stewards from various departments 
spontaneously pointed out that management had to get the agreement of 
both sections concerned before implementing a temporary transfer. Obviously, 
the agreement of the section the worker came from depended very much on 
immediate employment prospects in this particular area. Hence the threat 
of imminent lay-offs or short-time working might outweigh any reluctance 
to accept a reduction of the manning of the section and to cover for the 
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job of the worker being transferred. 
The situation was less straightforward on the part of the 
receiving section, which typically insisted upon some guarantees before 
accepting labour on a temporary basis. To start with, workers in this 
section would usually require the assurance of a forty-hour week. Since 
much of the reluctance to accept temporary labour was due to the possible 
loss of overtime earnings (Evans, 1980: 47), the shop steward might also 
bargain over the maintenance of a given overtime level. The following 
memo signed by a section manager in the ART unit provides a telling 
example of such bargaining occurring: 
It has been agreed between myself and no 2 Fitting and 
Welding Shop Committee that 2 men from S. D. I. Dept. will 
be allowed to work on the above section on a temporary 
basis, if the present -levels of over-time are maintained, 
and if at any time the over-time levels are reduced then 
the additional labour will be taken off the section. 
Please note that I am not, as Section Manager, giving 
a guarantee on future over-time levels. 
In interview, the TGWU shop steward and the other three members of 
the shop committee in the Dravo section (of the Heating Division), which had 
the reputation of adopting restrictive policies on such matters, explained 
the rationale of their action. 
18 They clearly saw themselves as 
representing an autonomous unit within the factory. Since their primary 
responsibility was to protect wages and conditions within their section, 
they would only accept temporary labour in order to save the jobs of other 
union members in accordance with a policy 'accepted within the union 
movement', on the understanding that they could expect the same protection 
if their jobs were temporarily at stake. The position adopted by this 
17. Memo from the section manager for the attention of the general 
manager, the industrial relations manager, and the shop stewards 
concerned. Entitled 'Additional Temporary Labour no 2 Fitting and 
Welding', and dated 25 October 1977. 
18. Interview held on 30 August 1979. 
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section in a case which occurred earlier in 1979 is indicative of this 
defensive attitude. At the weekly meeting of the TGWU shop stewards, 
their representative 'reported a decision of his section that they would 
allow 3 people into the shop on agreement that after 13 weeks, 3 Dravo 
would get voluntary redundancy. Convenor answered that he had been told 
by the Company that he should go to the Dravo and sort them out. '19 The 
minutes of the meeting held the following week show that they finally 
accepted the three workers coming on a temporary basis 'after reaching 
an understanding with manager that current overtime arrangements would 
20 
continue for 5 weeks and then be reviewed'. 
While the evidence presented above deals with production workers 
in daywork areas, the situation which prevailed in the press shops also 
deserves some attention. There again, management had a formal right to 
mobility of labour between the sections of the press shops. The 'Press 
shop incentive scheme agreement' stipulated that 'it is agreed that there 
can be free movement of labour from one press shop or area to another. 
Any "movement" thought necessary by management will be fully discussed 
with the stewards of the areas concerned. '21 In practice, however, 
production managers admitted that they had lost the freedom to do so. 
There was no longer free movement of labour between Press shops nos. 3 and 4. 
In the words of a shop steward now working in a daywork area, 'there is 
22 
no bridge between shops 3 and 4'. It emerges from the interviews that 
the main reasons for this shop-floor policy had to do with piecework. 
19. TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book, 28 February 1979. 
20. ibid., meeting held on 7 March 1979. 
21. Article 3.7 of the document dated 27 January 1972. This agreement 
still provided the general framework of the piecework scheme at the 
time of the fieldwork. 
22. Informal interview with TGWU steward of the 'Panel section', 
7 September 1979. 
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Movements between sections were held to affect sectional cohesiveness 
with respect to the negotiation of standards and, moreover, press operators 
used to lose money as a result of a transfer because of the learning 
process. In the Press shop incentive scheme there was no reference to 
any allowance for an operator being transferred to a new job. (In the 
other firm, the 1975 agreement provided a 10 per cent allowance for the 
first 40 hours on a new job; Section 10, art. 2b. ) In a written agreement 
reached in April 1972 on the reorganisation of the former Press shop no. 1 
into the Light section, management accepted that the press operators 
going to this Light section would not be mobile across on to other no. 3 
presses. 
23 This was so even though these sections were adjacent within 
the large shop no. 3, the operators doing similar work under the same 
piecework scheme. 
When the shop stewards put forward a claim for a lay-off pay agree- 
ment in 1978, management made it clear that any progress would have to 
be tied to a union compromise on mobility. Hence when the personnel 
director issued a draft proposal on lay-off pay late in August 1978, the 
general reaction of the TGWU shop stewards was that it was 'no more than 
a mobility agreement'. 
24 At a later stage, when the Company submitted its 
proposals for the funding of part of the 1979 wage increase by productivity 
improvements, mobility again became a central issue. The following 
extract gives a good idea of the spirit and content of management's 
proposals. 
23. Copy of the agreement on the reorganisation of the 'Light section no 3 tress shop', dated 12 April 1972. Source: management files. 
24. TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book, 6 September 1978. There 
are regular references to this issue in the Minutes book over the 
years 1978 and 1979. 
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If the Company is to meet market requirements and fluctu- 
ations it needs to be able to transfer resources (including 
the human resource, namely its employees) within and between 
its constituent product Divisions ... 
As a consequence, it will be at management's discretion to 
move employees from one section, Division, etc. to 
another ... 
... The overall design of this arrangement is that 
people can be transferred easily from one location to 
another where the business position requires it (i. e. where 
the need for uianpow25 is increased in a particular area on 
a temporary basis). 
Many specific conditions under which management could proceed with 
temporary transfers were part of the proposals. For instance, movements 
would have been limited to six categories of flat rate employees and 
four groups of pieceworkers, one of them the press operators. Most 
important of all was the repeal of the 1975 agreement presented above and 
the implication that mobility would no longer be subject to status quo. 
It is interesting to note that the controversial industrial relations 
plan put forward by British Leyland management in 1979, and ultimately 
imposed on its workforce, also included a drastic change on mobility. 
Hence clause 5.2 (in a section on changes in 'working practices') 
stipulated: 
It is agreed that there will be full co-operation in the 
movement of labour to ensure the efficient continuity of 
production. In consequence, any Employee may be called 
upon to work in any part of his employing plant and/or 
to carry out any grade or category of work within the limits26 
of his abilities and experience, with training if necessary. 
A good number of employees and shop stewards shared management's 
view that greater flexibility of labour was necessary to improve productivity 
25. Third issue of the Company's proposals on the Hourly rated wage 
settlement for 1979. Issued by the personnel director on 6 April 1979, 
clause 2.4.1. 
26. Company Proposed Draft Agreement on Bargaining, Pay, Employee Benefits 
and Productivity, Covering Hourly Rated Employees in BL Cars, 
November 1979, p. 2. 
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and the financial position of Firm B. The possibility of a deal involving 
a lay-off pay guarantee also had to be seriously considered on the union 
side. The TGWU convenor was certainly inclined to think that the shop- 
floor line of action on mobility was too restrictive (Evans, 1980: 94). 
The following entry illustrates the type of compromise he was promoting: 
He C the convenor7 repeated the advice of the union district 
official that policy was to, whenever possible, avoid lay- 
offs and accept mobility. Convenor felt we could try to pin 
the Company down to having mobility only on a day where lay- 
off would otherwise be operated. He suggested that it might 27 be tried for 6 months to look at some of the problems in practice. 
The Company proposals for change were finally rejected, the principal 
resistance coming from the production workers (and especially those in the 
large PO 3 classification) and the press operators, most of them TGWU 
members'. According to Evans' account, 'the company's offer was endorsed 
by the large majority of stewards, but rejected by an equally large 
majority of the membership' (1980: 107). In a memo for the attention of 
the JSSC members, the personnel director recognised that the Company had 
to withdraw its proposal and expressed the implications of this in a 
style which shows some resentment. He emphasised that 
the principles behind the 1975 agreement on mobility 
naturally continue to stand, and the Company will in 
future press its case where it believes that to be 
necessary. 
Mobility is required to enable the Company to more 
effectively discharge its order book: the deletion of 
claus 2.4.1 is likely to depress profitability and 
therefore result in less money in the pot for 1980's 
settlement. 
There will be no domestic lay off agreement unless a 
mobility clause better (from the Company's A oint of view) 
than 2.4.1 can be successfully negotiated. 
27. TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book, 17 January 1979. 
28. Quoted from a memorandum written by the personnel director, dated 26 April 1979. Source: management files. 
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Management failure to get this agreement is indicative of shop-floor 
resistance to compromise on measures of control 'which had developed 
informally over the years. As Evans pointed out, 'the issue of mobility 
is one that the members felt could only be controlled through their customary 
informal checks, with the now additional support of the mutuality clause' 
(1980: 107-8). The convenor also pointed out that the more management 
insisted on their proposal, the more a feeling of suspicion was spreading 
on the shop-floor; they felt there was 'something behind it'. 
29 
Such a sophisticated set of rules over assignment and temporary 
movement of labour was unknown in the two factories of Firm A. To some 
extent this may be explained by the fact that the section did not 
represent an important point of reference, or a barrier to the free move- 
ment of labour. This single factor certainly made flexibility of labour 
a different issue. 
To make this observation is not to say that management had complete 
freedom, or that workers had no influence, on temporary movements of 
labour. The first point is that labour mobility was relatively limited 
in the large machine shops of Factory II. The period of training necessary 
to achieve a better than average standard of production was longer than 
in the press shops of the other firm. Operators and machinists tended to 
become specialised on 'their' machines and they commonly stayed on the 
same work station for years. In such a case, they liked to point out that 
'they know their job better than anybody else'. When asked about the 
issues over which they had some control, many of them spontaneously answered 
'the control of my job'. This degree of specialisation and the relative 
'permanence' on the same work station had the effect of fostering a type of 
29. Formal interview with TGWU convenor, 25 October 1979. 
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fostering a type of individual autonomy on the worker side, and particularly 
a high degree of independence in relation to supervision. Such an acquaintance 
with a particular job also imposed limitations on management freedom over 
deployment of labour. Writing on the basis of research conducted in 
three Manchester factories, Goodman (1982: 378) also observed that the 
concept of 'property rights in jobs' 
clearly had deep meaning for most workers, and was the basis 
of often intricate agreements concerning temporary transfers 
... tenacious claims to highly specific tasks can obviously 
reduce flexibility. Arbitrary transfers were successfully 
resisted in all three factories, in which the main criterion 
(apart from new starters) was equality of inconvenience and 
'fair shares'. 
It has to be stressed that the contrast between the machine shops 
(Firm A) and the press shops (Firm B) related not only to the type of 
shop regulations and the process by which decisions were taken but also 
to the frequency of changes in labour assignment. While there was 
constant movement on the shop-floor in the press shops, there was relative 
stability in labour assignments in the three machine shops. In order 
to go some way towards explaining this significant difference, it is 
interesting to look at the main characteristics of the work processes, 
using the analytical tools introduced in this chapter. The first element 
is that the non-automatic and semi-automatic machines in operation in the 
machine shops required some training and specialisation on the part of the 
operators and machinists. They were conventional machine shops oriented 
towards very specific and specialised production. Although there was no 
'modern' or 'high' technology, many of the machines were nevertheless 
of some ingenuity and sophistication in terms of engineering. Since 
many work stations consisted of the grouping of two or more machines, most 
operators and machinists liked to stay on a job which they had got to 
know well over the years. They knew all the 'angles' of the job, for 
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different components, and this relieved some of the pressure of 'making 
out' (Burawoy, 1979). 
Another relevant variable introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter is the decomposition of labour. The comparison is clear in this 
respect: there was a lower degree of decomposition in the machine shops 
as compared with the press shops. It will be shown at a later stage in 
the dissertation (particularly in Chapter 7) that demarcations were 
rigid between the different functions in the press shops. In contrast, 
the machinists did the setting of their machines and were usually quite 
independent in this respect. (As noted in Chapter 2, the basis of the 
distinction between the classification of machinist and operator was 
that the former had to do the setting work. ) This lower degree of 
division of labour also contributed to the development of the labour 
autonomy and 'control over the job' referred to above. Indeed, the job 
of machinist required not only specialisation (mentioned above) but also 
a considerable degree of qualification. 
A third general characteristic of the work process which also 
contributed to the much lower frequency of changes in labour assignment 
in the machine shops was the method of production. Although batch production 
predominated in the machine shops, these batches were of a larger size 
than in the press shops. There was even mass production on some lines in 
the machine shops. Another aspect is that although there was a fairly 
wide range of products in these machine shops, these product specifications 
were grouped in a more limited number of categories of products. Hence 
a change of batch did not always lead to a modification in the manning 
and assignment of labour, in contrast to the situation observed in Press 
shop no. 3 and Press shop no. 4. 
When there was effectively a need for temporary transfers between 
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work stations, the management of Firm A had a relatively high rate of 
success in putting forward the argument of fluctuations in product require- 
ments. In some cases, and especially when there was little or no work 
coming in on a particular work station, the alternative for a worker or 
work group who resisted transfer was lay-off. The production managers 
we talked to were rather sensitive on the point that priorities in 
production had to be a management prerogative. One of the concrete 
implications of this principle was that even if there was still some work 
going on on a worker's usual work station, he might be asked to move for 
a while to cover for a job which was urgently needed. According to the 
personnel director and the industrial relations officer, management 
regularly succeeded in getting this degree of co-operation, although it 
usually involved discussion with the shop steward. 
30 
one of the arguments 
put forward by management in this type of situation was a reference to 
the 'flexibility agreement'. From all acounts, this 'agreement' had never 
been written down. It was an understanding which held some recognition 
on the part of the shop stewards. The industrial relations officer, a 
former GMWU shop steward, recollected that this originated from 1975. In 
the context of the loss of a major contract with Volvo, the unions then 
had to accept greater flexibility of labour to avoid lay-offs in 
substantial numbers. 
31 
In this firm, any resistance to movements of labour which were felt 
to be unjustified could only be manifested on an individual or work group 
basis. In the foundry and the machine shops, the issues of assignment 
and flexibility of labour were therefore within the scope of management 
30. Informal interview, 3 January 1979. 
31. Formal interview, 18 December 1978. 
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decision-making, in contrast to the situation prevailing in the other firm. 
It has to be stressed, however, that in order to protect this prerogative 
and its legitimacy on the shop-floor, managers took care to use this 
option reasonably and fairly. This was particularly important in this 
type of issue where efficiency depended very much on shop-floor co-operation. 
Management rights in these matters had also been institutionalised 
by the inclusion into the comprehensive 1978 collective agreement of 
provisions specific to flexibility of labour. It was 'agreed that there 
will be no restriction on the management use of labour' provided that 
particular criteria were respected. 
32 
This was followed by usual pro- 
visions such as the following: 'when transferred the employee retains 
his own rate or the job rate he goes onto if it is higher'. The agreement 
did not actually recognise the shop steward's right to be consulted 
before any transfer of labour but retained the milder formula which said 
that 'at all times, the Unions will be kept fully informed of movements 
of labour'. It also prevented reference to the status quo clause by 
stipulating that 'in the event of a dispute the employee will move while 
representations are made through procedure, provided that the move is 
consistent with the above criteria'. 
In this section of the 1978 collective agreement, the parties 
confirmed their commitment to flexibility and productivity. To this effect, 
there is a direct reference to the national agreement of December 1968 
on 'Productivity Principles and Bargaining Criteria' between the EEF and 
the CSEU. These are the most relevant clauses of this national agreement: 
1. The Union and the Federation unreservedly agree that 
there is an urgent and continuing necessity, in the 
32. Agreement between the employer and the GMWIJ, TGWU, AUEW and EETPU, 
effective on 1 January 1978, section nine, pp. 15-17. 
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interests of those employed in the Engineering Industry 
and of the Community as a whole, for the productive 
resources and the manpower of the industry to be deployed 
and used more efficiently ... 
4. The following are some examples of impediments to the 
efficient utilisation of labour: 
(i) inappropriate and uneconomic manning of machines, 
processes, production lines or departments; 
(ii) inappropriate and uneconomic use of labour; 
(iii) lack of flexibility in the deployment of labour; 
(iv) resistance in principle to the introduction of 
shift-working on the basis of nationally agreed 
conditions; 
(v) resistance to the planned use of working hoSSs; 
(vi) waiting time and other non-productive time. 
Indeed, over the years 1978 
and productivity became mori 
The negotiations leading to 
the theme of productivity. 
held in late November 1979, 
following terms: 
to 1980, the issues of flexibility of labour 
and more predominant in management objectives. 
the 1980 collective agreement were centred on 
In the minutes of these bargaining sessions 
the managerial argument is presented in the 
The aim of the Company is to agree on maximum machine utili- 
sation at these pay talks in line with the National Agreements. 
The night shift is to be closed because it is uneconomic at the 
moment, if this situation is changed then the night shift may 
not be closed ... 
The Company require all current operating practices to be 
maintained as a minimum, as well as flexibility and mobility 
and the abolition of hand washing and machine cleaning 
allowances. A commitment on inc3ýased productivity is 
essential from the trade unions. 
33. Agreement of 10 December 1968, article 8.2 of the Handbook of National 
Agreements. Clause 4 was quoted in full in the domestic collective 
agreement. It may be recalled that Firm A was not federated. It 
was generally accepted on both sides, however, that the Company was 
bound by the terms of the national agreements. During the fieldwork, 
we came across an exception to this understanding when the Company 
refused to enforce the terms of the national agreement of April 1978 
on the particular aspect of holiday pay. This dispute went up through 
Works Conference, which was attended by the researcher in December 1978, 
where failure to agree was registered. 
34. Minutes of '1980 Pay Negotiations', meeting held outside the Company 
premises and involving the personnel director, the finance director 
and two other managers as well as all the firm's shop stewards, 27 November 1979, pp. 16-17. 
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The Company did not have much difficulty in getting such a 'commitment on 
increased productivity`. An agreement was reached early in January 1980, 
after a limited number of days of negotiation as compared with the two 
preceding years. In fact, during the second half of 1979, the shop stewards 
and shop-floor workers in general offered very little resistance to a 
restructuring of production in the machine shops. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, this involved a significant reduction in the labour force 
through voluntary redundancies and attrition. The GNWU senior shop steward 
was firmly convinced that managers were only responding to market pressures 
and that the origin of the problem was 'beyond management control'. His 
endorsement of the resolute changes implemented by the Company helped to 
secure shop-floor co-operation. In an interview the convenor stressed 
that he had had problems with some of the less experienced shop stewards 
in making them understand the need for changes in working methods and 
higher productivity. By December 1979, however, his position within the 
shop steward organisation had been strengthened by the fact that three of 
the four stewards who had accepted voluntary redundancy were among the 
less co-operative with the dominant shop steward line as well as with 
management. 
35 It may be recalled that by then the recession was very 
severe, particularly in the West Midlands engineering sector. 
2.3 Internal Progression Hierarch 
This third category of substantive issues concerns the movements of 
labour which are of a more permanent nature. Biore precisely, it addresses 
35. Formal interview with senior shop steward, 14 December 1979. In total, 
six of the sixteen shop stewards in function in March 1979 had given up 
by December of the same year; two of them were still working for the 
Company. It may be of some interest to note that, in both firms, 
experienced managers admitted that they had some degree of success in 
inciting (by various means) 'trouble-makers' or more militant stewards 
to take voluntary redundancy. 
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the following question: to what extent, and by which process, is it 
possible for workers to have access to better jobs within the ranks of 
manual labour, -once they have been employed in the factory? What is their 
degree of control over the access to jobs which are commonly felt to be 
higher on the promotion ladder? 
In the United States and Canada, this is of course an important area 
of job control, the whole procedure being generally tied up with the notion 
of seniority. Indeed, the seniority rule is a founding principle of the 
type of job control developed by non-craft unions in these countries. 
Over recent years the broader concept of the internal labour market, which 
refers to the development of a complex set of rules concerning the attach- 
ment of-the worker to the firm and the whole question of deployment of 
labour within the factory, has been established by writers in the North 
American context (see, for instance, Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Edwards, 
1975; and Burawoy, 1979). 
From the viewpoint of a North American student, it is therefore 
interesting to observe the relative importance of the seniority principle 
in a context where job control is generally felt to be stronger than in 
our native country. From such a perspective, and reporting on his study 
of the engineering industry in the Birmingham area, Milton Derber (1955: 64) 
wrote: 
The seniority idea (referred to as 'last one in, first one 
out' principle) does not have the widespread appeal in 
Britain that it does to American unions, and by and large 
the unions there have not made it an important objective. 
As a result, management had a considerable amount of 
flexibility in most establishments with respect to lay- 
offs as well as to rehiring and transfers. The concept 
of the worker's 'right to a specific job' was not 
prominent except where craft regulations were affected. 
On promotions there were even fewer restrictions. 
Seymour Melman, also an American scholar, conducted some fieldwork at the 
Standard Motor Company in Coventry in the early fifties. He noted the 
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comparatively limited influence of seniority. He observed, however, that 
following the lessening in influence of the craft tradition, 'for the 
first time there have appeared the rudiments of seniority regulation 
covering the movement of workers among occupations' (1958: 55). 
In the current period, the impact of the seniority principle in 
British workplaces is by no means comparable to North America. But it 
is nevertheless the case that with the exception of craftsmen's jobs, many 
of the better manual jobs in British factories, especially in terms of 
skill and job content, are available only through the internal promotion 
channels. In this process seniority may have a significant influence. 
This was shown in important research on a local labour market for manual 
workers in the East Midlands (Blackburn and Mann, 1979: 95-9,110). 
36 The 
following sums up their findings on the internal labour market: 
In general, then, better jobs are gained through movement 
up the internal hierarchy, presenting a further limitation 
on choice ... With the exception of autonomy, differences in intrinsic job content - variety, manual skill and mental 
abilities - tend to lie within the internal labour market. 
Relatively skilful jobs are not readily available, even 
in return for sacrifices in other work aspects. Skilful 
jobs are obtained with seniority and are therefore 
accompanied by higher wages. (1979: 99) 
A recent paper by William Brown on the impact of the recession upon work- 
place labour relations indicates that this trend may be growing in Britain. 
He puts the emphasis'on the development of 'a set of management strategies 
which tend to isolate workforces from both the labour market and the 
labour movement outside' (1983: 48). By these strategies British employers 
may foster the development of internal labour markets and a form of 
'enterprise unionism'. In this context, it is interesting to look in more 
36. The research covered nine firms located in the town of Peterborough, including two large engineering firms. 
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detail at the regulations on internal promotion in the two firms under 
study. 
To start with, it is important to note that these movements of 
labour of a relatively 'permanent' nature did not have exactly the same 
meaning in both firms. In contrast with the other firm, the assignment 
of labour in Firm A was not determined within a section but was 
controlled at factory level. Also, a worker was assigned to a very 
specific job. In Firm B the worker was assigned to a section where his 
labour power would be used according to his job grade. In practice this 
meant that a worker in Firm A had to go through the internal vacancy 
procedure to obtain a better job in his own department, while it was 
usually possible for a worker in Firm B to improve his position if there 
was a vacancy to be filled in his section. 
37 
These differences certainly 
help to explain why this question of internal promotion was more an 
issue of contention in Firm A, particularly in the machine shops. 
At an 'extraordinary Works Council' held specifically to discuss 
this matter in August 1976, the Firm A management adopted a very traditional 
stance. It is reported in the minutes of the meeting that 
the Transport and General Workers Union were claiming 
that one of their members was being unfairly treated 
and consistently passed over for promotion. The 
Company replied that with reference to the 1929 agreement, 
the company had the right to manage, and this must also 
include the right to higher and fire, although the right 
to fire has been modified somewhat by domestic agreement 
and legislation. The company insisted that it was 
fundamental to the right of management to reserve its 
right of highering. 
The Transport and General replying mentioned that 
service should not be the sole criterion, but said that 
its member Mr. Z., clock number 3069 has been unfairly 
37. Of course, this was irrelevant in some sections where labour 
assignment was done on a purely collective basis, as in Press 
shop no. 4, for instance. 
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treated and turned down on two occasions, for piece 
end grinding jobs. 
Mr. personnel director] then mentioned that it 
was the company who had týg right to higher and select 
and not the trade unions. 
Although such a strict managerial rights position was more of an argument 
than a reflection of the true balance of power in the workplace, it shows 
the importance given by management to the issue of selection of workers 
for the filling of vacancies and promotion. This matter certainly had 
important ramifications for management control. 
For many years decisions on this matter had been taken according 
to a formal management policy which stressed management's ultimate right 
to decide. Although this was by no means an agreement, the shop stewards 
had been active in challenging management over the application of this 
policy. There is evidence of this in the minutes of various works 
council meetings: 
The Trade Unions request that any vacancies arising be 
advertisSO in the usual way. The Company have agreed 
to this. 
The company is reserving its rights under the National 
Agreements re. hiring and transfers. The guidelines in 
operation at the moment are a statement from the company 
and are not an agreement. 
The criteria are suitability, service, ability to do the 
job, and the applicants' history within the company. The 
final decision is by the company. 
The AUEW feel that their members are being discriminated 
against and are R5epared to go to law for an interpretation 
of the 1968 Act. 
38. Minutes of a meeting involving shop stewards' representatives of 
all manual unions, held on 13 August 1976. It has to be noted that 
all the minutes of works council meetings to which reference is made in the dissertation were written by a management representative and 
should not be regarded as 'agreed minutes'. 
39. Minutes of the meeting held on 12 November 1975. 
40. Minutes of the meeting held on 16 February 1977. 
- 212 - 
In 1976, the Company indicated its wish to issue a revised policy state- 
ment on internal vacancies and there was much discussion with the shop 
stewards on this matter. In fact, the major preoccupation of management 
was to make sure that seniority was considered neither the sole criterion 
nor the most predominant one. This was the meaning of the following 
entry: 'amendments to the internal recruitment policy are to be issued. 
More emphasis will be placed on experience and suitability as opposed to 
length of service. '41 The new 'Internal Recruitment Policy' issued by 
the personnel director in June 1977 set out the following regulations: 
In dealing with applications the company will exclude 
applicants who 
(a) Have been with the company less than twelve months. 
(b) Have been in the company's employ for longer but have 
" not been in their current occupation for more than 
twelve months. 
(c) Applicants who having previously applied for an internal 
vacancy, was offered it and refused it within the 
previous year. 
Other applicants will be selected on the following criteria: 
(a) Previous experience for the job applied for. 
(b) Works history, i. e. absenteeism etc. 
(c) Ability to communicate where appropriate for safety 
or operational reasons. 
(d) Service with the company. 
It will be noted that, once the minimum period of twelve months of employ- 
ment was met, seniority was only the fourth criterion for internal 
promotion. While the second criterion ('works history') might refer to 
the co-operative spirit of the worker, the third one ('ability to 
communicate') might hinder the progress of many immigrant workers in the 
foundry who had a limited understanding of English. In practice, however, 
it was only through many years of good service that workers gained access 
to the better jobs, especially within the large group of machinists. It is 
41. Minutes of the works council meeting held on 10 November 1976; 
similar entry in the minutes of the meeting held on 15 July 1976. 
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also worth recalling that there was virtually no movement of labour 
between the factories. Until recently vacancies in one plant were not 
even advertised in the other. 
As part of this new policy, management also sought to establish its 
right to go for external recruitment for jobs arising out of a first 
movement of personnel (i. e. from the second stage of internal mobility). 
This was challenged by the unions and an agreement was reached at full- 
time official level by which management was required to advertise (on 
the noticeboard) in three consecutive stages before going to the external 
market. If a vacancy had to be filled, for any reason, the personnel 
officer had to advertise this job X, the job of the worker Y who would 
get the job X, as well as a third job which might be left vacant if someone 
was 'promoted' to the job Y. The book in which the personnel officer 
registered carefully the successive stages of the procedure showed that 
for many jobs in the machine shops there were effectively three internal 
movements before the lower grade vacancy was filled through the external 
labour market. It was observed that the shop stewards were vigilant in 
checking management interpretation of the rules all through the process. 
Here are examples of the types of dispute which were reported under the 
heading 'Internal Recruitment Policy': 
Another Works Conference is to be called on Internal 
Recruitment, because of the Transport and General 
Workers Union ejection to an outside operator being 
on 711F Grind. 
The Shop Stewards registered a failure to agree on the 
basis if one man applies for the job with insufficient 
service provided and he is satisfactory he should be 
transferred. They did not want to pursue the argument 
that a man should have no more than one move in twelve 
months. 
42. Minutes of the works council meeting held on 16 June 1977 
(meeting no. 21). 
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The Company indicated they were not prepared to accept 
this position, and the Trade Unions are therefore 
registering a failure to agree. 
On a separate issue K. LTCWU shop steward] indicated 
that with a vacancy on Rockwell on nights, if we 
brought a man in from outside to do the job, the job 
would be 'blacked'. The basis for this position was 
that there had only been one applicant and he had 
only a few days short of twelve months service. 
The situation was different at Firm B. The information on 
vacancies was not communicated on the noticeboards but through the shop 
steward network. The senior shop stewards got the information from 
management and informed their shop stewards at the weekly meeting. On 
return to the shop-floor the stewards informed their constituency members. 
The applicants were then interviewed by a production manager (usually 
the unit manager) who had the responsibility to choose the worker 'best 
suited for the job'. This procedure applied to two successive stages, 
as opposed to three in the other case study, after which the Company 
went to the external labour market. In formal interviews with representa- 
tives of both sides it was made clear that the production manager had 
the freedom to decide at his discretion, without being constrained by 
the seniority rule. over the years this had not been a matter of conflict 
between management and labour. The shop stewards had not really challenged 
management on this. Clearly, seniority on promotion did not seem to be 
a priority for this workplace union organisation. This might only be 
possible, however, if management appears to decide, as a general rule, 
within the limits of fairness. As the personnel director commented, 'like 
in anything there is the formal and the informal system and in practice 
we generally must have good reasons for not respecting seniority'. 
44 
In 
43. Minutes of the works council meeting held on 9 November 1978 (meeting no. 34). 
44. Formal interview, 2 May 1980. 
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fact, if a worker with higher seniority was not chosen, and especially if 
it was not the first time that he was passed over, he or his shop steward 
might raise the matter and complain about it. Some evidence of this 
occurring was found in the TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book. 
However, the point is that this was not an issue which was felt to be 
important enough for the shop-floor to put pressure on and apply 
sanctions. 
Another relevant consideration was that although management 
decided in the last resort, the experienced TGWU convenor was sufficiently 
involved in the whole process of labour mobility and internal promotion 
to exert real influence. And since the toolroom (AUEW) and the tinsmith 
areas (NUSMW) were isolated from these internal movements of labour, in 
the sense that a worker could only have access to these sections through 
the external labour market (conditioned by a pre-entry closed shop), 
it was mostly within the ranks of the TGWU that such movements occurred. 
From the start their convenor was informed of all job vacancies. As 
was the case with most issues in which the TGWU was involved within the 
factory; he was also likely to be informed and involved whenever a case 
was not restricted, by its implications, to an individual or a particular 
section but had some ramifications for the collective organisation. Here 
is an illustration of the autonomy left to the convenor in such matters; 
Convenor spoke of new starters who seem to think that 
they can swop jobs after a short period as press- 
operators, and felt that they are being misinformed. 
Stewards discussed problem and left it to Convenor to 
treat such case on its merits on questions of transfers. 
45 
45. TGWU shop stewards' committee Minutes book, meeting held on 
8 December 1976. Similar evidence in the minutes of the 
meeting held on 9 March 1977. 
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Taking advantage of his strong bargaining relationship with most production 
managers and all labour managers, the convenor probably had some influence 
in making the procedure operate with a reasonable degree of fairness. 
In these circumstances the method had sufficient credibility among the 
ranks of shop-floor workers. 
As was implied in the last quotation, the press operators were 
the most strategic group as regards labour mobility in this factory. 
Because their work required heavy physical effort, a comment frequently 
heard in these shops was that the job of press operator was suitable 
only for young workers who were prepared to perform physically demanding 
tasks in order to earn relatively good money. Some figures seemed to 
support this general impression. In October 1978,105 (83 per cent) of 
the 127 press operators were under 40 years of age, and only two were 
over 50. By comparison, only 47 per cent of all the employees (hourly 
paid and staff) of the firm were under 40, and 28 per cent were over 
50 years of age. The average age of the press operators was 33.8 years, 
compared with 42 years for all employees. At the same period, the press 
operators had an average of seven years of service in the Company, compared 
with twelve years for all employees. Therefore, the opportunity for 
press operators to get access to other jobs within the factory through 
internal vacancies became crucial at a certain stage in their working 
lives. 
There were basically two routes for alternative work within the 
factory. The most important in terms of numbers was the access to direct 
production work in the daywork areas. There were also some possibilities 
of getting access to ancillary jobs. The other alternative, and by far 
the most rewarding in terms of job control, status and earnings, was a 
toolsetter job. There were 45 toolsetters at the time of the fieldwork, 
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and all of them had been press operators before. Entry to this trade was 
reserved exclusively for the press operators', and they had recently 
returned to the traditional system by which it was not possible for a 
worker to return to the press shop as toolsetter once he had left for 
another production unit within the factory. The press operators who 
wished to become toolsetters gave their names to a production manager who 
periodically chose those who would go on training for the job. From 
those who completed the training successfully, it was for management to 
decide who would get a setter job. Here again, management discretion 
to decide had not been challenged over recent years, and it was accepted 
that seniority was not the predominant factor. Although a degree of 
technical ability was certainly required in this particular case, a 
responsible and co-operative attitude on the part of the candidate 
would obviously been given the greatest consideration in the making of 
management decision to promote (Blackburn and Mann, 1979: 103-11). This 
has to be pointed out as an important asset in the building up of manage- 
ment control and discipline. It may also be relevant to note that the 
shop steward function did not represent a handicap in this respect; 
many stewards had become setters over the years. 
As for assignment and transfer of labour, a major contrast was 
observed in the way the shop-floor organisations in the two firms tried 
to have some influence on management decision-making. As compared with 
the preceding issues, however, the pattern was different. The procedure 
was much more formal at Firm A. Decisions were taken on the basis of a 
comprehensive written policy, on the elaboration of which the unions had 
some influence. In this firm the shop stewards as a group were more 
interested in and vigilant over this issue than the shop stewards in Firm B. 
The former were very attentive to management handling of the procedure on 
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internal promotion. As compared with the shop-floor organisation in 
Firm B, the Firm A shop stewards showed more concern over the seniority 
rule and the progression of the individual within the factories. In spite 
of these differences, it should finally be stressed that in both cases 
management had at their disposal an important asset for social control, 
that is the ultimate power to promote long-standing and co-operative 
employees. 
This closer look at the mechanisms for internal progression in 
these workplaces also points to some of the reasons why the seniority rule 
has traditionally been less predominant in Britain as compared with the 
North American pattern of job control. Especially because of piecework 
and fragmented bargaining in engineering workplaces, there were not so 
many stable job hierarchies based on job classification and an internal 
wage structure. In North America such centralised job classifications and 
wage structures developed at a much earlier stage. Lazonick noted that 
internal job ladders had existed in large American companies even before 
the First World War (1983: 126-7). In British factories, the reasons why 
manual workers wanted a move to other jobs were often related to the 
nature of the work or the opportunity for higher earnings, but this did 
not necessarily represent a 'promotion'. Hence at Firm B, leaving a 
press operator's job was seen, in most cases, as a move from strenuous 
and harsh work to a more relaxed working environment. But it also involved 
a loss of earnings. It was not an internal promotion but a move from the 
centre to the periphery of the work process and the pattern of control. 
In short, the work pace was slower and social relations were not so tense; 
but there was also less money involved. It was not a situation where 
everybody wanted to move to 'a better job'. Accordingly, there was less 
need for sophisticated regulations on internal progression to protect 
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workers from management favouritism. 
With the institutionalisation of labour relations at workplace level 
in Britain, it will be interesting to see if the situation has developed 
on similar lines to the North American pattern. There were certainly 
indications of this happening at Firm A. In the machine shops, a worker 
could have access to better jobs in every respect, even within the same 
job classification (X5). We studied in some detail the formal procedure 
by which the progression within the ranks of manual labour was managed 
in this enterprise, under trade union control. 
3. SOME CONTRASTS BETWEEN AND WITHIN THE FIRMS 
The bulk of evidence presented so far in this chapter has established 
that there were two different patterns of worker control over deployment 
of labour. At Firm A, the shop-floor had relatively little control over 
assignment and transfer of labour. This was partly because the section 
was not a natural boundary for mobility and the shop steward organisation 
was not suited for detailed control over the worker contribution in the 
work process. It was shown in the preceding section, however, that shop 
stewards were active on the issue of internal progression. They had 
achieved some influence in protecting the individual against management 
discretion. Such a pattern of job control would appear to have something 
in common with the predominant pattern in North America, where unions are 
generally successful in negotiating administrative rules on issues such as 
labour mobility but do not interfere seriously with management control 
over aspects more directly related to the work process. In such a situation 
the shop-floor organisation does not raise the most crucial issue of the 
transformation of labour power into effort. 
At Firm B it was reported that manual workers had developed an 
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important degree of job control over assignment of labour and transfer 
across the sections. This collective control was found to be particularly 
sophisticated in some areas. The pattern observed in this factory 
appeared to be somewhat typical of well organised engineering factories 
in the West Midlands. In many ways, shop-floor control over labour 
assignment in the press shops was reminiscent of the gang system which 
had a strong influence in Coventry engineering factories (Rayton, 1972; 
Melman, 1958: 34-7; Freedman, 1977: 212-15). It was argued that collective 
control over assignment of labour was not in itself detrimental to 
production, although it had major implications for management control at 
the shop-floor. In contrast, the issue of transfer of labour represented 
a serious problem for managers. They tried, without success, to come to 
terms with the shop-floor organisation on this matter. 
In this chapter no general attempt is made to explain how these 
very different patterns had developed. Nevertheless, some mention was 
made of particular characteristics of the work process which fostered 
job control in the press shops and hindered its development in the machine 
shops. A fuller explanation will be developed in the following chapters. 
Moreover, it is felt that some contribution to an understanding of job 
control may be gained by studying the main differences observed within 
each firm. Hence the bulk of this concluding section deals with an analysis 
of contrasts within the organisations, starting with Firm B. 
From what has been presented so far in the dissertation, it is 
possible to suggest a distinction between three patterns of job control in 
the areas which were studied most closely in this factory. There was, first, 
the craft control tradition, observed in the toolroom and in the tinsmith 
section. Both were 'one union shops' and were isolated from all movements 
of labour within the factory. In the case of the NUSMW members, the whole 
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process of job regulation was so peculiar that this area constituted an 
'island' within the factory. In the toolroom, job control was also about 
the preservation of the craft tradition and status. The toolroom shop 
committee members saw themselves as the protectors of genuine skilled 
labour at the shop level and also in their relative position to the 
TGWU members. 
A second pattern was characterised by the press operator type of 
job control. This appears to be typical of the nature and extent of 
control inspired by semi-skilled engineering workers with a robust 
shop-floor organisation. Their pattern of shop steward representation 
was highly favourable to job control. Most of them also worked on the 
basis of a piecework system which had been eroded over the years. However, 
it is argued in this dissertation that piecework was not the fundamental 
cause for the development of job control but only a contributory factor. 
More fundamental reasons are to be found in the nature of the work process, 
the material basis for the control problems faced by management. 
A third pattern of job control was observed in the daywork 
production areas. Workers there had much less job control than the two 
other categories but their influence on labour utilisation was neverthe- 
less much more important than that of manual workers at Firm A. It 
was noted that many of these dayworkers had been press operators before, 
and they were still part of the relatively strong TGWU domestic organisation. 
Although their control over assignment of labour and other specific 
aspects of the work process was relatively moderate, it was seen that they 
were very strong on issues such as transfer of labour, especially when it 
had some impact on overtime working. Finally, it has to be stressed that 
these three distinct patterns of job control are not presented here as 
general models of shop-floor action on labour utilisation. Their pertinence 
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for explaining differences in our case studies will also be evaluated in 
the light of the evidence presented in the following chapter. 
By contrast, the evidence on Firm A shows that this shop steward 
organisation was more alert and influential on the issue of internal 
promotion than on the two other main issues discussed in this chapter. 
This observation raises an interesting question about the pattern of 
control which existed in the firm. Was it really a case where a stable 
workforce was strongly committed to the company and sought the gradual 
improvement of its situation within it? Our study of the composition of 
the labour force, presented in Chapter 3, showed this not to be the case. 
From the data on length of service and seniority it was possible to 
establish that the Firm A workforce was characterised by a high degree of 
instability of employment. This was particularly the case for the majority 
of immigrant workers in the foundry. 
Indeed, this instability of employment was a major impediment to 
the development of a degree of labour cohesiveness necessary to seriously 
restrain management freedom as regards labour utilisation. Moreover, 
there was a cleavage between the workforces of the two factories, and 
their integration within a single domestic union organisation was more 
formal than real. While there was occasional union resistance in the 
machine shops, the worker organisation in the foundry was very weak. By 
being able to develop a coherent bargaining structure, as well as a 
disputes procedure, at company level, management was placing itself in a 
favourable strategic position. The whole structure of labour relations 
was established at the level which was most convenient for the management 
of two separate workforces producing in an integrated work process. 
CHAPTER 7 
WORKER CONTROL OVER EFFORT 
It was emphasised in Chapter 1 that the contrast between the 
potential inherent in labour power and the constraints upon its realisation 
in the work process represents the most fundamental feature of the reality 
of control in the workplace. In focusing on control over effort, this 
chapter looks at the heart of this problem. 
Starting from the distinction between labour power and labour, the 
first dimension of the problem is the indeterminate character of the 
employment contract. In practical terms this means that it is impossible 
to specify every aspect of labour utilisation at the time of employment, 
let alone the very amount of effort which should correspond to a given 
yhhýýr 
wage. This has to be determined at the point of production, on a day-to-day 
basis. But what makes it more problematic, and this is the second dimension 
of the problem, is the fact that in the process of converting labour into 
effort the interests of management and labour are contradictory. This 
is the very location and material basis of conflict in the workplace (see 
Edwards and Scullion, 1982a: 1-9). It is in order to realise the optimal 
conversion of labour power into real effort in the work process, within these 
major constraints, that management has to organise a structure of supervision 
and control. 
Although the analytical problem is presented in fairly general 
terms, the writer is aware of this being a very complex area of study. 
Also, the discussion centres on only some of the means by which organised 
workers develop a degree of control over effort. Moreover, the intention is 
not to present a complete picture of the situation in these three factories 
but to focus on departments and sections where the evidence is most likely 
to contribute to the analysis and argument of the thesis. 
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The first section deals with the various types of demarcation by 
which the nature and contours of jobs are defined. These lines of 
demarcation constrain management in the allocation of work to different 
categories of workers or to different shops. The two following sections 
discuss more directly the question of the effort bargain. 
1 Although many 
scholars would define labour relations with reference to the wage-effort 
bargain, there has been relatively little empirical research on the 
'effort side' of the exchange. This is particularly remarkable considering 
the long-standing debates on 'restrictive practices' and productivity. 
A typical weakness in the literature also consists in studying either pay 
bargaining or labour utilisation without proper consideration of the 
dynamics of effort and compensation, both aspects being part of the same 
ongoing process. Sections 2 and 3 may represent a modest contribution 
in this respect. 
Section 2 introduces different patterns of control over effort 
under different work processes and payment systems. The third section 
focuses exclusively on the large press shops at Firm B. The main theme of 
this section is the notion of 'control over time'. While the importance 
of 'making out' under piecework is well established (especially Roy, 1953; 
Burawoy, 1979), it is suggested here that another major preoccupation of 
factory workers is control over their working time. Particular attention 
is given to the degrees of worker control over the intensity of effort and 
the distribution of effort over the whole shift, which are necessary to 
develop a degree of control over time. 
1. Baldamus (1961), the classic reference on this concept, used more 
commonly the term 'effort value'. The term 'wage-effort bargain' is 
also commonly used as a synonym. 
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1. JOB DEMARCATIONS 
Batch production requires a high degree of flexibility of labour 
to meet the frequent variations in the flow of production. In the pre- 
ceding chapter we saw that various regulations on assignment and transfer 
of labour allow different degrees of management freedom. The rigidity 
of demarcations between tasks, or conversely the amalgamation of related 
tasks, is another major determinant of flexibility of labour. In this 
section, attention centres on job demarcations based either on strict 
decomposition of labour, the enforcement of craft tradition, or boundaries 
between autonomous sections. 
In the press shops, flexibility of labour was required most because 
of the predominance of short runs of production. The regulations on 
labour assignment, which were under worker control, permitted a fairly 
high degree of flexibility. However, there were restrictions to mobility 
of labour between sections, not only in the press shops but as a general 
rule in Firm B. It was also in these press shops that the strictest 
application of the principle of decomposition of labour was observed. 
There was absolutely no relaxation on the distinction between the types 
of task, i. e. setting, production, quality control, material handling, and 
maintenance. Indeed, there were additional demarcations within production 
(press operating, 'reclaim' and 'scrap balers' jobs), quality control 
(table inspectors, patrol inspectors and viewers) and maintenance jobs. 
It was observed in Chapter 3 that in the case of the large Press shop no. 3 
the members of ten different shop steward constituencies took part in the 
work process. These distinctions had been well established over the years 
and, being acknowledged by managers and workers, did not cause any friction 
or dispute at the time of the fieldwork. It did not matter whether they 
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originated in custom and practice or more universal craft demarcation. 
It is worth noting that such a sophisticated network of demarcations did 
not exist to any comparable extent in the daywork production areas which 
were more at the periphery of the production process such as, for instance, 
the Fitting and Welding no. 2 or the Copper Block sections. 
In the machine shops (Firm A), whose work process was comparable to 
the press shops, the decomposition of labour was not as rigid. The major 
difference was that the machinists were setting as well as operating the 
machines on their work station. Although they had been setting for many 
years, this was first recognised as part of their job when in the wage 
structure negotiated in 1978 the grade of machinist (operator-setter, 
grade 5) was introduced as opposed to the grade of operator (grade 9). 
Prior to this the most usual sanction of the machine operators had been 
to refuse to do the setting when they had a dispute with management. So 
in practice management bought out a sanction which was based on control 
over job content. More important than the differential in the basic rate 
(E3.50 a week) was the substantial difference in the conversion factors 
of the two grades. The idea was to recognise and develop the engineering 
skills of the machinists and make them 'all-round specialists' on their 
specific work station. This also explains their autonomy and 'control over 
their job', an aspect discussed in Chapter 6. Indeed, the new piecework 
system introduced in 1975 also preserved a remnant of the traditional 
scheme which was called the 'supplement'. It meant that the machinists 
who worked on more demanding jobs in terms of skill got an additional bonus. 
When, during the research, a CMWU shop steward put forward a grievance which 
had the practical effect of playing down the 'skill differential', he could 
not count on the support of the JSSC. 
2 It was felt fair to maintain the 
2. At the works council meeting we attended on 9 November 1978, the CMWU 
senior shop steward told management representatives that he did not support 
this grievance but that 'any shop steward has the right to put his claim 
through the procedure himself, if he does not have the support of the JSSC'. 
- 22; - 
the differential since, as the GMWU senior shop steward put it: 'Do you 
think it normal that a worker operating one or two machines could be 
paid exactly the same wage as another operating three or four of them? '. 
3 
Finally, the foremen in the machine shops also worked as setters 
almost on a full-time basis. For this reason, and also because of the 
larger size of the batches produced, the relative number of toolsetters was 
much smaller than in the press shops. Along with the patrol inspectors 
(quality control), they were not regarded as genuine skilled workers by 
machinists and operators. Interestingly, toolsetters and patrol 
inspectors were very much at the bottom of the gross earnings table 
within the Company. 
Compared with demarcations which follow the decomposition of labour, 
those based on craft tradition are more universal and widely accepted. 
Hence a management document dated January 1977 (Firm B) stipulated that 
'all groups will be expected to co-operate in every possible way to 
improve efficiency by adapting to new methods of working, using any 
mechanical handling equipment deemed by the company to be necessary and 
removing all demarcation barriers with the obvious exception of closely-knit 
traditional craft areas'. Although even these traditional demarcations 
have been challenged in other engineering firms, for example British 
Leyland, 
4 
there was no evidence of this occurring in the firms studied. 
3. Informal interview, 22 November 1978. 
4. The controversial programme imposed on the BL Cars workforce in 1980 
stated the need for 'the introduction of more efficient methods of 
using available maintenance resources, including the elimination of 
trade demarcations and, with training where appropriate, the amalgamation 
of related trades' (Company Proposed Draft Agreement on Bargaining, Pay, 
Employee Benefits and Productivity, November 1979, art. 5.6). See 
also Robert Taylor, 'BL Takes on the Shopfloor', Observer, 25 November 
1979, and 'A Step Towards Efficiency', Observer, 20 Apri 1980. 
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However, it was observed in both cases that while the status of genuine 
craftsmen, defined as those who had undergone an apprenticeship, was never 
challenged, this was not the case for those who got access to skilled jobs 
(such as toolsetting) through internal promotion. 
Craft demarcation encompasses two different principles. One is 
the restriction of specific tasks exclusively to craftsmen. The other is 
the long-standing division between different trades. Although craft 
demarcation was not in itself an issue of contention during our fieldwork, 
its strict enforcement had implications which are of interest in the study 
of job control. 
The main activity of the large toolroom at Firm B consisted of 
ýý , 
%ýý 
manufacturing and ensuring the maintenance of the tools of the presses, 
i. e. the 'tool' which is attached to the head of the press and the die 
which is fixed to its bottom part. The considerable discretion toolroom 
workers had on many aspects of their work meant that sanctions such as 
work-to-rule and withdrawal of co-operation were particularly effective. 
Instances which were enforced in recent years were following strictly 
every specification of the drawings so that production was slowed down; 
asking for all tools to be cleaned; enforcing strictly every safety rule; 
requiring regular assistance by the foreman, etc. But the most damaging 
sanction was the refusal of members of the repairing section to go down 
to the press shops and carry out immediate repairs on the tools, either 
directly on the press or on the shop-floor. Although the members of the 
repairing section were a minority of the toolmakers, they were sometimes 
mandated by the whole shop to apply this drastic sanction. The shop 'looked 
upon them as the area for sanction'5 because their work was directly related 
Formal interview with a member of the toolroom shop committee, 
19 September 1979. 
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to production. This specific type of pressure was applied early in 1979 
in order to get a better differential in relation to the toolsetters, and 
also during the national engineering strike of the same year. 
An example of this type of industrial action is particularly inter- 
esting in showing how the enforcement of job demarcations could make 
management dependent upon the co-operation of different occupational groups 
with complementary contributions to the work process. Local support for 
the national strike, which occurred during our observation in this plant, 
bore striking similarities with the situation reported by Edwards and 
Scullion (1982b) at the 'Components Factory'. While the series of one-day 
strikes in August was enforced without much discussion, the majority of 
the workforce did not wish to support the two-day strikes of September. 
6 
It was very much considered by TGWU members as a strike movement of the 
skilled unions, and especially the AUEW (Edwards and Scullion, 1982b: 58). 
While the AUEW, NUSMW and NSMIIvi were officially instructed not to work on 
3 and 4 September, the TGWU shop stewards had to accept the wish of their 
members to come to work, although recommending them not to do so. However, 
a memorandum from the Company, distributed in the factory on the Friday 
prior to the strike, was rightly interpreted by employees as a recommendation 
not to cross the picket. lines. 
7 In spite of this, a minority of TGWU 
6. A factory meeting held on 28 August overwhelmingly rejected the strike 
call, against the JSSC's recommendation. The TGWU mass meetings of 
31 August produced the same result in spite of all their shop stewards 
threatening to resign if they did not get the members' support for 
the national strike. 
7. Sections 5 and 6 of this note from the personnel director read as 
follows: 'It is important to understand that whilst the factory will 
open on Monday, it may not be possible to operate effectively (. . .) 
or it may gradually become so. As a result, the Company would (. . .) 
need to send people home. Decisions on this will be made section by 
section. ' It went on: 'Should any members of the AUEW, NUSMW and/or 
NSMM cross the picket lines, the Company will not be able to employ 
their services. To do otherwise would be to create insoluable post- 
dispute problems. ' 
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members did cross the lines. The toolmakers felt that this could eventually 
break the strike support in the factory and, later in the week, stopped 
co-operating in the press shops in the way described above. This was 
done in order to put pressure on the TGWU and force them to stop their 
members crossing picket lines. The immediate effect was to force the 
JSSC to call a meeting with management and ask for the factory to be 
closed during the following two-day strike. The same afternoon 
(6 September) the Company agreed to meet this request. 
This course of action was greatly resented by the TGWU majority. 
The toolsetters, members of this union, were to retaliate against the tool- 
room. While the toolmaker had the exclusive right to work on the tools, 
the responsibility of the toolsetter was to ensure the proper working of 
the press. More specifically, and partly for safety reasons, only he was 
allowed to take the tool out and put it back into the press once it had 
been repaired. For most of the day-shift on 7 September the toolsetters 
refused to carry out this particular operation. Because of clear 
demarEction lines, this had an immediate impact on production. The minutes 
of the labour-management meetings held during the day in order to settle 
the dispute contain the following: 
The setters felt that they were being pressurised by a minority 
group to be out on strike for two days ... 
/The shop steward speaking/. The Setters felt that the Tool 
Room had become too powerful and the whole purpose of this 
exercise was a protest to prove that the Tool Room was not the 
only powerful group in the Company with the ability to close 
down manufacturing. 
/The general manager. This was a tit for tat situation which 
could be seen by the Tool Room as an opportunity to have a go 
at the Setters again at a later date. 
Astriking feature of this episode was the position of management. They 
were not responsible for the events affecting production. They tried to 
calm it and did not wish in any way to take advantage of the division 
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within the workers' organisation. Their strategy was marked by the fear 
of further inter-union disputes resulting from a clash on the picket 
lines or the breaking of demarcation lines. Management was particularly 
afraid of losing the JSSC which was indeed under great stress over this 
period. The major preoccupation was to protect the institutional framework 
which, as has been shown, had been created with great difficulty over 
the last decade. 
These events are also in themselves manifestations of a high degree 
of job control. As a general rule, a greater degree of job control 
increases the range of intermediate sanctions available to the workforce. 
Where a complex network of demarcation lines is enforced, as in the case 
presented here, management is even more dependent upon the co-operation 
of different groups, organised in different unions. Hence it may be noted 
that the type of sanction applied by the toolsetters would have been 
ineffective in the machine shops (Firm A) since this job territory was not 
exclusive to them. In the circumstances prevailing in the press shops, 
however, some groups had a high potential for disruption with little cost 
to themselves and a relatively small group of workers directly involved. 
The passive reaction on the part of management, which might have retaliated 
against a small group such as the toolroom repairing section disrupting 
production, may seem surprising. But management knew that the few workers 
directly involved had the full support of a broader section of the work- 
force. The organisation necessary for such a strategy of withdrawal of 
co-operation (Edwards and Scullion, 1982a: 162-7) had been established. 
Indeed, it may be suggested that, as a general rule, job control and 
social organisation are likely to be found together since they are 
positively related. 
A third type of job demarcation, in addition to demarcations based 
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upon decomposition of labour and craft distinctions, follows the dividing 
lines between particular sections. This type was observed only at Firm B. 
So far as these demarcation lines were acknowledged by management, they 
were not in themselves a source of conflict. During our fieldwork it 
was especially on the boundary around the tinsmiths that problems occurred, 
either in relation to the Fitting and Welding no. 2 or the Copper Block 
section. This is understandable considering the analysis of the NUSMW 
shop steward that the whole history of his union had been conditioned 
by the erosion of their job territory by dilution, mechanisation and the 
incursion of general unions. Edwards and Scullion (1982a: 216-19) observed 
a comparable situation leading to demarcation disputes between NUSMW and 
TGWU members in the Small Metals Factory. As they explain (1982a: 216): 
The clash with the general union was not the product of an 
irrational tendency of unions to squabble with each other 
but the result of the structure of the situation: a union 
that tries to deal with managerial challenges to its members' 
interests through 'closed' policies is likely to have disputes 
on the boundaries it has drawn around itself. 
During the period of observation, such a demarcation dispute 
resulted in an eight-day strike by nineteen members of the Fitting and 
Welding no. 2 (FW2) section. Relations between the tinsmiths (skilled 
NUSMW members on piecework) and the FW2 section (semi-skilled TGWU and 
AUEW members on daywork) were generally poor, and particularly unfriendly 
between their respective shop stewards. The Automotive Heat Transfer 
unit (AHT) was particularly short of work over this period, the tinsmiths 
being on a four-day week and the FW2 workers not getting any overtime, 
a crucial issue in this section. There was an interesting custom and 
practice rule by which FW2 workers would always work longer hours than the 
tinsmiths over the week. 
8 A major reason for this practice was that the 
S. Formal interviews with the section manager (18 September 1979) and the 
shop steward (20 and 21 September 1979). 
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FW2 section -a daywork section - was located between two piecework groups 
(one section of the press shops and the tinsmiths) in the flow of 
production. This was likely to produce bottle-necks in production. And 
FW2 members were also enforcing a restriction of output to make the bottle- 
necks more acute when they felt that management was not giving them 
proper working hours. At the time of the strike, the FW2 workers had also 
accumulated some grievances against local managers (who described this 
group as an 'awkward section'). The dispute arose when, following a minor 
breakdown in FW2, the section manager allocated a small number of components 
to the tinsmith area without consulting the FW2 shop steward. The section 
went on strike, in protest against the section manager breaking a local 
agreement secured in 1976. This agreement specified that 'absolute attention 
to detail must be paid when we are planning to change the location of work 
from one section to another, and no action should progress without the 
proper consultation taking place first'. 
9 
The strike was prolonged by the fact that on its second day the 
Company refused to pay the wages for the time lost from its beginning. 
Because senior managers recognised that the dispute originated in a mistake 
by a member of their team, and the Company had issued telegrams asking, 
the strikers to return to work, the workers argued that they should be 
paid. They quoted a precedent which had occurred a few years earlier 
when maintenance people had been paid in a similar context. The managing 
director refused the payment, insisting that he could not make legitimate 
such a breach of the disputes procedure, which should prevail even when a 
local substantive agreement had been broken. A few weeks later the general 
9. Memorandum from the then general manager of the Heat Transfer division 
(HTD) to the local manager, with copy to the shop steward, dated 
16 August 1976. 
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manager issued a memorandum which in fact blamed local management for the 
strike. He first referred to the agreement quoted above and went on: 
On Wednesday, 7th July 1979, an incident involving the movement 
of work from Fitting and Welding 2 to the tinsmiths without 
prior consultation caused the subsequent industrial action 
taken by the members of Fitting and Welding 2, with the resultant 
loss of production until Friday, 13 July. 
I would remind you that recommendations made in the above 
mentioned memo ... are endorsed by me, and that your section 
of management shoull0be directed to adhere to the required 
working procedures. 
Although the protest had been very costly to them and had not stopped 
production in the AHT unit as they had expected, the strikers felt that 
they had made their point. 
2. DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF CONTROL OVER EFFORT 
2.1 Piecework and the Effort Bargain 
The effort bargain is a consideration of great significance under 
any piecework system. It is crucial even for time-rate workers since 
the amount of effort has always to be determined, considering that there 
is almost inevitably a gap between the optimal use of labour power within 
particular technical conditions of production and the level of effort 
which is possible and acceptable in given social conditions. Hence Ditton 
has shown the extent of output-restriction by workers on time-rate in a 
large factory bakery. He concluded that 
those on hourly pay do institute unofficial workplace controls 
in response to the lack of specifications about effort levels 
in the employment contract ... these controls 
do not appear 
to be as sophisticated as those produced by men paid by the 
piece. However, their net effect is a better wage level 
created by reducing the amount of effort expended, whilst 
holding the wage constant. (1979: 166) 
10. Memorandum from the general manager of HTD division to the unit and the 
section managers involved, with copy to the shop steward who led the 
strike, dated 7 September 1979. 
°`ý. 
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This possibility had been recognised by Baldamus in his original work, and 
he considered that we should 'treat the concept of effort value as a 
tool of analysis that has general applicability, independent of the method 
of wage payment'(1961: 98). As he pointed out, 'even under daywork, unless 
there is some tacit reference to prevailing effort values, the contract 
would not be workable ... The only difference 
is that with piecework 
the relevant expectations become more accentuated and thus more conscious 
to the participants in the situation. ' 
Indeed, the point is that under piecework the issue of effort 
bargain represents a more central preoccupation in the minds of workers 
and production managers, and the process has much wider implications in 
terms of control. In the case of piecework, the question of the degree of 
utilisation of labour power, the capacity to work which is bought on the 
labour market, is raised openly. Indeed, the primary function of piece- 
work is to establish a direct relation between effort and monetary 
compensation, thereby reducing the need for direct control over labour by 
management. In confronting more directly this problem of transformation of 
labour power, however, piecework does not resolve it but only makes it a 
more salient and conflictual issue on the shop-floor. Conflict occurs 
regularly in the process of bargaining over the determination of the 
ratio of money to effort, and also over the related but different issue 
of the enforcement of the agreed standard in day-to-day production. Most 
of the evidence presented in sections 2 and 3 deals with the second 
aspect, i. e. the control gained and enforced by workers at the moment of 
producing under a given standard. This is a strategic area to look at 
since once effort is openly made a matter of bargaining, it becomes the 
dominant preoccupation of most production workers. This is probably more 
so when they work on the basis of several different ratios of effort to 
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wages over a single shift, as was frequently the case in the factories 
studied. It follows that workers usually develop some form of social 
organisation at work group or section level in order to exercise varying 
degrees of control over the utilisation of their labour power. 
One way to illustrate the comprehensiveness of the effort bargain 
under piecework and thereby its wider implications for job control is 
to consider the subject of manning levels. In daywork production areas, 
manning levels were usually regulated through custom and practice, with 
particular cases being the object of fierce shop-floor bargaining. For 
those on piecework, on the other hand, manning levels were integrated in 
bargaining over the standard. The issues of manning, standard quantity 
and money were linked and represented the focus of piecework bargaining. 
The resulting agreement covered the three aspects. Where there was a 
change in conditions, for instance in a case where management added an 
operation (even a minor one), the shop-floor sometimes had a tactical 
choice between arguing for one more operator or a reduction in standard 
quantity. ' In most cases the preference was for an increase in manning 
levels. In fact, when enforcing a ceiling on earnings or working under 
a type of measured daywork as in Press shop no. 4, this was the only 
sound policy. 
There were also disputes over manning levels which did not raise 
the question of the ratio of effort to money. One such dispute occurred 
in Press shop no. 4 in 1976. The following extract from the minutes of 
the joint meeting involving the general manager and the TGWU convenor is 
self-explanatory. 
A point made by Che shop steward) that on a previous run, a 
stacker Zone-man operatioi% was put on the job, and by doing 
so, the Company had set a precedent for manning. The operators 
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requested that the previous manning level be maintained 
as a status quo position until the job dispute had been 
fully discussed through procedure. 
The General Manager replied that there was no condition for 
a status quo and that under no circumstances could Management 
agree to the manning level being determiTid by local conditions 
at the time of one particular press run. 
Besides manning, there are other critical issues on which management 
action is constrained as a result of the operation of piecework. Obviously, 
the strength of the shop-floor organisation is an important factor. But 
even in the machine shops (Firm A) there were constraints to modifications 
in the work process which rested partly on the determination of the 
effort bargain. For instance, at the time of the research the production 
engineering manager had worked out a plan involving a complete reorganisa- 
tion of the line 711F, which was producing a Ford component on a continuous 
basis. He was convinced that such a change would reduce manning and 
increase productivity. He had submitted the project to the shop stewards 
concerned for 'preliminary consultation'. But he never attempted to 
proceed with the proposal' because it had been made clear that it would 
be resisted most vigorously. Management chose not to act partly because 
it did not wish to distort the delicate ratio of effort to wages once 
this had been agreed. It should be pointed out, however, that these workers 
would not necessarily have the power to resist a similar challenge now. 
When we last visited the factory in December 1979 management was already 
acting with less consideration for shop-floor power. 
In the press shops, management freedom to organise production was 
certainly curtailed in many respects by the considerable degree of shop- 
floor control over the piecework scheme, a subject documented in section 3. 
To a greater extent than in the Firm A machine shops, there were major 
11. Minutes of the meeting held on 12 October 1976. Source: management 
files. 
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restrictions to changes in the layout of the presses for a given job. 
This was because any change in conditions raised the opportunity for the 
operators to challenge the standards. The allocation of work was obviously 
a major issue in which managers were limited by the extent of worker 
control over effort. The following analysis by the unit manager responsible 
for Press shop no. 3 and the Light section is significant: 
At the moment, we put jobs in presses where we have a standard. 
It restricts us quite a lot. It reduces our flexibility. We 
do not have piecework problems, but it is at the considerable 
price of losing some flexibility. There must be a serious need 
if we put something in presses or lines where there is no standard. 
l2 
To a large extent this situation had developed because, as press operators 
and production managers pointed out, it was almost always possible for 
an operator to resist when he was allocated a 'bad job'. He would clock 
out for some reason or other and in fact the forms of individual and 
group resistance were not always as subtle as those described by Roy 
(1952: 436-41) in relation to goldbricking. 
A related kind of restriction on management action was imposed 
by demarcations between sections of the press shops. In principle, there 
was no demarcation line between the shops. However, the 'right' to transfer 
jobs from one section to another was limited by whether or not a proper 
standard existed and by the need to gain the consent of press operators 
to work normally on the transferred job. Indeed, it should be noted here 
that standards were not transferable between shops. A standard was 
specific to the section where it had been agreed. There were, for instance, 
some jobs with 'double standards', i. e. different standards for production 
in either Press shop no. 3 or Press shop no. 4. 
12. Formal interview, 7 May 1980. 
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This sub-section has been concerned with a general discussion on 
the implications of different payment systems for various forms of control 
over effort. In the remainder of section 2, the main object is to outline 
the patterns of control observed in different production areas of the 
two firms. In view of the above argument about the importance of piece- 
work a brief account is presented of two areas which produced under piece- 
work systems. Section 3 will then look in more detail at control over 
effort and time in the press shops. 
2.2 The Machine Shops 
In order to make a general assessment of control over effort in 
the machine shops at Firm A it is necessary to set out briefly some 
characteristics of their work process. The best starting point would 
appear to be an observation of the most important production line which 
manufactured a particular Ford component. There were sixteen machinists 
and operators working on this line on day-shift and fourteen on night-shift. 
The machining of this component was performed at five successive work 
stations. The first two were linked work stations, in the sense that 
a mechanism automatically transferred the component from the first work 
station to the next. These workers were operating semi-automatic machines 
and hence their jobs were, to a large extent, machine-paced. In contrast, 
operatives executing the three subsequent grinding jobs were on separated 
work stations. They were also using non-automatic machines, which means 
that they did some manual work on every single component. 
These different types of machinery had direct implications for pay 
and control over effort. Those working on the first part of the line did 
not control the crucial issue of work pace and hence they did not have 
complete discretion over the level of effort. They had only limited 
influence on the quantity produced and there was much less room for 
I 
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speeding-up. As a consequence, the possibilities of high piecework 
earnings were restricted. Indeed, this led to short walk-outs (tactfully 
called 'unauthorised meetings') by all manual workers of the plant (both 
shifts) in September 1978. The workers argued that it was very difficult 
for workers on machine-paced jobs to earn the same level of incentive bonus 
as the others. Management maintained that it was fair for those putting 
in less physical effort to get less out of the incentive scheme. In 
contrast, there was greater variation in the earnings of the other group 
of pieceworkers. The majority of the high earners, and all the rate-busters, 
were on manually controlled jobs. 
Nevertheless, management was generally in control of the effort 
bargain in the machine shops. On the line producing Ford components, 
those having a good deal of control over their level of effort were also 
working on isolated or separated work stations. Besides the weakness of 
their shop-floor organisation, this lack of integration between work 
stations was a major impediment to labour cohesiveness not only on this 
production line but in the machine shops more generally. A majority of 
the operators and machinists were assigned to isolated work stations, the 
others working in groups of between two and five workers. There was there- 
fore comparatively little debate on manning levels. Since workers in the 
machine shops were assigned to the same work station for long periods of 
time (in sharp contrast to the press shops), there was therefore relatively 
little room for bargaining and conflict on two very crucial issues. This 
is very different from the organisation of work in the press shops where 
issues such as assignment of labour and manning levels made the link 
between control over labour utilisation and over pay'JIdetermination. 
Hence it is argued here that particular aspects of the work process 
in the machine shops set the structural basis for limited labour cohesive- 
ness and solid managerial control over effort and labour utilisation in 
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general. It did not provide the appropriate environment for worker 
resistance at the point of production. However, this is only part of an 
explanation for management control over the effort bargain. Attenton is oK 
now directed to the negotiation of a sophisticated tool of management 
control in the shape of the payment system. 
Following the reform, the basic rates were negotiated annually with 
the JSSC at company level. More unusual was the negotiation at the same 
level of different piecework conversion factors (called 'incentive levels') 
for different job grades. Variations were high and this could make a 
substantial difference in the pay packet. There was no explicit rationale 
for the ranking but key jobs in the work process, those on which a high 
operator performance was of crucial importance, had significantly higher 
conversion factors. The conversion factor for the machinists was also 
much higher than that of the operators. About 65 per cent of the piece- 
workers in the machine shops worked on the bs of individual standards L-'' 
which they had usually negotiated by themselves, with some support from 
shop stewards at the later stage of bargaining. The standards were 
signed by the machinists or operators directly concerned. Clearly, piece- 
work bargaining was not conducted by a work group or a section under the 
leadership of the shop steward, as was generally the case in the press 
shops. The piecework scheme was also tight because of the preponderance 
of genuine work study from the mid-seventies onwards. This was conducted 
for management under the firm hand of the production engineering manager, 
a strong character who contributed greatly to the establishment of firm 
management control over performance in this company. 
During the main period of fieldwork in 1978, the average operator 
performance in the machine shops was about 118 per cent of the piecework 
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standard. 
13 
During our follow-up research we had access to a complete 
summary of piecework performance which shows that for the week ending 
7 December 1979 the average performance in the machine shops was 130 per 
cent (compared with 134 per cent in the foundry and 132 per cent for the 
two factories). The detail of these figures and an interview with the 
production engineering manager suggest that this increase reflected 
to a large extent an improvement in labour productivity, with a comparable 
level of output being achieved with lower manning levels. The minutes of 
the 1980 pay negotiations (conducted in late November 1979) indicate, 
however, that management was slightly concerned about the piecework scheme 
getting looser. In informal interview, the CMWU senior shop steward 
argued that management had to bear the responsibility for having allowed 
people to go above 125 per cent, which was meant to be the maximum figure 
when the scheme was negotiated in 1975. He said that some rate-busters 
were 'fiddling the clock' (increasing down time) but that shop stewards 
could not do anything about this since 'it is up to management to watch 
fiddling'. 
14 
We had access to figures showing that the piecework earnings 
of some machinists were far higher than the average in 1978. Managers 
pointed out that a small number of rate-busters could be tolerated, 
especially if they were workers recognised for their exceptional skills, 
but that care should be taken not to raise the general expectations. 
But the piecework system was by no means out of management control. 
13. For the week ending 6 January 1978, the average performance in the 
machine shops was 114 per cent; it was 121.3 per cent in the week 
ending 5 May 1978. In the week ending 1 December 1978, the average 
performance for the two plants was 117.3 per cent. In an interview 
conducted on 28 November 1978, the production manager confirmed that 
118 per cent was a very good estimate. 
14. Interview conducted on 14 December 1979. 
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First, managers would get from the computer a complete series of data on 
production and pay for every operator, on a weekly basis. They had the 
necessary tools to compare the performance of individual workers, work 
groups or departments over time, between shifts, etc. At a works council 
meeting, the personnel director 'reiterated that he was entitled to check 
performance under 90 and over 120. If found to be accurate the performance 
would be paid, but if there is any challenge the operator concerned and 
his representative will be present. 115 Secondly, an average performance 
of 130 per cent (which was recorded late in 1979) is not really excessive. 
Indeed, an average rate which is too low always bears the risk of acting 
as a disincentive. With a figure of 130, it is estimated that the 
operators were getting (on average) about 12 per cent of their earnings 
out of piecework and the machinists 18 per cent. Therefore the proportion 
of variable earnings was still relatively low, especially when one 
considers the sophistication of the structure of control over effort 
which was built into this piecework scheme. Again, the amount of down 
time was quoted by senior managers as a major problem. Over a period of 
one week ending 1 December 1978, down time represented about 18 per cent of 
working hours in the machine shops and exactly 21.5 per cent of working 
hours for the two factories. Over the first week of December 1979, the 
figures were 19.7 per cent for the machine shops and 23.1 per cent for the 
two factories. But here again, the data coming out of the computer, from 
the information registered on the piecework cards, provided the necessary 
information for putting the finger on the problem area and increasing 
supervision in relation to a specific problem in a specific working area. 
Indeed, the information was broken down by department for each of the 
15. Minutes of the meeting held on 17 August 1978. 
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seventeen categories of down time. 
The above considerations also explain why management could enforce 
relatively loose supervision and remain in command of the operations. But 
the two main observations in this sub-section are the following. First, 
management had been successful in organising, with or without any strategic 
consideration, a work process which set the right conditions for manage- 
ment control. Secondly, they were able to build upon it a piecework 
scheme which further facilitated management control over effort. 
2.3 The Tinsmiths and Craft Control 
In studying control over effort, it is interesting to look 
briefly at a small group of N1SMW members who enforced an exceptionally 
high degree of control over this aspect of work. It was craft control 
of a particular nature since these were production workers. As a result 
of lack of investment in technology and very little innovation in work 
organisation in general, this production unit had become uncompetitive for 
the volume passenger car market. The production of automotive radiators 
was limited to repairing, the commercial vehicles, and the so-called 
specialist markets. Accordingly, the number of, tinsmiths had declined 
rapidly from about 200 in 1959 to 38 in 1979. 
The tinsmiths were producing on the basis of a very traditional 
piecework scheme based on prices. There was no work study of any kind 
(as a rule, there was 'no clock' allowed in this shop) and operatives did 
not clock in and off when changing jobs. A job to be priced was tried for 
a while by a cross-section of the members. A price would then be sub- 
mitted to the section manager by the shop steward. If they did not agree, 
the shop steward would go back to the shop for reconsideration. Both sides 
agreed that the process of bargaining prices was not really problematic. 
Collective control over production and earnings was absolute. They operated 
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a ceiling on earnings (called 'restrictive practice' by the managers 
concerned) and nobody could earn more (nor less in practice) than the 
'striking rate' of £1.10 per hour in 1979.16 The practice, much in line 
with NUSMW policy, had operated 'since the shop exists', in the words of 
the shop steward, and was accepted by management as a matter of fact. 
Besides the 'advantages' for management of stable production and labour 
costs, this was made acceptable by the high degree of collective discipline 
which characterises this union. On the one hand, the union assured 
management of skilled labour, high quality standards and good workmanship. 
On the other hand, collective discipline meant that a sheet metal worker 
had to spread effort over the whole shift, and any member 'making the 
price look too high' might have to answer for his behaviour. The shop 
steward checked the piecework cards, and overbooking or excessive 
utilisation of the 'back of the book' were also matters for discipline 
by the shop committee. Any member behaving in a way likely to bring the 
union into disrepute could be subject to sanction. This member could 
appeal to the shop committee, and then the district, in accordance with 
the formal rules and traditions of this highly democratic union. 
From the early seventies, management policy had been to eliminate 
all piecework schemes not based on work study. As a result of the 1973 
wage negotiations, the then managing director took it for granted that the 
tinsmiths had agreed to freeze their piecework earnings in return for 
other considerations. But there was no written agreement. The tinsmiths 
did not increase their ceiling between 1973 and 1977, when this issue led 
to a major dispute. When the shop advised the Company of their decision 
16. In 1979, all the NUSMW members earned £44 from piecework, in 
addition to a basic rate of £51.34 and a supplement of £4.84, for 
a weekly earning of £100.18. 
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to 'speed-up' in February 1977, management refused and claimed this was 
in breach of the above agreement. The tinsmiths increased their production 
according to the collective decision and the Company refused to pay above 
the ceiling. Following a go-slow and later a withdrawal of co-operation, 
management was forced to accept a reference to ACAS arbitration to 
determine whether the tinsmiths 'have at any time agreed with the management 
to restrict their earnings to any predetermined or existing levels'. 
17 
A major problem for management at the time of the hearing was that 
the managing director involved in these discussions had since left the 
Company. He could not say with certainty or produce written evidence 
that he had reached a definite agreement in 1973. The NUSMW, for its 
part, was able to produce a union shop record dated 1973 which stated, 
among other things, that 'this agreement did not in any way restrict the 
Shop from Speeding-up, but to talk about it first, before doing so'. 
18 
The district officer also emphasised that 'the Tinsmiths regarded their 
unilateral right to determine their level of piecework earnings as sacro- 
sanct. This was a key feature of the trade and no one group of tradesmen 
would be allowed to "sell" that right. '19 Their policy was presented in 
more detail in the Union's Statement of Case: 
It should be noted that when considering a speed-up of piecework, 
our people, acting in what we believe to he a responsible 
manner, have at all times taken the following into consideration: 
17. Terms of reference stated in the Minute of Appointment of the 
arbitrator, dated 19 July 1977. 
18. Quoted in the Report and Award of the ACAS arbitration, dated 
30 August 1977, paragraph 9(3). It also stated: 'The view was 
expressed by the Company that the copious notes referred to by the 
Union were no less subject to distortion than the recollections of 
a manager. They were not an objective and agreed record' 
(paragraph 11(6)). 
19. Report and Award of the ACAS arbitration, paragraph 9(1). 
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1. The state of the order book. 
2. The present stock situation. 
3. The unemployment situation in our trade in Coventry. 
4. Availability of parts and flow of materials. 
20 
The district officer pointed out that on the basis of these criteria 
there had simply been no justification for a speed-up at Firm B during the 
1973-1977 period. In the past, there had even been occasions when it had 
been necessary to reduce earnings. 
21 The arbitrator felt that this line 
of argument was 'marginally more convincing' than the evidence submitted 
by management. Hence he awarded in favour of the union in that they had 
not renounced the possibility of speeding-up and increasing their piecework 
earnings. 
On the face of it, management's position on this issue certainly 
appears highly paradoxical. They were fighting against a 'straight 
speed-up', i. e. workers wanting to produce more for more money. Bearing 
in mind that 56 per cent of the tinsmiths' earnings was not based on 
piecework anyway, the management's stance may be seen as irrational. And 
if the tinsmiths could not increase their ceiling on earnings, they could 
hardly increase their output at all. Indeed any level of piecework drift 
would gradually reduce the output per worker. 
22 
In a formal interview the 
managing director accepted that this interpretation was correct but 
argued that the Company had to follow a different rationale because of 
20. ibid., paragraph 9(4). 
21. ibid. 
22. The district officer took up this point and commented that 'there was 
something perverse if at a time of economic crisis when the merits 
of harder work were being extolled his members could not be encouraged 
to increase their output and earnings'. ibid., paragraph 18(3). 
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specific constraints. There were three basic reasons for management's 
position. The first was the pressure that an increase in the tinsmiths' 
earnings would put on the wage structure, with leapfrogging and differentials 
problems. At the time this was a matter of contention, in particular with 
toolmakers and maintenance workers. In this context the small numbers of 
employees directly involved had to be considered in comparison with the 
Company's total workforce and labour costs. The second reason was that, 
although it was presented as a 'straight speed-up', management expected 
that the tinsmiths would gradually return to bargaining over piecework 
prices so that the previous level of effort would eventually be restored. 
Management was implicitly adopting the view that there was such a thing 
as a 'natural' level of effort to which workers with such a high degree 
of control were bound to return. 
Indeed the third reason was related to this traditional type of 
job control. The managing director repeated in interview that the tin- 
smiths were the 'last of the industrial dinosaurs' and that it was a 
'self-fulfilling prophecy' that they would make themselves obsolete. 
23 
Hence managers saw it as a dramatic problem of attitude on the part of 
these workers. There was just 'nothing you could do' with the tinsmiths; 
senior managers were inclined to feel that they could only let the market 
forces eliminate them gradually from the factory, sooner rather than later. 
As a matter of fact, under the Recovery Plan advocated by the management 
team by the end of our fieldwork in 1980, the tinsmiths would have had 
a very limited role to play. Following the take-over of the factory in 
August 1980, the size of the workforce was reduced even more sharply and 
by 1981 there were no NUSMW members working in this factory any more. 
23. Formal interview, 13 May 1980. 
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The degree of worker control discussed in this sub-section is in 
many ways exceptional. Yet this type of collective control over effort 
and earnings does not appear to be untypical within this craft union 
representing direct production workers. The NUSMW is characterised by 
strong organisation and discipline at shop level. For instance, Edwards 
and Scullion (1982a: 202-9) have documented their complete control over 
issues such as recruitment and overtime in the Small Metals Factory. What 
is also fascinating for analytical purposes is the extent to which manage- 
ment may be prepared to carry on production without 'detailed control' 
over the work process (Hyman and Elger, 1981: 116-17; Edwards, 1983: 20-22), 
an issue which will be discussed in the following chapter. A final 
observation which emerges from this sub-section is that in a rapidly 
declining position in the product market both sides acted in a way which, 
to some extent, appeared to be in conflict with their own 'interests'. 
Eventually the structural forces prevailed and management and labour 
could no longer secure a continuation of the employment relationship, 
a reminder of their structural interdependence with regard to production. 
3. CONTROL OF TIME IN THE PRESS SHOPS 
In Manufacturing Consent, Burawoy put a great deal of emphasis on 
the notion of 'making out', which he presented as a major preoccupation on 
the part of pieceworkers (see also Roy, 1953). In documenting this, he 
was also able to express convincingly the feelings of machine shop workers 
with whom he had worked, and the shop-floor culture of this factory 
(1979: especially chapter 4). 
While the notion of 'making out' is well established in the litera- 
ture, it is suggested here that 'control of time' is a concern of no less 
significance for factory workers. By this, we refer essentially to worker 
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control of the use of their working time. Bence one of the basic principles 
of worker behaviour in these three engineering factories was the intensi- 
fication of effort during certain periods of time in order to build up 
a reserve of working time to be taken as long breaks or a longer period 
of leisure at work. In all cases, the period of reference for workers 
to organise their working time was one shift. In the case of the press 
shops, there were always opportunities for operators to 'get in front' and 
accumulate leisure at work so that they could finish early. For this 
reason, and although variable degrees of control over time were observed 
in other production areas, this section focuses exclusively on the study 
of the structure and process by which press operators could, to a certain 
extent, manage their working time. Particular attention is given to the 
control over the work process which is necessary for any group of workers 
to achieve this. 
Although some of the evidence presented here may be specific to a 
single factory, most of the analytical considerations have a broader 
application. Arguably, the notion of control of time is a more universal 
one than 'making out'. The two aspects are obviously related, but the 
point here is that worker control of time is not limited to work under a 
specific payment system (such as piecework or measured daywork). Indeed, 
it is not thought to be exclusive to factory work. Pfeffer, following his 
participant observation in an engineering factory in the United States, 
discussed at length this aspect of working time, and especially the notion of 
'doin' time' (1979: chapter 4). He argued that 'during a working life the 
salient factor shaping the experience of time for most employefs is that 
time itself, even more than labor power, is what workers are conscious of 
selling on an hourly basis to the employing company for wages' (1979: 72). 
The object of this section is not to describe and analyse the whole 
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process of piecework bargaining. This has already been documented at 
length, and the study of the British engineering industry by Brown (1973) 
is the most apposite. The interest here is on control over time and over 
effort more generally. In the press shops, however, many facets of 
control were entangled with the piecework system so that its study is 
appropriate in so far as it illustrates this particular pattern of control. 
After an introduction to the working of this piecework scheme, the 
discussion is structured on the basis of an analytical distinction between 
the immediate intensity of effort and the continuity or distribution 
of effort over the whole shift. 
24 
3.1 The Press Shop Piecework System 
Although the basic rate of the 134 press operators (in August 1979) 
was negotiated as part of the annual wage negotiations, in practice it 
could only be settled by the operators' acceptance of the deal, in the sense 
that they would not agree to be outvoted by the factory workforce. It was 
also at this level, i. e. at divisional level and across the sections of the 
press shops, that they negotiated many items of the mechanics of piecework 
such as the conversion factor, the price for waiting time, specific 
allowances, etc. Finally, it was underlined in Chapter 6 that while 
discussion on piecework standards usually involved the whole shop in the 
case of Press shop no. 4, bargaining was more often limited to the level of 
the work group in the cases of Press shop no. 3 and the Light section. 
A question underlying much of the discussion here is the extent to 
which this piecework system was a tool for management control or, conversely, 
a mechanism facilitating worker control over effort. In short, the material 
24. This distinction was first brought to our attention by Dubois and 
Monjardet (1979: 8). 
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to be presented will show that piecework was in a state of decay at the 
time of our research and that this had implications for the whole pattern 
of control. The best single indicator to illustrate this is the average 
piecework performance, i. e. the ratio of output in relation to the piece- 
work standard. In the week ending 5 October 1979, the average piecework, 
performance stood at 302 per cent, as compared with 305 per cent over 
the week ending 19 October. Although our series of data on this ratio 
is limited, complementary sources of information also indicate that the 
expected yield on piecework jobs was about 300 per cent at the time of 
our observation in the second half of 1979. 
But there are two important reservations here. First, the above 
ratio was based on what had been booked (as distinct from what was 
actually produced) by operators when they reported on piecework jobs; the 
process by which they could reduce the period of reference and hence 
increase this ratio will be explained at a later stage. Second, this was 
the ratio when press operators were actually on piecework time. The 
problem for management was that they were clocked on piecework for a 
very limited period of time during the shift. Over a period of seven weeks 
in September and October 1979, the operators reported to be on piecework 
jobs for 36.7 per cent of working time, and this was an improvement in 
comparison with the previous year. 
25 They were also producing on the 
basis of a daywork scheme for 19.7 per cent of their working time. And 
they were on down time for a high 43.9 per cent of their working time. From 
the data collected, it is possible to estimate that when considering piece- 
25. Over a period of eight months starting in March 1978, they were 
on piecework time for 26 per cent of the working time, with 28 per 
cent of working time on agreed daywork and 46 per cent on down time. 
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work, day work and down time, the press operators' average pay (excluding 
any shift or overtime premium) corresponded to a performance of about 
240 per cent, i. e. a ratio of 2.4 times the average piecework standard. 
That is a very important figure. It means that any piecework standard 
with an expected yield of less than 240 per cent was not a real incentive 
and was not worth any intensification of the work pace. Indeed, the 
expected yield, or the going ratio for piecework jobs, was more in the 
range of the above figure of 300 per cent. 
Another significant manifestation of this inflationary movement 
in piecework standards is worth mentioning. As explained in Chapter 4, 
following the 1969 strike on the crucial issue of the level of effort 
when there was a dispute over a standard rate, a so-called 'dispute rate' 
of 135 per cent was agreed at the Composite Conference held in March 1970. 
This meant that operators would not produce below the 135 ratio when 
enforcing sanctions in the process of piecework bargaining. In 1979 press 
operators would slow down to such a production ratio only in exceptional 
situations: it had become too costly a sanction for them. Indeed, payment 
for waiting time had been increased from 85 to 150 per cent in 1974, and 
then to 175 per cent in the 1979 wage settlement. Not surprisingly, 
operators were looking for means to go 'on the clock' rather than reduce 
their piecework performance to a low 135 per cent. Since the waiting time 
payment also applied to time at the surgery or even to mislocations or 
'crunches' (if management could not prove these to be cases of sabotage), 
there were numerous opportunities for experienced pieceworkers to do so. 
A piecework scheme where the average performance was three times the 
standard rate agreed between the parties could certainly be described as 
very loose. The basic standard had lost any significance as a basic level 
of effort and the gap between the point of reference for bargaining purposes 
- 254 - 
and the actual level of production was so wide that the system had lost its 
credibility. Any pretence of work study was a technical mechanism of 
standard determination could no longer be taken seriously in the Presswork 
division. The determination of the effort bargain was therefore plainly 
a matter of bargaining. 
3.2 Control over the Immediate Intensity of Effort 
As a general rule, the key factor for control over the immediate 
intensity of effort is the type of machinery used. This characteristic 
of the work process was crucial in the press shops. All the presses were 
non-automatic machines and the operators had to intervene in the production 
of every single component. Many presses could go up and down for a 
maximum of 900 strokes per hour. That is the optimal level of effort which 
could technically be achieved. Effectively, on many jobs, it was 
possible for operators to produce at the optimal level over short periods 
of time and they regularly did so. But obviously this was by no means 
a normal or an acceptable level of effort. The point is that work pace 
was under the operators' control. When producing on lines, the pace 
would be established by the rhythm of production of the whole work group, 
but even in these cases an operator had to push the button on every 
single press, for every component. 
There was, therefore, a huge gap between the limit set by the 
technical conditions of production and the level of effort to be determined 
by power relationships on the shop-floor or, in other words, as a result 
of a social process. This set the material basis for two phenomena 
studied here. One is the long tradition of hard piecework bargaining 
which was discussed in Chapter 4. Standards of production were not really 
conditioned by technical factors and this is what made work study 
particularly vulnerable. And under the prevailing social relations in 
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production, they could not be dictated by management: they were to be 
the object of very hard bargaining. Under the influence of a robust shop- 
floor organisation, which itself had developed very much in the process 
of bargaining over the ratio of effort to wages, the piecework scheme had 
gradually deteriorated to the state described in this chapter. The second 
phenomenon stemming from this worker control over the intensity of effort 
was the process by which the operators could speed-up, 'get in front', 
and accumulate leisure in work. Control over work pace, very much conditioned 
by the type of machinery, may therefore be considered as the starting 
point in the development of worker control over many issues in these 
press shops. 
It should be emphasised that describing the piecework scheme as 
being loose and discussing the operators' control over the intensity of 
effort is not to argue that people were either working hard or not working 
hard. Questions such as the absolute level of output or the rate of 
surplus value are not within the scope of this dissertation. To tackle 
these matters would require different analytical tools and the gathering 
of information of a different nature. The focus here is on control over 
labour utilisation. Hence, assuming that press operators had a high degree 
of control over the intensity of effort, they could still produce at a 
relatively fast or a relatively slow pace. Indeed, much of the discussion 
here is about the process by which they controlled effort so that they 
could work very hard for particular periods of time and more slowly or not 
at all for other periods during the same shift. 
Bearing in mind the above consideration, another issue related to 
the immediate intensity of effort is relevant here. That is the organisa- 
Lion of collective output restriction, the focus of Roy's major work (1952). 
I 
lý 
He discussed two forms of output restriction, i. e. goldbricking and 
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quota restriction. Collective output norms require an appreciable degree 
of social organisation and Edwards and Scullion (1982a: 170,176) reported 
that they were not universal, even in the West Midlands engineering sector. 
In their Components factory, as in the Firm A machine shops, there were no 
quota restrictions and rate-busters were tolerated. 
At Firm B there was considerable variation between areas of 
production. The tinsmiths had complete collective control over output, 
a situation described at length in the preceding section. Such an 
institutionalised form of output restriction did not exist elsewhere in 
the factory. There were significant contrasts even between different 
sections of the press shops. In Press shop no. 3 and in the Light section, 
the ceiling on earnings was established at 300 per cent for every single 
piecework job. The shop stewards were responsible for the enforcement of 
this maximum limit in their section. Evans, who also studied the situation 
in the press shops, reported that 
of the six current stewards interviewed, four confirmed they 
had an 'understanding' with the work-study engineers, by 
agreement with their sections, that they would be notified 
by the former of any operator exceeding the limit. Only one 
then had the authority, after notifying the individual(s) to 
change their piecework bookings. (1980: 73) 
The situation was totally different in Press shop no. 4. From 1974 
to May 1979, this section worked on the basis of a form of measured daywork 
called 'agreed daywork' in this factory (to emphasise that this was the 
outcome of negotiation, not work study). The scheme proved to be a 
disaster in terms of productivity, and on management's insistence one shift 
(shift B) agreed to return to piecework in 1979, the members of the other 
shift (shift A) rejecting these proposals. The new series of piecework 
standards for producing clutch covers and back plates, =der which the 
operators on shift B decided to 'sell' the agreed daywork scheme, C)could 
objectively be classified as very loose. At the time of the observation, 
those on piecework were producing at full strength, taking advantage of the 
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new scheme without any collective output restriction. They were 
producing more than twice the output of the other shift with whom they 
would alternate on a four-week basis. This was regarded with some 
resentment by press operators in other sections. They would comment that 
'they had gone mad since they are back on piecework', a behaviour seen 
as lacking collective discipline. By doing this, it was felt that press 
operators were making a mess of the whole piecework system. This could 
legitimate a management offensive and jeopardise the progress achieved 
over many years on the effort bargain. 
The case of Press shop no. 4 gives an insight into the rationale 
for the collective output norms applied elsewhere. When asked about the 
reasons for enforcing a ceiling, the shop stewards and other press 
operators usually put first the need to protect the standards. A principle 
of piecework bargaining was to 'preserve the best standards'. There were 
many standards on the basis of which it was not possible to produce at 
the ceiling level (300 per cent); the principle was to concentrate on 
improving these, not to abuse the better ones. Although there was no 
evidence of rate-cutting, the ceiling was therefore relevant in relation 
to the strategy on piecework bargaining. A second reason put forward 
by some operators was the need to protect work, i. e. to make sparing use 
of the reserve of production orders. In a factory where the product 
market was not stable, it was felt to be sound policy to take account of 
short-time job opportunities. Thirdly, and at least as important, there 
was the need for group cohesiveness, for a minimal level of collective 
spirit. Rate-busters and other manifestations of selfishness were seen as 
unacceptable sources of tension and division. 
3.3 Control over the Distribution of Effort 
Worker control over the continuity and distribution of effort during 
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a whole shift generally requires higher degrees of control over the work 
process and more extensive social organisation than simple control over 
the pace of work. In this instance, workers are involved in the 'manage- 
ment of time' in the sense that they plan and organise their working day. 
It is possible to conceive of a situation where management defines the 
overall daily production while allowing a high degree of autonomy to the 
workforce in the phasing of production. But in the case observed here, 
the considerable degree of worker control over time was also used to limit 
the overall amount of effort and production. Hence this was a crucial 
area of control taken from management. 
It is useful to draw an analytical distinction between two degrees 
of control over the distribution of effort. These will be called 'making 
time' and 'accumulating time'. The first expression has been coined by 
Ditton (1979: 162-3) and refers to a situation where operators take 
advantage of their control over the immediate intensity of effort to 'get 
in front' and hence earn limited periods of discretion, or 'breaks' on 
the shop-floor. Obviously the work process in the press shops provided a 
fertile ground for the operators to speed up and 'make time' to a 
considerable extent. They certainly did so, also taking advantage of the 
rather loose piecework system. 
But 'making time' is still a relatively basic form of control over 
effort and it was present, to varying degrees, in all the piecework 
situations observed in these three factories. In the large machine shops 
(Firm A), for instance, the usual pattern was that many operatives could 
regain discretion over their working time for short periods, just enough for 
long tea-breaks and conversation with workmates, in a casual and relaxed way, 
on the shop-floor. The teams of pieceworkers working on the pouring tracks 
in the foundry could go a bit further and achieve a limited accumulation 
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of working time over the shift. It was observed that from about one hour 
before the end of the day-shift, they worked fast and on a collective 
basis to'wind up production and clean their working areas to that they 
earned a period of about 35 minutes of leisure. Although washing-up time 
was included in this latter period, it appeared that their only constraint 
was not to leave the factory before the end of the shift. 
Although making time was fairly common in all three factories, this 
is not to say that 'making out' (or reaching an appreciable piecework 
performance in the press shops) was easy or natural for all manual workers. 
This was dependent upon skills acquired as part of the learning process 
on very specific job requirements. Workers needed an understanding of the 
intricacies and politics of piecework as well as some familiarity with 
technical aspects and 'angles' of specific jobs, so that they could 'beat 
the clock'. On this, Ditton (1979: 161-2) observed that experienced 
operators were able to take. advantage of apparently more difficult jobs 
which offered better opportunities for time-manipulation (see also 
Burawoy, 1979: 64). 
While the practice of 'making time' is quite usual, although by 
no means universal, the accumulation of time off requires a higher degree 
of worker control over effort and time. Yet the latter is also more 
attractive to operators and more pervasive in its consequences for the 
character of work. The accumulation of non-working time has significant 
implications for management control because it involves the manipulation 
of time on a relatively large scale. The expression 'accumulation of time' 
refers to the consolidation of high levels of effort and production over 
a substantial number of hours so that a worker can build up a reserve of 
time-off within the duration of the shift. The expression 'reserve of 
time-off' is deliberately rather vague: it is meant to refer to a period 
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of non-working time which is, by any standard, longer than what may be 
considered a mere tea-break. 
The matter under discussion here is more substantial than the 
issue of tea-breaks. It is also much more problematic because, as a 
general rule, accumulation of time off is not recognised as acceptable and 
legitimate by managers. In the press shops, for instance, the question 
of tea-breaks was not really an issue. Press operators did not argue for 
longer tea-breaks, mainly because on most jobs they could make and 
accumulate time-off during the shift. Eventually afternoon tea-breaks were 
'sold' for the whole factory, as part of the funding for the 1979 wage 
increase. This was not so great a concession from press operators, as 
the wording of the clause indirectly suggests: 
There will be no fixed afternoon tea breaks, with the 
consequent result of straight through working. This will 
not prevent individuals from consuming beverages or food 
during the afternoon provided that normal working is maintained. 
26 
In the study of control over labour utilisation, the issue of 
accumulating time is particularly interesting on two grounds. The first 
question is the process by which workers can take advantage of the work 
process to build up and accumulate periods of time-off. Allowing for 
piece rates which are sufficiently loose for accumulating a substantial 
period of labour time, an operator has to be allowed to speed-up and 
produce time-off in the first place. The second hurdle in relation to 
management control is for the workers to have the opportunity to enjoy what- 
ever period of time-off they have actually produced and accumulated. This 
condition may be at least as important as the preceding one. For instance, 
Ed Sokolsky, 'one of the better operators on the line', was quoted by 
26. 'Hourly Paid Wage Settlement, 1979', article 2.4.4. 
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Roy (1952: 432) as saying that 
he always makes out for ten hours by eleven o'clock, that 
he has nothing to do from 11: 00 to 3: 00, and has even 
left early, getting someone to punch his timecard for 
him 
'That's the advantage of working nights', said Ed. 
'You can make out in a hurry and sit around, and nobody 
says anything. But you can't get away with it on day 
shift with all the big shots around. Jack has to take 
it easy on these housings to make them last eight hours, 
and that must be tough. ' 
Most managers disapprove of workers 'doing nothing' for appreciable 
periods of time. Even if workers have reached their quota of production, 
managers usually argue that workers are employed, and have their basic 
rate paid, for 40 hours a week. 
Therefore, where workers are able to enjoy at least part of 
their accumulated time off, a distinction can be made between three 
types of situations. Workers may be allowed to spend some time loafing 
on the shop-floor, in the area nearby their work station. They may 
also be allowed to leave their working area and have some leisure 
elsewhere within the factory, as in the case under study here. Finally, 
they may 'extend leisure in work into leisure outside work', as in 
the rather exceptional case observed by Edwards and Scullion (1982a: 
102-3) at the Large Metals Factory where workers had devised informal 
rotas by which they could leave the factory 'for periods of time off 
lasting up to half a day'. In fact, this practice is exceptional only 
in factory work, since 'job-and-finish' is fairly common among other 
types of work (refuse collectors, milk delivery men, etc. ). 
In the press shops, there were three different and complementary 
resources through which press operators were able to make and accumulate 
time off. First, attention has already been given to their control 
over the work pace, the basic resource for speeding-up and making time. 
The second group of resources encompasses those originating in shop-floor 
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regulation. Many were the result of bargaining, such as loose piece- 
work standards or generous manning levels. For example, the agreed 
daywork scheme would come into this category. Others were imposed 
unilaterally by the shop-floor: the principle of mutuality, the 'right' 
for a pieceworker to speed-up, the 'right' to swop jobs after x number 
of components (which fosters cohesiveness and makes management 
retaliation more risky), or the right to stop work when the target is 
reached. It follows that there were opportunities for making and 
accumulating time which were built into the system. There was no need 
to break the rules to get in front substantially: it could be done 
by using skills and shrewdness in interpreting the rules of the game. 
A third resource which was particularly important for accumulating 
time, however, involved the bending and breaking of rules. That was 
the practice of 'fiddling the clock' or 'chiseling'. Borrowing from 
Roy, Burawoy defined chiseling as a practice which 'involves redistri- 
buting time from one operation to another so that operators can maximize 
the period turned in as over 100 per cent' (1979: 58). This is a useful 
definition, although in the press shops chiseling was not only based 
on redistribution of time between piecework jobs, a practice called 
cross-booking. The operators were also taking advantage of periods 
booked on down time (especially 'waiting time') or on agreed daywork 
to start producing on a piecework job so that they could 'get in front' 
substantially and accumulate time off. In this factory it was called 
'fiddling the clock'. The basic principle involved reducing the period 
of reference for a given production on a piecework job. Because of 
the predominance of small batches and the very fragmented nature of 
the work process, the operators might have several occasions to do so 
in a single shift. Evans, who had been the press operators' steward 
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in the Light section, observed that 'changes in work schedules, move- 
ments between jobs and countless causes of production interruptions 
aided operators to extend their "relaxation" periods, or exploit their 
"waiting time" allowances to boost piecework bonuses' (1980: 67). 
The immediate effects of 'fiddling the clock' were to inflate 
the ratio of piecework performance and, to some degree, to be paid 
twice for a given period of working time (i. e. waiting time allowance 
in addition to higher piecework bonus). The more general effect was 
a significant contribution to the making and accumulation of a surplus 
of effort and time, to be consumed before the end of the shift. A 
crucial point here is that workers were paying attention to the effort 
side of the bargain. The very high proportion of down time, to which 
reference was made earlier, provides some evidence for their success. 
This was the main concern of production managers in the press shops 
who felt that the payment system was not good enough to motivate 
operators to produce more. Hence chiseling was not used to boost 
earnings but to limit effort. In such a situation, the 'game of making 
out', which otherwise could be quite acceptable to management (Burawoy, 
1979), did not turn out the level of productivity that they were 
looking for. 
This phenomenon was most prominent under the agreed daywork 
scheme in application for most of the work in Press shop no. 4 and some 
production lines in Press shop no. 3. In these areas, the production 
of heavy components on presses of high tonnage was predominant, and 
these were not considered to be good piecework jobs by operators. Before 
the introduction of the agreed daywork scheme in 1974, there was 
evidence of sabotage and other forms of direct action. In this context, 
management sought to establish a daywork system on the basis of which 
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they would get better co-operation from the shop-floor. The Company 
was looking for a more regular and steady flow of production. 
27 
The agreement was reached on the basis of Q 
xa 
o 
sndar-ls, not the application of work study. In practice, the scheme 
meant that the operators were expected to produce to a target which 
would pay the equivalent of a piecework performance of 197 per cent. 
By all accounts, the root of the problem for the Company was that the 
basic standards which they agreed were too low from the beginning. 
This can be seen in the example of the main single component produced 
in 1979, a type of heavy clutch cover (part no. 48312). The maximum 
speed of the press was 900 cycles per hour. Under agreed daywork, 
operators had to produce 328 components per hour to make the 197 per 
cent performance (i. e. 166 components corresponded to 100R). When 
shift B returned to piecework in 1979, in a situation where management 
was initiating the change from a relatively weak bargaining position, 
the piecework standard was established at 240 components per hour. 
Hence the press operators had no problem in reaching the daywork 
production target. 
28 
Indeed it became obvious to all that the operators 
would not produce at a smooth and steady pace on the basis of this 
payment system. Such a spreading of effort would have required a very 
high degree of collective discipline. The actual practice consisted in 
speeding up during the early hours of the shift so that the daily 
27. The agreement was negotiated and signed by the general manager, 
who became managing director in 1976. He had been trained in the 
Glacier school of management for which a change from piecework 
to timework was a central tenet. 
28. The agreement of April 1974 consisted of a sliding scale of five 
possible levels of production corresponding to as many levels of 
performance and remuneration. But the operators never had any 
problem in producing at the highest of these levels which 
corresponded to the 197 per cent performance quoted above. 
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production target could be reached long before the end of working time. 
At the time of observation in 1979-80, operators working on daywork in 
Press shop no. 4 regularly completed their daily production around 
lunch time. 
29 
By working intensely during the first part of the shift 
they were able to accumulate a substantial period of leisure at work. 
This phenomenon was widely known and discussed by all participants in 
the press shops, and also within the circle of senior managers. 
Within the logic of this payment system there was no way that 
the operators would produce more than the agreed production target. What 
made the matter much worse for the Company, however, was that press 
operators found ways to produce less than the standard on a daily basis. 
This was the case when operators clocked off work for various reasons, 
hence proportionately reducing the daily standard of production. Manage- 
ment thought that going off piecework would put an end to the game of 
clocking off and on for any short stoppage of production. The 1974 
agreement stated that: 
Payment will be calculated on the average rate of production 
achieved over the period of working on agreed day work up to 
the end of each shift. Clocking will be kept to a minimum 
and clocking off will only take place when a major stoppage 
of production is anticipated. Stoppages for box changes, 
issue of gloves, trips to the surgery for other than major 30 
treatment, etc., will not be considered as major stoppages. 
This degree of co-operation was not achieved, however, and the foremen 
were not firm and dedicated enough to enforce clocking discipline. Another 
paragraph of the agreement identified a list of reasons for stoppage that 
29. The press operators on day-shift worked from 7.30 a. m. to 12.30 p. m. 
and from 1.00 p. m. to 4.00 p. m. Those on night-shift worked from 
8.00 p. m. to 1.30 a. m. and 2.00 a. m. to 6.30 a. m. 
30. Agreement entitled 'Presswork Unit Pieceworker's Pay Proposals', 
April 1974, Issue 5, paragraph 2.4(i), 
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justified clocking off without any reduction in earnings. 
31 
In 
practice, there was so much pressure from the shop-floor on this matter 
that, some years ago, a section manager made a deal with the operators 
which became a custom and practice known as the '7 hours guarantee'. This 
meant that the operators would produce on the basis of the production 
target for seven hours (out of eight) and were then assured of one hour 
of waiting time with no loss of earnings. The peculiar rationale 
behind this understanding was that the operators would only go off the 
clock for major stoppages exceeding one hour per shift, thus reducing 
the inconvenience of clocking. As one would expect, it did not eliminate 
such a deep-rooted practice. During a dispute over 'excess clocking' in 
Press shop no. 4 in 1979, the managing director told the meeting: 'the 
present payment scheme within no. 4 Press Shop was the result of a bad 
agreement but the operators are turning it into a very bad agreement'. 
32 
It became clear to management that they would have to withdraw 
from an agreement so damaging to productivity. In an internal document 
entitled 'no. 4 Press Shop Profitability', prepared for the managing 
director and other senior managers, the general manager for press-work 
wrote (October 1977): 
I also consider that a change of Shop Management could be a 
rather toothless gesture unless the real (. . .) in the 
woodpile has been exposed and corrected, i. e. the payment 
system/agreement which allows men to be paid at a rate higher 
than the flat rate areas without the obligation on the part 
of those men to work for a fair day's pay. 
31. These are: 'press breakdown not attributable to operator error; end 
of run; awaiting material or boxes; job stopped by inspection or 
supervision through no fault of the operator; accidents requiring 
medical attention'. ibid., article 2.4(iii). 
32. 'Minutes of a meeting held on Monday, 19th February 1979', p. 1. 
When the managing director addressed all the employees of the factory 
in October 1979, he referred to the agreed daywork scheme as 'the worst mistake I ever did'. 
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In 1979, management succeeded in negotiating a return to piecework for 
one of the two rotating shifts (shift B). These workers agreed on 
a package of standards which were loose enough to justify a much higher 
level of effort in return for higher earnings. The other shift of the 
same section refused and voted to stay on daywork. During the fieldwork 
we could therefore observe two groups of employees on the same work 
process functioning at very different levels of effort under different 
payment systems. 
The contrast was made sharper by the fact that those back on 
piecework did not enforce any form of collective output restriction. 
They were producing at a remarkably high level of effort, trying to make 
the most of the loose piecework standards. Over the first seven weeks 
of production under the piecework scheme (from 18 May 1979), the 
average piecework performance stood at 323,313,341,318,344,361, and 
339 per cent. While the press operators on shift B of Press shop no. 4 
had received an average of £82.68 a week over the six-week period 
preceding the implementation of piecework, their wages were £110.21 on 
average over the following seven-week period (corresponding to the 
above piecework performance). In 1979, the operators on piecework in 
Press shop no. 4 were producing more than twice the amount of those on 
agreed daywork on the other shift. Indeed, often with some fiddling 
of the clock, it was not unusual for work groups to book a quantity 
corresponding to the maximum speed of the press. 
But while the difference in output was exceptionally high, this 
was not reflected to the same extent in wages. The figures to which we 
had access revealed a good deal of variation in the differential between 
the weekly earnings of the two shifts. On most weeks, however, this 
differential fluctuated between £20 and £30, that is around 25 per cent 
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of wages. Many operators felt that the variable element of the payment 
system, which had been reduced in relative terms over the years, was 
not substantial enough to reflect the surplus of effort and production 
in their earnings. This may be one of the reasons why, in our last 
series of interviews (May 1980), managers complained that although 
pieceworkers in no. 4 were earning as much as they did before, their 
production was not as high as in the period immediately following the 
change. There was some fiddling, more pressure on effort control, and 
the problems of management control were recurring. 
This sequence of events has shown once again that in a situation 
where the shop-floor had some control over the work process, neither 
the daywork nor the piecework schemes were sophisticated enough to 
motivate workers and ensure managerial control. In other words, neither 
direct control nor labouQautonomy with control over output would allow 
management to get the level of effort they had in mind. Such a degree 
of worker control over the distribution of effort required considerable 
social organisation. Indeed, the very process by which workers were 
able to impose their own management of time on the employer is worth 
further attention. Two examples illustrate how the shop-floor organisation 
was able to institutionalise its control over effort and time. 
The fs t concerns early finishing, or leisure at work. Once the 
operators had reached their standards, the well established practice was 
that they could stop working, leave the shop-floor and go 'upstairs' 
to take leisure and wait until the end of the shift. It was noted that 
such a period of leisure at work could be very substantial for those 
working on agreed daywork. As Evans (1980: 75) reported, 
agreed daywork standards were 'loose' enough to encourage 
the operators to relax their own collective self-discipline. 
Operators could 'get their day in' by lunch-time, and the 
afternoons were given over to card-playing and other leisure 
activities. 
A-* 
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Although the practice was most obvious under agreed daywork, where 
management had 'lost the battle', in the words of a section manager, it 
existed in varying degrees in all areas of the press shops. On most 
working days, within one hour of the end of the shift, there were few 
press operators to be found on the shop-floor. Of the pieceworkers, 
some had reached the ceiling, others had achieved their 'target' for 
the day. For many operators, the best deal of all was a mixture of 
agreed daywork and piecework jobs during the same shift. 
33 
They would, 
for instance, get ahead on a daywork job and then start working on a 
piecework job (often before being clocked on) so that they could earn 
a piecework bonus and still finish relatively early. 
Although members of management never legitimised the practice 
of early finishing, they had to recognise its existence. By their 
action, however, production managers contributed-to the institutionalisa- 
tion of a type of behaviour they would otherwise classify as 'restrictive 
labour practices'. Hence, once press operators had made up their 
working day, the foremen could use neither their labour nor the presses 
to which they were assigned since operators were still clocked on the 
job during this period of leisure at work. However, it became a 
custom for management to take 'advantage' of this unusual situation by 
putting setters to work on these presses so that they could prepare 
the production lines for the beginning of the following shift. In a 
context where management was often short on its schedule of production, 
it made the best of this margin of discretion resulting from the practice 
of press operators finishing early. Similarly, one of the section 
managers explained that if he had a 'hot job' to be allocated in the 
33. A small minority of jobs done in Press shop no. 4 had always been 
produced on piecework. In Press shop no. 3, the two systems had 
coexisted since 1974, most of the jobs being produced on piecework. 
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afternoon, he would ask for the work group's co-operation so that they 
did not reach their daily production in the earlier part of the shift. 
34 
By making arrangements that acknowledged the practice of finishing 
early, management was contributing to institutionalised shop-floor 
control. 
In the second example concerning overtime working, this process 
was pushed a step further. By custom and practice, overtime was distri- 
buted according to the principle of 'one in, all in'. This meant that 
if management wanted to run one or some of the production lines for a 
few additional hours, it had to offer overtime to everybody in the 
section. Although this rule originated from the sections, it was a 
fairly general practice at Firm B, most of all in the press shops. In 
the context of early finishing, the problem at some stage was to 
decide whether the operators would have to get back on their press 
for the period of overtime, or whether they could make up this overtime 
production within the standard hours, even before the period of leisure 
at work. Initially, management was adamant that press operators should 
return to their work station if they chose to work overtime, say from 
4 p. m. to 5 p. m. At the time of our observations, however, management 
had given this up and press operators could, and in many cases did, 
complete their overtime production within standard hours. In Press 
shop no. 3, for instance, it was usual for the foreman to enquire 
whether the operators wished to work overtime at lunch time. With this 
information, he would attempt to work out how they could man the pro- 
duction lines in order to respect these choices and achieve the maximum 
amount of production. Hence, it was convenient to put those wanting 
34. Section manager, Press shop no. 3,4 October 1979. 
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overtime together so they could reach their production standard, 
including overtime, not too late in the afternoon. Once again, however, 
they had to wait for the end of their overtime period before leaving 
the factory. 
Obviously, such a practice illustrates the depth of worker 
control over effort and time or, it might be said, the extent to which 
management had capitulated. Why did management tolerate this practice? 
First, it would not necessarily be more efficient to have the production 
stopped for a couple of hours and then have some of the operators back 
on the shop-floor at 4 p. m. Management might lose, for instance, the 
'advantage' of having the presses and the production lines set for the 
next shift. Some maintenance work might also have to be done. More- 
over, when managers made a point of forcing the operators to come down 
to their work station for overtime, they realised that the operators 
were fed up and, unwilling to produce with co-operation. Indeed, once 
they had been waiting for a while, many operators would simply refuse 
to start again. At times when the Company was trying to get more 
production by any means, management came to acknowledge and even 
institutionalise some working arrangements which, under different social , '. 
relations, would be strongly opposed in the name of rationality and 
efficiency. 
Before suggesting an explanation for this degree of control over 
effort and time exercised by press operators, it is appropriate to 
consider the other integral part of the effort bargain: the issue of 
wages. The high degree of control exercised by the press operators, 
and especially their collective pressure on the effort side of the wage- 
effort bargain, has been documented at length in this section. But to 
what extent was it achieved at the expense of comparatively lower wages? 
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From their control over the intensity and distribution of effort, the 
operators were able to limit the overall amount of effort and the 
creation of relative surplus value. What was the impact of this on 
weekly wages? 
This question can be explored by reference to a series of data 
on the press operators' relative pay position within the factory, and 
in relation to other press operators in the Coventry labour market over 
the last decade. These data have been collected by the Coventry and 
District Engineering Employers' Association, and are similar to those 
analysed by William Brown in his studies on the impact of incomes 
policy on engineering wages (1976 and 1979). They comprise standard 
weekly wages, excluding overtime and shift premium, collected in 
October of each year. 
35 
Table 7.1 on pay differentials shows that the press operators 
maintained a very high position in the internal wage structure in 
comparison with all occupational groups on a daywork payment system. 
Indeed, their weekly wages were closely comparable to those of the 
electricians over the decade, with a E6.30 gap in favour of the operators 
in 1979. They also kept their position within 10 per cent of the wages 
of the most skilled and strategic group in presswork production, the 
toolmakers. Finally, by the end of the decade they had consolidated 
their differential in relation to indirect labour, both semi-skilled 
(internal truck drivers) and labourers. 
Table 7.2 shows that for most groups of manual workers (with the 
exception of labourers) Firm B was very high in the wages-league table 
35. The writer is very grateful to William Brown and Peter Nolan, of 
the ESRC Industrial Relations Research Unit, who gave access to 
this series of data. It covers seven occupational groups in 
25 engineering factories, from 1971 to 1979. For a note on the 
statistical basis of these data, see Brown, 1976: 47-9. 
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of the Coventry engineering sector in 1971 and 1972. Over the following 
years its relative position declined, and by 1979 most occupational 
groups were at a medium rank in the same wages table. The main exception 
to this trend is the group under study here, since the press operators 
were still receiving higher wages at Firm B than in any other factory 
in the Coventry labour market in 1977 and 1979 (Table 7.2). Considering 
that the bases for external comparison were 'in national terms ... 
relatively high-paying establishments with long traditions of powerful 
shop-floor trade unionism' (Brown, 1976: 28), it therefore appears that 
the press operators (Firm B) were not making more concessions on wages 
than on the other component of the effort bargain. 
3.4 Towards an Explanation 
Before discussing the determinants of job control at a more 
general level, it would be useful to identify the elements of an 
explanation of the press operators' .. control over effort 
documented here 
at length. Why did effort and working time escape from management 
control to such an extent in these shops? Discussion focuses on four 
institutional factors, placed in an historical perspective, and three 
aspects of the work process in the press shops which appear to be 
significant. 
The first factor relates to the origin of the piecework scheme. 
First, the scheme, from its inception in the late sixties, was not based 
on systematic work study. Its technical basis was dubious and never 
won much credibility among the ranks of operators. Moreover, it was 
explained in Chapter 4 how press operators had resisted the implementation 
of this piecework system because it conflicted with the principle of 
mutuality. This was a major underlying cause of the labour relations 
crisis of the late sixties. It was a time when the strength and 
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confidence of the shop-floor organisation were at their highest and, 
by late 1969, the very basis of the piecework scheme was shaken by the 
press operators' resistance. From 1970 on, management was in retreat. 
While the Company was in neither the financial nor the market position 
to 'buy peace', management adopted a more defensive and conciliatory 
approach so that industrial strife could be reduced in the press shops. 
In this process, and in a context where production managers had to 
face short delivery targets and regular pressure from the main customers, 
they came to rely more and more on 'provisional standards' (i. e. 'one 
off' deals to get the work done) which also contributed to the decay 
of the payment system. Hence, over the decade, the fragile payment 
system was further eroded as a result of constant piecework bargaining 
and haggling. 
This leads us to the second institutional factor, the shop-floor 
organisation. It is obvious that a high degree of collective control 
over effort depended very much on the development of a relatively 
robust shop-floor organisation, which invested much of its energy in 
hard bargaining over production standards and manning levels. To 
develop control over effort requires the social organisation necessary 
ro reduce division between workers. Although collectivism 
had declined considerably by the late seventies, it could still be 
observed at section level. Moreover, the factory organisation was still 
strong enough to mobilise and generate support if management tried to 
take on a particular section, at least in the press shops. 
Thirdly, some attention has to be given to mismanagement in 
relation to the effort bargain in the press shops. The point is that 
the payment system had not only been broken by shop-floor pressure. At 
various stages, senior managers had been involved in negotiations which 
had serious implications for the effort bargain. Some steps were taken 
- 277 - 
which reflect either a lack of strategy or an incomplete understanding 
of the causes and implications of the shop-floor control over effort. 
Negotiation of agreed daywork may be a good case in point here, but 
other examples are also worth noting. In several cases during the 
1970s, some negotiations conducted at divisional level resulted in a more 
or less general reduction of standard quantities for all the press shops. 
This was done, for instance, as part of the 1979 wage negotiations, when 
the piecework standards were reduced so that the overall wage increase 
of the press operators could correspond to the overall increase of 
11 per cent within the factory. This is not a conventional way of 
proceeding, and it had the effect of further demoralising the work study 
engineers. 
The logic of this payment system was to increase the conversion 
factor regularly in order to adjust piecework earnings to both internal 
and external labour markets (Brown, 1973: 18-21). Surprisingly, 
however, the collective agreements show that the conversion factor in 
application before 1974 remained unchanged until 1979. Instead, most 
of the progress in weekly wages over the period was the result of 
increases in the 'make-up factor', that is, the non-variable component 
of press operators' wages. This was exacerbated when Phases 1 and 
2 of national incomes policy were consolidated in the make-up factor as 
part of the 1978 agreement. Indeed, the piecework base rate was 
increased from £19.53 to £40.13 a week as a result of this agreement. 
Such a sharp diminution of variable piecework earnings had the effect of 
making less direct the relation between effort and wages, which is the 
key if piecework is to be a major incentive. This became obvious to 
top management and the 1979 collective agreement stated 'that successive 
years of adding increases for pieceworkers onto the make-up (fixed) 
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element has acted as a disincentive to such employees and requires 
correction'. 
36 
A fourth institutional factor explaining the erosion of management 
control over effort was the weakness and lack of dedication of shop-floor 
management in the determination and enforcement of the effort bargain. 
For instance, the foremen did not give any support to the work study 
engineers at the time of work study and piecework bargaining. 'We try 
to keep away from it', one of them stressed in formal interview. 
37 
Moreover, foremen were particularly lenient on time control, in a work 
process where there was plenty of room for ingenious workers to 'beat 
the system'. The very high proportion of down time provides evidence 
for this. All the work study men we talked to complained about the 
carelessness of foremen. They blamed them for not knowing all the 
intricacies of the peculiar payment system in operation in this factory. 
Our analysis would rather suggest that such a pattern of indulgence and 
leniency corresponds to rational behaviour to be understood in studying 
the strategic position of the foremen whose influence was weakened as 
a result of the reform (Chapter 5). 
We now turn our attention to structural factors, looking back 
briefly to some of the main characteristics of the work process which have 
all been considered at some stage in the above analysis. The question of 
the material basis of job control will develop into a general argument 
of this dissertation. At this stage, what is intended is to stress the 
fact that the work process in the press shops was intrinsically very 
36. 'Hourly Paid Wage Settlement, 1979', article 3.1. 
37. Interview with a foreman of Press shop no. 3,10 October 1979. 
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difficult to manage. 
The first of these relevant aspects of the work process is the 
method of production. Presswork production at Firm B was synonymous 
with batch production. This involved more or less frequent reorganisations 
of production lines, with consequent changes in manning, composition 
of the work groups, and production standards. Moreover, it was explained 
earlier that, partly as a result of unfortunate corporate decisions, 
the Company's share of the presswork market became highly concentrated 
on small and medium batches. A large number of short runs meant that 
the propensity for shop-floor bargaining was very high. Competition 
in the product market and the Company's dependence upon a small number 
of large component manufacturers generated some pressure at the point 
of production which the press operators were often able to exploit for 
short-term gains. Hence the multiplication of inflationary 'provisional 
standards' referred to above. 
Secondly, a good deal of emphasis* has been put on the type of 
machinery in operation in the press shops. All of these presses were 
non-automatic machines and, even on production lines, an operator bad 
to press a button on every press for every single component. This 
created a major gap between the optimal level of production from a 
technical viewpoint and a socially acceptable level of output, i. e. 
what is realistic under a given balance of power and social structure. 
It is also suggested that this operator control over the work pace became 
the starting point for the build-up of more general control over effort. 
A third technical condition of production which appears to be 
significant in studying control over effort in the press shops is the 
integration between work stations. Most of the work in Press shops no. 3 
and no. 4 was produced on linked work stations, the presses being joined 
I 
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by a series of conveyor belts. This set the material basis for a 
collective approach on the part of the workers on issues such as piece- 
work bargaining and the determination of the level of effort (e. g. 
output restriction). Integration between work stations also helped to 
develop the operators' cohesiveness in their relation to shop-floor 
management generally. This factor was particularly important in a 
context where operators were producing small batches, which made for 
regular changes in the composition of the work groups, on a technology 
which gave them a good grasp of the immediate intensity of effort. In 
this specific combination of techniques, the integration between jobs 
was an important factor in the development of social organisation in the 
press shops. This is crucial since without this type of shop-floor 
organisation a comparable work process might have produced a very 
different pattern of control. Indeed, this was the case at the other 
engineering firm under study in this research. 
The explanation developed here is that this particular combinatiön-ý 
of technical conditions of production had an impact on the development 
of the pattern of control observed in the press shops,. It represented 
a rather unfavourable ground for management to develop a functional 
payment system and control over effort. Management, which had shown 
other signs of weakness, had to perform on terrain (the work process) 
and with reference to circumstances (the product market) which placed 
them at a disadvantage. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The empirical material presented in this chapter contributes in 
many ways to the development of the general argument of the dissertation 
and many of the issues will be discussed in the general conclusions of 
- 281 - 
the thesis. Following the above explanation of the press operator type 
of job control, we intend to discuss here at a more general level the 
factors which may account for the very different degrees of job control 
in the two firms under study. 
The distinction between the different patterns of control in 
the factories studied, which was developed in Chapter 6, now appears 
more pronounced. For instance, while both the tinsmiths and the press 
operators were reported to have very high degrees of control over 
effort, there were significant differences in the origin and enforcement 
of these collective controls. But it is principally on the sharp 
contrast between the patterns of control of the two main groups of semi- 
skilled production workers that attention will focus here. What are the 
main lines of explanation for this much lesser degree of control over 
effort in the machine shops (Firm A) as compared with the press shops? 
The process of institutionalisation of labour relations studied 
in Chapter 4 is comparable in the two firms. The structures of labour 
relations were roughly similar at the time of observation. Hence the 
primary cause of the different patterns of control could not lie in 
the institutional framework. It remains possible, however, that the 
same reform might have set different processes in action in the two 
workplaces, thus maintaining or even exacerbating the difference between 
them. 
In studying control over effort in this chapter, a good deal of 
attention was given to the various payment systems applied in the 
different workshops. However, our empirical material suggests that the 
payment system does not represent an explanatory factor of the different 
patterns of control, but that it usually reinforced the position of either 
management or labour, depending on the balance of power on the shop-floor. 
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Hence, it was not an independent variable but an element which contributed 
to strengthening the position of the side having most control over the 
details of the work process. This would help to explain why a payment 
system introduced as an element of management control might be turned 
against management when the shop-floor developed control over many 
aspects of their work. This level of analysis is also consistent with 
the fact that similar payment systems are often compatible with sharply 
different patterns of control in different factories. 
Hence the most obvious explanation of the different patterns of 
control over effort is the strength of the respective shop-floor 
organisations. As was seen earlier, workers at Firm B had a much 
longer history of militant action and the structure of their organisation 
was better suited to job control. The evidence presented in Chapters 6 
and 7 in fact shows that these factors favoured a more collective 
response to many facets of labour utilisation. What is more problematic, 
however, is that the strength of the workers' organisation at Firm B 
was located at the section level, with much less strategy and organisation 
developed at factory level. This issue will be discussed in the con- 
cluding chapter. The complex question of the reasons for the different 
characters of these two workers' organisations was studied in the 
conclusion of Chapter 3. We stressed the tradition of craft control and 
militancy at Firm B, as well as the differences in the composition of the 
labour force and the pattern o£ shop-floor representation. In addition 
to these factors, it has been suggested in this chapter that some of the 
characteristics of the work process contributed to fostering social 
organisation in the press shops and not in the machine shops. 
The emphasis placed on productive activities and workers' 
organisation and resistance in this dissertation should not detract from 
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the fact that management structure and strategies obviously had a 
strong influence on the degree of job control. Firm A's management had 
relatively firm control over effort. A very small network of senior 
managers (including the managing director and the personnel director) 
were in command, and they kept in touch with day-to-day production, very 
much in the tradition of family-owned businesses. They could also 
count on a sophisticated production control system, permitting monitoring 
of the work process without too much direct supervision. Following the 
intervention of the CIR, they adopted a broad reformist approach to 
labour relations, with much more recognition and involvement of the 
shop stewards. However, this pluralist approach was very much a minority 
position within the ranks of senior management (Ogden, 1981: 35-6; 
Purcell, 1981: 31). Such an approach had reduced overt manifestations 
of conflict, but line managers did not like the idea of having to 
consult shop stewards and justify their decisions on 'production matters'. 
The approach 'was not producing the results that line management wanted 
to see'. 
38 With the increasing decline of the engineering industry, 
the pressure for labour productivity became stronger and the personnel 
director had to 'reflect consensus within management' and retreat to a 
more 'old-fashioned style of management'. 
39 
This shift in managerial 
strategy, from approximately late 1978, meant a stricter attitude towards 
labour resistance and restrictive labour practices and less 'talking' 
with the shop stewards. From then on, labour productivity was a major 
theme and it involved a substantial reduction in the size of the labour 
force in the course of 1979. 
38. Formal interview with the personnel director, 21 December 1978. 
39. ibid. 
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In comparison, some appreciable differences were observed in the 
structure and strategies of management at Firm B. For one thing, 
this was a management-controlled company, owned by a large engineering 
group. The top managers in command during the seventies were very 
imaginative, particularly in their relations with labour. However, 
their influence was mediated by as many as four layers of management 
between the managing director and the 830 manual workers. Many members 
of shop-floor management had been promoted because of their technical 
abilities and had little skill in managing people. After the period of 
confrontation of the late sixties, there was little trust between lower 
levels of management (including foremen) and the workers. Shop-floor 
managers were on the defensive, and the philosophy of participation and 
shop steward involvement advocated by the management team who took 
office in 1970 had the effect of demoralising them even further. Shop- 
floor managers had a small role to play in this reform, and they certainly 
felt that it weakened their position. It is felt that this relative 
weakness of management at the level of production was a contributory 
factor to the development and persistence of a higher degree of job 
control at Firm B. 
There were genuine differences in the managerial strategies of 
these two firms. But these choices were also made within different 
constraints. Hence, there were strong market pressures in the two cases, 
although the financial position of Firm B was more critical. Shop-floor 
resistance was also much more pervasive in the latter firm, and this had 
a dominant influence on management behaviour and strategies. Finally, 
it has been emphasised in this chapter that the technical conditions of 
production facilitated the emergence of worker control over effort in the 
press shops, to a degree not even comparable to the situation observed 
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in the machine shops. It would be appropriate to further develop this 
argument on the material basis of job control. 
One characteristic of the work process studied in this chapter 
was the decomposition of labour. In fact, the distinction between 
types of task was conceived and applied much more strictly in the press 
shops than in the machine shops, and this led to a complex network of 
demarcation rules in the former case. In section 3, we have tried to 
show that the production of small batches on non-automatic machines 
and integrated work stations set the material basis for the substantial 
degree of control exercised by press operators over many aspects of the 
utilisation of their labour. Although the two factories concerned 
were producing batches of components, the combination of the many 
aspects of the work process was more favourable to worker control in 
the press shops. Of course, these technical conditions were no more than 
resources (or potential advantages) which had to be developed by a 
cohesive shop-floor organisation to produce the observed results. Hence, 
while control over the immediate intensity of effort depended very much 
on technical conditions, control over the distribution of effort over 
the shift required a high degree of social organisation. It should be 
noted, however, that in the development of the necessary shop-floor 
organisation the work process did not have a neutral effect. Some 
conditions, and particularly the decomposition of labour and the inte- 
gration between work stations, had a positive influence on the development 
of a stronger shop-floor organisation at Firm B. 
Clearly, it is not argued here that the nature of the work 
process determines the pattern of control, but rather that the structural 
variables which condition strategies and behaviour on both sides must 
be analysed. It is suggested that the work process sets the material 
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basis for control over labour utilisation. This potential influence, 
however, which is by no means the only possible one, may or may not 
materialise depending on the social structure and organisation prevailing 
in a given workplace. Similarly, the specific nature of the shop-floor 
organisation is probably the most crucial factor. As a result, giving 
proper consideration to the productive activities underlying labour 
relations does not represent a new version of technical determinism. 
Nevertheless, rejecting technical determinism should not lead to a 
position by which the work process is considered as neutral in the 
struggle for control on the shop-floor. 
CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Although many concepts and analytical distinctions have been 
introduced throughout this dissertation, the thesis so far remains largely 
descriptive and empirical. The time has now come to pull the various 
parts of the argument together. This exercise should lead to an analysis 
which will have some implications for policy and theory, in addition 
to furnishing an understanding of labour relations in two engineering 
firms . 
The conclusion is written in three sections corresponding to the 
phases of our argument. In order to make the main argument of the 
dissertation more explicit, the first section presents in a more coherent 
fashion the specificity and significance of our analytical framework for 
the study of labour control. Many of the implications of such an 
approach are considered in Section 2, which deals with the impact of 
the reform of workplace labour relations on job control. It is argued 
that the results of institutionalisation are contradictory, and that 
worker controls over labour utilisation resist changes introduced in 
the structure of labour relations. However, there are objective limits 
to the development of job control which cannot be ignored. The final 
section examines the vulnerability of job control in a context where a 
sectional type of worker resistance affects the capitalist enterprise 
negatively at a very sensitive point in a period of economic recession. 
1. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS-ON THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In Chapter 1 the concept of work process was identified as the 
starting-point of the study of control over labour utilisation. Labour 
relations were to be considered as a derivative function in, reference to 
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.. 
the primary function of the enterprise, which is production. In this 
study these more or less institutionalised relations between managers, 
workers and trade unions have not been studied as an autonomous sphere 
of relations. They have been analysed with reference to the activities 
and immediate relations developing at the point and at the time of 
production. Given this perspective, it was necessary to describe in 
some detail the nature and contours of the work processes in the 
factories studied (Chapter 2). The following chapters focused mainly 
on the institutions of labour relations and their reform. From an 
operational definition of the concept of work process, it was then 
possible to refer in a specific way to the essential characteristics of 
the different production activities and proceed to an empirical study 
of job control (Chapters 6 and 7). The presentation of a good deal of 
evidence led to the development of the argument on the material basis 
of job control, a central theme of the thesis. 
The analytical framework of this dissertation may be labelled 
materialist in that it locates the material basis of the relationship 
between capital and labour in the work process. Production activities 
are conceived as an infrastructure conditioning the relationships 
between individuals, groups and institutions in the workplace. This 
develops into a dichotomous framework for the study of labour relations, 
in which the basis of conflict is found in the transformation of labour 
power in the work process. Control over the way labour power is 
utilised, the central problem studied here, is considered to be a 
strategic issue. Detailed study of the specific conditions of labour 
utilisation and of the whole structure, of control which has developed in 
relation to it are the other, characteristic features of this approach to 
I 
I 
0 
- 289 - 
I 
labour relations. In spite of such an emphasis on structural forces, 
the evolution of the processes of control in the two firms was discussed 
in considerable detail throughout the dissertation. Following Edwards 
and Scullion, this writer takes the view that "'action" and "structure" 
are intimately related, with each continuously affecting the other' 
(1982a: 277; also Edwards, 1983: 51). 
1 
On the one hand, the strategies 
and actions of the participants and the whole social process which 
arises are very much influenced by the social structure. On the other 
hand, this structure develops only as a result, in specific historical 
conditions, of individual and collective actions, or in other words as 
a result of the process of control over the years. From this viewpoint, 
a study of the social structure does not make sense without a study of 
action and social processes. Accordingly, by looking at the material 
forces as well as at the social organisation and processes, it was 
possible to go some way towards understanding the development of 
particular patterns of control. 
The present study also makes a more specific contribution. it 
has tried to show how the working of the institutional framework for 
labour relations, as well as the way the process of control over work 
relations develops, are conditioned to some extent by production 
constraints and the need, more generally, for management to control the 
work process. In doing so, this research has pointed out some of the 
ways to link two major trends in the literature: the institutional 
approach to the study of labour relations and the more recent discussion 
on the labour process. Although these two areas of research have 
1. The writer would like to make explicit the influence of these two 
publications on the understanding of many facets of the approach 
discussed in this section. 
r 
4 
I 
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expanded in Britain over the last decade, with few exceptions they have 
followed different routes. Indeed, the two trends are even more 
strongly entrenched in North America, both 'sides' ignoring each other 
in an obvious demonstration of intellectual parochialism (Hyman, 1982). 
It is important to make more explicit the possible contribution 
of a materialist approach to the study of workplace labour relations. 
Within the limits of this research, such a position has implications 
for at least four different levels of analysis. First, at the most 
general level, we have tried to show that there is no clear separation 
between productive and institutional relations, the former being the 
infrastructure on which labour relations develop. It was possible to 
illustrate this in many ways in rendering the concept of the work 
process operational. Secondly, although the focus of this research is 
on control and not conflict, this analytical framework would tend to 
consider these concepts closely associated. In the same way as Edwards 
and Scullion (who said a great deal about control in their study of 
conflict), we made use of some of the tools of Marxist theories on 
the labour process which 'locate conflict in a struggle between workers 
and employers for control over the terms on which labour power is 
translated into effort' (1982a: 257). 
At a third level of analysis, this dissertation puts a good 
deal of emphasis on the relation between the technical conditions of 
production and the pattern of control. We have tried to show in Chapter 7 
that the work process is not a neutral element in the struggle for 
control over labour utilisation; it sets the material basis for a 
specific pattern of control. It was stressed, however, that the work 
process does not determine the pattern of control. Whatever the 
I 
technical labour process may be, management is able to impose control 
r 
in some workplaces and not in others. Of course, what is crucial is the 
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structure and pattern of management control over the work process and 
not the technical labour process in itself. If one is studying job 
control, or control over the way labour power is utilised in the work 
process, however, the analysis must go deeper in looking at the very 
determinants of control. In this respect, it is felt that a materialist 
analysis should gain a great deal in gauging the actual importance of 
the technical labour process: one of the major contributing factors 
in the development of control. Hence we arrive at the proposition 
documented here, that a particular combination of technical conditions 
of production contributed to the emergence and protection of a 
substantial degree of job control in one of the factories studied. 
e. 
At a fourth level of analysis, it is possible to go one step 
further. The proposition which is now put forward is that worker 
control over the work process generates the resources for a broader 
range of intermediary sanctions available to the workforce. While the 
nature of the work process has a significant influence on job control, 
it also appears that the degree of job control has, in turn, a positive 
relation with the potential for worker resistance. As a general rule, 
the more discretion workers have over the nature of work and the level 
of effort, the more dependent management becomes upon their co-operation. 
Furthermore, the very impact of'sanctions, such as work-to-rule or a 
refusal to perform the complete job description, tends to vary with the 
degree of job control. The case of the toolmakers at Firm S, discussed 
in Chapter 7, illustrates this point. Their craft control, consolidated 
by rigid demarcation lines, gave them the-necessary resources to 
disrupt production with little cost to themselves. Of course, the 
deployment of sanctions requires social organisation. The point is, 
however, that job control and social organisation are likely to be found 
i 
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in the same workplace, since they are closely and positively related. 
This relationship, which is called here the instrumentality 
of job control, may take effect in two opposite ways. On the one hand, 
there appears to be a threshold of worker control below which any 
form of individual or collective resistance is risky. This was the 
case in the clothing factories studied by Edwards and Scullion. On 
the other hand, we have observed a generating effect, by which greater 
control over labour utilisation develops greater potential for worker 
resistance. This can be seen in the case of the press operators. 
This process helps to explain the interdependence between the different 
forms of job control and, more importantly, the main reason why its 
development is such a recurring process. 
2. THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON JOB CONTROL 
The Donovan Commission held the view that major dysfunctions in 
the structure of labour relations hindered the development of a 
rational and coherent mode of job regulation and resulted in 'disorder 
in factory and workshop relations' (1968: 40). Accordingly, its 
programme for reform centred on the development of an institutional 
framework for conducting labour relations in the workplace. Although 
the frequency of unofficial strikes received a good deal of attention 
in the press and part of the literature, it would appear that the 
advocates of structural reform were deeply concerned with the lack of 
management control over labour utilisation. To many observers, a primary 
concern in the reformist strategy was to give management the tools to 
fight restrictive labour practices in bargaining at the workplace. This 
was also the meaning of the movement for productivity bargaining and 
measured daywork. 
f 
q 
0 
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At Firm A and Firm B, there is no doubt that institutional 
reform has been highly successful in reducing the manifestation of 
conflict (the strike problem), in permitting the introduction of more 
coherent payment systems (the wage drift and pay problem), and in 
broadening the scope of fringe benefits. However, the impact is much 
more problematic on the crucial issue of job control and restrictive 
labour practices. Here the results appear to be contradictory. The 
bulk of empirical material concerning Firm A leads to the conclusion 
that in factories where the scope and degree of job control were 
limited prior to the reform, and where the shop-floor organisation was 
relatively weak, the institutionalisation of labour relations helped 
management to confine job control within narrow limits. This model of 
labour relations had a significant influence in preventing the develop- 
went of job control, and it strongly contributed to reinforcing 
management control over labour utilisation at a higher level in the 
organisation. At Firm B, in contrast, where job control was solidly 
established by the late sixties, the reform did not help management 
to reduce job control significantly, but rather contributed to 
stabilising it. True, the limits of job control have been circumscribed, 
and some may argue that it prevented management control from 
deteriorating further. But once workers had established some discretion 
on many aspects of the deployment of labour, job demarcation, manning 
levels and the effort bargain, the possibilities for job control were 
rather saturated within existing social relations of production. 
In fact, some evidence presented in Chapter 7would indicate 
that worker control had become institutionalised in this factory. On the 
one hand, this means that job control did not depend any longer on 
shop-floor struggle and militant action, but became part of the shop-floor 
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culture. 'Vested rights' were protected by the shop steward organisa- 
tion, but the conflictual character of day-to-day relations had been 
relaxed. On the other hand, this also implies that short of a 
comprehensive offensive by management, which might be stimulated by 
external pressures, it would be very difficult for managers to regain 
control over labour utilisation. 
Besides giving very different results in different factories, 
there are other ways in which the results of institutional reform are 
contradictory. It would seem that its effects were least impressive 
in coping with the problem which concerned structural reformers the 
most, that is the question of the 'efficient use of manpower' (Donovan 
Report, 1968: Chapter VI). Moreover, our empirical evidence corresponds 
with Terry's analysis that the impact of the reform was the least 
impressive in companies which most badly needed it. He observed that 
in general it would appear that programmes for reform 
were least likely to satisfy managerial expectations 
in companies which already had strong shopfloor organisation 
and which were, according to the argument developed here 
about the concerns of management and the state, those most 
in need of reform. By contrast the sectors where it would 
seem to have had the most dramatic impact (in terms of 
changes over the decade) are those with only limited, if 
any, traditions of shopfloor organisation. (1983: 87) 
This trend suggests that the phase at which the process of institutiona- 
lisation occurs may be decisive. Clearly, to prevent the development 
of job control and to eradicate it once it has developed are two 
different matters. In engineering firms with long-established shop- 
floor controls, managers could hardly have regained the ground already 
lost without a dramatic shift in the balance of power at the level 
of production. Such a course of action would have involved a frontal 
assault against the shop-floor organisations as well as, in most cases, 
reorganisation within management. It appears, however, that the 
I 
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economic recession recently had the effect of forcing just such new 
work relations, and in a way which is not less exceptional. By contrast, 
in the factories where management control had never been eroded to 
a comparable extent, the new institutional framework may have set the 
trend for an American type of management control over labour utilisation, 
even without-these exceptional external pressures. 
The observed results of labour relations reform seem to be 
typical in another way. In their recent review of labour relations in 
the private sector since Donovan, Sisson and Brown (1983: 137) concluded 
that there have been considerable changes in the conduct 
of bargaining over market relations, but that there has 
been surprisingly little change so far as managerial 
relations are concerned. In particular, the informality 
which characterised much of the bargaining in the 1960s 
continues to be a dominant feature twenty years later. 
The dynamics accounting for the persistence of informality were well 
explained by Terry (1977) and many of their facets have been considered 
in this thesis. However, the phenomenon through which structural 
reform had strong effects on market relations and little on managerial 
relations requires further exploration. Some would argue that there is 
no logical reason for the phenomenon discussed here and that managerial 
problems related to labour utilisation are simply more difficult to 
tackle. There is at least one way, however, in which institutional 
reform may have consolidated job control. The contemporary form of job 
control (that of non-craft workers) in the engineering industry developed 
in the context of weak management control systems, where managers were 
not assuming real subordination of labour to its full extent and were 
dependent upon traditional piecework schemes. In a recent paper, 
Lewchuk (1983: 104) argued that British motor car employers rejected 
direct control and Fordism as a viable strategy in the first quarter 
of the century 'because it required a degree of managerial-control which 
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seemed incongruous with what management had been able to achieve 
during the war'. His explanation was that in a context in which they 
did not feel in full command of production, employers were largely 
dependent on payment by results as a way to attenuate conflict between 
capital and labour. Hyman and Elger (1981) also located such a type of 
'unscientific management' within an historical perspective. In this 
I. sense, job control may be seen as the other 
face of a specific type 
of management: the delegation of control at work. From such a situation, 
- the transfer of direct control of the 
labour process to management, 
through a strategy of either joint or unilateral regulation, required 
the elaboration of an information and control system within management. 
Indeed, regaining control necessitated shifting the equilibrium within 
management as well as between management and labour. Such a major 
restructuring was unlikely to happen except in response to a serious 
crisis. 
In most workplaces, too little consideration was given to these 
defects within management structure and organisation. The first point 
is that, as noted earlier, many production managers were suspicious 
from the beginning about pluralism and the nature of labour relations 
reform, notably about the greater role given to the shop stewards. 
With poor economic performance in engineering, and eventually the wider 
recession, senior production managers were to impose more firmly their 
natural predominance in the balance of power within management. 
Secondly, it is well established in the literature that reform had 
the effect of weakening the influence of foremen and shop-floor managers. 
Although in many engineering factories this level of management was not 
really in full command of operations before the reform, there was a 
need to fill the gap created within the management structure as a 
result of their further isolation from the process of control. Tor 
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example, at Firm A senior managers established a management control 
system and made sure they were in control of the many facets of pro- 
duction; this was not observable at Firm B. Therefore it seems logical 
to suggest that in many workplaces the workers' position in the balance 
of power at the shop-floor level may have improved as a result of 
labour relations reform. It is important to stress that the shop-floor 
remains the level of action which is most crucial to the development 
of job control. 
2 
Procedural arrangements such as those discussed in this 
dissertation are not in themselves to the advantage of one side or the 
other. It all depends on the balance of power at a given level. In 
view of the above discussion on management, as well as the recurring 
nature of job control, it is not surprising that job control may have 
flourished under an institutional framework designed to reinforce 
management's position at a more central level. Even within the confines 
of the individual factory, the question of the complementarity between 
different levels of control must be assessed properly by management 
and labour if their strategies are to be successful. 
From a different viewpoint, one also has to consider that 
contrary to the 'problems' of unofficial strikes and wage drift, 
restrictive labour practices were directly linked to the work process. 
The way labour power is utilised is very specific, and also quite 
conditioned by production constraints. Moreover, contrary to craft 
control, contemporary job control (such as that of press operators) was 
2. Michael Terry's discussion on the 'tactical significance of the 
shopfloor' is relevant here (1977: 85-7). 
r 
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highly dependent upon worker organisation at the shop-floor. It was not 
built upon intrinsic characteristics of the jobs, which were in fact 
semi-skilled or unskilled, nor was it spontaneous. It had to be 
organised on the principle of the shop steward system. Hence job 
control was strongly related to the strength of a specific shop steward 
and shop-floör organisation. In the case of Firm B, for instance, the 
pattern of shop steward representation constituted an appropriate 
adaptation to the contours of the work process, a model favourable to 
'job control. To cope with restrictive labour practices, managerial 
strategies would have had to be sophisticated enough to take account of 
the specific character and material basis of job control, and contribute 
also to the institutionalisation of a particular type of shop-floor 
organisation. 
I 
Because of the material and organisational forces discussed here, 
a coherent structure of labour relations could not help management to 
regain control over labour utilisation in the same way as it regulated 
unofficial strikes and fragmented pay bargaining. With the new 
institutional arrangements, it was possible to develop disputes procedures 
and internal wage structures which helped to take some of the pressure 
off the level of production and displace the conflictual relationship 
towards a higher level in the hierarchy. As far as job control is 
concerned, it should be seen as an organised response to specific conditions 
of production. Indeed, it was so intimately related to the result of 
shop-floor cohesiveness and militancy that there was a strong resistance 
by workers to concessions regarding discretion on such matters. Itwould 
appear, therefore, that the analysis of the Donovan Commission put too 
much emphasis on the institutions of collective bargaining and too little 
on the fact that job control was rooted in an adaptation to specific 
0 
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production processes by a particular type of shop-floor organisation. 
The weakness of this analysis was to exaggerate the autonomy of labour 
relations and hence overestimate the potential of structural reform. 
The derivative nature of labour relations was illustrated by the 
case of Firm B where industrial relations reform had fostered an appease- 
ment of open conflict without setting the conditions for the levels of 
production expected by the Company. Production and labour managers, 
more and more aware of this situation, were openly questioning the 
relationship between 'good industrial relations' and productivity. The 
problem was that, under the appearance of relative industrial peace, 
weak management control over the labour process had detrimental effects 
on productivity. Hence in spite of a relatively good performance there 
existed a pattern of control plainly unacceptable to the Company. Indeed, 
a major re-organisation of production was to come, and this should have 
had obvious effects on work relations. The point is that favourable 
labour relations is not an end in itself; the performance of a given 
structure of labour relations is likely to be assessed with reference to 
the criteria of productivity and profitability. The important work by 
Purcell on the impact of the reform on the process of industrial relations 
also provides evidence of this. Hence, in the two cases where a high 
degree of 'cooperative bargaining' was achieved, at least for a while, 
as a result of the reform, 
the high-trust pattern was short-lived. In one firm rapidly 
deteriorating product market and profitability led senior 
group management to take unilateral action, which re-opened 
the confrontation with the unions. The other plant was 
closed down, despite the dramatic improvements, when rapid 
technical change and market decline combined to force a 
major rationalisation in the industry. (Purcell, 1981: 245) 
Considering the contradictory results of Firm A and Firm B, as 
well as other sources, it was suggested above that the phase at which 
institutional changes intervened had a good deal of influence on the 
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impact of reform on the process of control. The timing of the change 
also deserves careful attention when comparing structures of labour 
relations at a national or international level. The role of a particular 
type of institutional framework in preserving managerial prerogatives 
and hindering the emergence of job control in the first place cannot 
necessarily be repeated in permitting the employers to regain the 
control they had lost prior to the structural changes. Hence, in 
comparison with the experience of the United States and Canada, the 
institutionalisation of workplace labour relations came at a much later 
stage in Great Britain. This appears to be a major source of persistent 
contrasts between the two patterns of labour relations. Burawoy (1979: 
189) addresses the question in these terms: 
Why should the experience of the United States be different 
from that of Great Britain, where there continues to be 
a strong shop-steward movement and a militant rank and 
file? In similar industries, workers in Britain have 
managed to retain greater control over the shop floor than 
in the United States. ... One possible answer lies 
in 
the relative timing of unionization and mechanization. In 
Great Britain, unions had established themselves prior to 
the twentieth-century thrust toward mechanization, whereas 
the reverse is true for the United States. Thus, at the 
time of their formation, industrial unions in the United 
States had to take expropriation of control over the labor 
process as a fait accompli, whereas, in Britain, industrial 
unionism appeared earlier, was able to resist such expropriation, 
and in this way laid the basis for a more militant trade-union 
movement. 
While our analysis is consistent with Burawoy's argument, we would also 
add that, besides 'the relative timing of unionization and mechanization', 
the late institutionalisation of workplace labour relations is a major 
explanatory factor of the higher degree of job control in Britain. 
3 
3. Burawoy does not appear to be very familiar with structural changes in 
British labour relations. lie only notes that 'more recently, large 
British corporations have been attempting to move toward more American 
patterns of organizing work, the internal labor market, and the 
internal state' (1979: 189). His only reference on this matter is 
Nichols and Beynon, Living with Ca italism (1977). , 
I 
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Indeed, while there is a longer tradition of unionism in British work- 
places, it is also true that, in contrast, the development of a comprehensive 
structure to channel this pressure from the shop-floor came at a much 
later stage. A formal model of labour relations at plant level had 
developed at a relatively early stage in North America, and it was 
concomitant with the expansion of industrial unionism. In contrast, 
' the movement of structural reform studied in this dissertation came after, 
and indeed constituted a reaction to, the 'challenge from below'. 
3. THE VULNERABILITY OF JOB CONTROL 
By national and international comparison, the scope and degree 
of control imposed by the engineering workers observed in this research 
are considerable. In one of the two firms under study, the challenge 
to management control over labour utilisation was substantial. By 
placing some emphasis on the most sophisticated forms of job control 
observed during the fieldwork, however, the dissertation may give the 
impression of an overwhelming power exercised by the shop-floor. This 
would not reflect accurately the balance of power in these factories; 
there are objective limits to the development of worker control. 
Returning to the Webbian distinction between the three types of decisions 
which 'make up industrial administration', namely 'the decision as to 
what shall be produced', the method of production and the working 
conditions (1897: 818), it may be noted that workers have progressively 
extended their influence to many of the conditions of utilisation of 
their labour power. This progress was quite widespread in countries 
such as Britain, and was supported by legislation as well as by the 
type of labour relations structure studied here. In contrast, workers' 
incursions into decisions concerning 'the manner in which the production 
shall take place', the second category of decisions, were limited and 
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most variable. They were limited because they were always imposed from 
a defensive position, management having the initiative in the relation- 
ship of subordination. They may be interpreted as exceptions to the 
general rule by which management is in command of the work process. 
Accordingly, they are always open to pressures from management circles 
or market forces. It follows that, outside the craft tradition, the 
scope and degree of job controls are quite variable between workplaces. 
.. 
This research adds to the evidence of sharp contrasts, even within the 
British engineering industry. Finally, one should not underestimate 
the importance of the fact that in capitalist enterprises workers have 
only the slightest direct influence on the third type of decisions: 
economic policies of the firm. In the context of this research, this 
refers not only to issues such as planning and investment, but also to 
recovery plans and programmes for restructuring production. 
The bulk of empirical evidence on Firm B may be interpreted as 
an illustration of the resistance and pervasiveness of job control in 
a poor economic context. Indeed, it is argued that labour relations 
reform failed to undermine job control and even generated contradictory 
forces which contributed to institutionalising it. With the appearance 
of industrial peace, large groups of manual workers still controlled 
many strategic aspects of the deployment of labour and the intensity and 
distribution of effort by the end of our fieldwork in May 1980. But 
this is only one part of the story. While job control was quite resistant 
to internal pressures, it proved to be vulnerable to external ones. 
While workers were resisting management attempts to dilute job 
control, the very basis of their organisation was being eroded. Over 
a period of fifteen years, the total labour force at Firm B had been 
reduced by approximately 900, down to 1,250 in August 1979. There has 
been a gradual decline in the size of the workforce, with several years 
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of significant redundancies. With the deepening of the recession, 
market and financial pressures intensified and the parent group was no 
longer a safeguard against more substantial reductions in the number 
of both manual and white collar employees. Management had presented 
a programme for restructuring production when the Company was sold in 
August 1980. But the new management team implemented an even more 
important reorganisation of production, resulting in massive redundancies 
over the following year. 
4 Much more than labour relations reforms, 
redundancies and major reorganisations of production are the ultimate 
threat to job control. Indeed, such a drastic end to the employment 
relationship for a large proportion of the workforce cannot occur 
without major changes in labour utilisation. This illustrates once 
again the contradictory nature of the employment relationship, in the 
sense that workers can only resist subordination to tie extent that 
their link of structural interdependence with the company is reproduced, 
which is possible only if at least a minimum rate of profit is maintained. 
Such a course is also likely to have other implications for job 
control by creating a further source of division between workers and by 
affecting their potential for resistance. It was observed at Firm A 
that the shop-floor had relaxed the relative control they had on manning 
levels when, for the first time in the seventies, the manual workforce 
was significantly reduced in 1979. At Firm B, which is the main point of 
reference here, we came across some instances where particular sections 
gave their consent to major compromises in order to save their jobs. 
But this was by no means the general picture, even in early 1980. The 
4. In a rather optimistic assessment of performance under this new 
management, it was reported in the local newspaper that 'during the 
past 12 months overheads, have been cut back ruthlessly. The workforce 
of 1,200 has been almost halved, and the firm's own transport depart- 
ment closed down. ' C. Lewis in CoventryEvening Telegraph 
Business Life, 7 September 1981. -! " '"'ý' "-'"'' 
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extent to which redundancies, and the recession more generally, have 
shaken the basis of job control in this factory since then remains an 
open question. But considering more recent information regarding the 
introduction of automatic presses in the Presswork division, as well as 
protracted periods of short-time working, it would be surprising if the 
pattern of control had not been affected, as in many other workplaces. 
Indeed, this type of worker control over many aspects of the 
work process is likely to be vulnerable to market pressures, basically 
because it is at variance with dominant social relations of production. 
Job control may be vulnerable to the extent that it creates serious 
problems for management and that workplace unionism cannot stimulate 
the measures of consciousness and organisation which are necessary to 
counter an eventual challenge from the employer. These are the themes 
explored in the final pages of the dissertation. 
A major principle of existing social relations of production is 
that the employer co-ordinates and controls the transformation of labour 
power in the work process. Control over the labour process is the fore- 
most management function in the workplace. However, the real management 
objective is not to maximise control but to develop the pattern of 
control most conducive, given a specific context and social relations, 
to the optimal utilisation of labour power in the production of profit. 
Many writers hold the view that the type of job control discussed here has 
had a negative effect on labour productivity and profitability in Britain. 
Kilpatrick and Lawson (1980), for example, argued that the highly 
decentralised structure of collective bargaining and 'the strength of 
job-based worker organisation' has been a primary cause of industrial 
decline in the UK. Hyman and Elger, along with other contributors of 
the British Left, replied that job control had been 'a secondary rather 
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than a primary factor' (1981: 145) of these structural problems. In a 
recent paper, Nichols (1983) offered a positive contribution to the 
understanding of this problem of the effect of job control on labour 
productivity, which is now discussed more openly. 
For our purpose, it is relevant to address the problem of control 
at a more micro level. To what extent is job control detrimental to 
the achievement of management objectives with regard to profitability? 
More simply, is job control a major problem for management? While it 
has long been assumed that job controls had adverse effects on manage- 
ment objectives, recent research shows this need not necessarily be the 
case. The problem of control is more complex; as Hyman and Elger 
(1981: 116) argued, 
.. 
job controls could not simply be regarded as the 
evidence or product of anti-capitalist struggle. 
Frequently they operated within limits acceptable to 
employers, and could often be viewed as elements in 
an accommodation which did not obstruct, and might 
even facilitate the production and realisation of 
surplus value. 
In fact, an important body of literature has shown that direct control 
is only one of the forms of management control in modern industry, and 
by no means the most rational and profitable one in all circumstances 
(Friedman, 1977; R. C. Edwards, 1979). This led Terry (1983: 74) to 
observe that 'treating job control as a "zero-sum" phenomenon, with a 
gain for workers representing a corresponding loss for management, is 
over simple. "Worker control" and its agents can further or hinder manage- 
ment aims. ' 
A distinction which is useful to the understanding of this 
phenomenon is that suggested by Hyman and Elger (1981: 117), and developed 
by P. K. Edwards (1983: 20-22), between detailed and general control. 
While it is not necessarily good management to seek control over every 
I 
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specific aspect of the deployment of labour and the control of time 
and effort, capitalist management can hardly do without control over the 
production process at a more general level. In the end, it is general 
control which matters, and as observed by Edwards, 'a "high" level of 
shopfloor control of the details of the work process need not lead to 
a "low" level of managerial success in the pursuit of its wider ends' 
(1983: 21). But it should also be stressed that the structure of 
management control must be studied as a whole, and that worker controls 
on 'details of the work process' may restrain to some extent the production 
of surplus value if management does not effectively control the situation 
at the intermediate level within its organisation. For instance, semi- 
autonomous work groups are only tolerable, and even profitable, to 
management when the latter is well in command of production activities 
above the shop-floor level, which is one of the 'favourable conditions' 
found in non-unionised factories. Hence we come back to the point made 
in the preceding section on the complementarity of the different levels 
of control, a determining element on the whole pattern of control. 
It is tempting to suggest a distinction between job control 
practices which do not confront management interests openly and others 
which are seen more clearly as antagonistic and detrimental to managerial 
aims with respect to production. For example, worker control over 
the details of assignment of labour in the press shop may be seen as a 
manifestation of what was called earlier the delegation of control at 
work. In contrast, the control imposed by the same group of employees 
over the intensity and distribution of effort, and indeed over the very 
use of their working time, may be interpreted as an antagonistic form of 
job control. Although this analytical distinction may be useful, we 
nevertheless come to the conclusion that the forms of delegation of 
4 
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control at work observed here were also a contributing force in the 
erosion of the general control exercised by management over labour 
utilisation. Again, the pattern of control depends very much upon the 
interaction between the different forms and levels of control. Hence, 
at Firm B, the many forms of worker control over labour utilisation and 
effort documented in this thesis had the cumulative effect of harming 
the programme conceived and administered by management for the 
y. 
realisation of profit. Here is a situation where, independently of 
the aims of job control, these forms of individual and collective 
resistance have hurt the employer, whatever the intrinsic value of 
managerial policies and practices with respect to labour productivity. 
There are two different notions implied in this assessment. First, 
the lack of convergence between workers' behaviour and especially the 
outcome of their action on the one hand, and their consciousness and 
intention on the other, represents a phenomenon which deserves more 
attention in industrial sociology (Maitland, 1980: 355-6; Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982a: 197-8). Secondly, to suggest, as we do here, that job 
control affected the realisation of a specific management programme is 
not to say that this model of management was in itself a way towards 
productivity and profitability. It does not mean either that it would 
necessarily have been successful had the workplace organisation and job 
control been much weaker. 
In another respect, job control is vulnerable because of the 
sectional nature of this form of worker resistance. Sectionalism has 
been a major theme of this dissertation, especially in Chapter 5. It 
may be explained to some extent by structural forces such as the division 
of labour and the pattern of shop steward representation. Hence the 
British pattern of workplace unionism is favourable to job control, but 
., 
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the corollary of this is the tendency to fragmentation and the difficulty 
of developing worker cohesiveness, even at the factory or company 
levels. The notions of 'factory class consciousness' (Beynon, 1973: 98; 
also Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1977: 250) and 'sectional conscious- 
ness' (Edwards and Scullion, 1982a: 222) have been well discussed in the 
literature. 
This is a complex question, however, because of the contradictory 
effects of sectionalism on job control. Indeed, it is argued in this 
thesis that shop-floor organisations which follow the contours of the 
division of labour are favourable to job control. This may even be 
necessary to build up worker control over the work process and make it 
resistant to pressures coming from formal collective bargaining above 
the shop-floor level. The counterpart, however, is that workers may 
appear very divided and disorganised when management is committed to 
challenge job control more unilaterally. Hence, while a sectional 
organisation may have a positive effect on the development of job 
control, the lack of a more collective consciousness may be felt 
strongly when workers face a more general offensive on the part of the 
employer. 
The struggle for the protection of job control at the most 
sectional level may be seen as short-sighted and meaningless beyond the 
most pragmatic preoccupation with 'making the job pay'. Such a judgment 
would appear to be unfair, however, unless proper consideration is 
given to the whole structure and process of control as well as to the 
question of alternative courses for collective action. Nevertheless, a 
major problem is that sectionalism adds to the natural frailty of job 
control. At Factory B, by the time of our observation, fragmentation 
within the organisation had made the progress achieved over the years more 
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vulnerable in at least two ways. First, it was obvious that the shop- 
floor organisation was not able to generate the degrees of central 
leadership and collectivism which are necessary to address broader-based 
issues such as redundancies and job security. 
The second problem observed was the lack of collective discipline 
within the shop-floor organisation. For instance, some of the experienced 
shop stewards were puzzled by the lack of discipline of many operators 
on agreed daywork who were not spreading effort and were consequently 
finishing very early. Even worse, from this perspective, was the 
selfishness of those showing no concern at all for collective output 
restrictions, as in Press shop no. 4. The argument of this 'old guard' 
of stewards was that such a pattern of behaviour may provoke and even 
legitimise an eventual management offensive to 'correct the situation'. 
This could jeopardise the progress made over the last fifteen years or 
so against what was originally an authoritarian management. This 
constitutes in fact another theme of the debate within the shop steward 
organisation between those arguing that 'responsible' shop stewards 
should fill the gap created by weaker shop-floor management, and the 
majority sticking to the traditional stance of 'it is management's job 
to manage' (Chapter 5). The trade union principle put forward by the 
minority was that the more control you get out of management, the more 
you must exercise collective discipline in enforcing it. But the fact 
is that this view did not always prevail on the shop-floor. 
The vulnerability of job control does not lie simply in the 
fact that it may be eroded progressively, but also in that the employer 
has the ultimate power of changing the very basis of work relations in 
the factory. As Edwards and Scullion (1982a: 187) point out, 'management 
can always re-define the situation'. Having well documented the 
extensive range of control over effort existing in one firm at the time 
I 
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of their fieldwork, they noted how 
this was a temporary accormnodation, and changing 
external conditions, notably a falling market share, 
problems of profitability and a need to 'rationalize' 
operations, led management to challenge the pattern of 
control which had been built up. (1982a: 199) 
I 
Hence, one may question the logic of particular forms of worker control 
over labour utilisation and subordination which may have an adverse 
effect on job security. By giving too little consideration to the 
viability of the firm, and even contributing to its relative decline, 
workers may follow a self-defeating pattern of behaviour. The question 
is made more relevant in the context of economic crisis, when management 
is still less isolated from market constraints and could be tempted to 
take drastic action. 
The position adopted here is that the type of shop-floor action 
observed at Firm B need not be irrational. Obviously, the problem of 
rationality remains very complex, particularly with reference to 
industrial behaviour. As Hyman (1978: 25) has stressed, 
the concepts of efficiency and rationality apply properly 
to the evaluation of alternative means to given ends. 
Unless these ends are known, it is not logically possible 
to evaluate the rationality or efficiency of any act or 
practice as a means. Nor can it be assumed that the 
objectives of one party to a relationship necessarily 
coincide with those of others: what is rational and 
efficient for one may be irrational and inefficient for 
those with different aims and interests. 
One should not presume either that workers had not seen the implications 
of their action. Perhaps the range of choices open to them did not 
allow for a more appropriate course of action from their viewpoint. 
Although most workers and shop stewards were aware that strict protection 
of job control could harm job prospects, they could not conceive of 
another pattern of rational behaviour on the basis of which they could 
organise and mobilise. Such a positive strategy for control was not 
I 
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discussed in the factory and, as a matter of fact, this did not appear 
on the agenda of the British labour movement. 
These workers shared an overwhelming feeling of a lack of 
control over economic policies, both at the level of external market 
forces as well as within the firm. There was 'nothing you could do 
about it'. And as regards the decisions which may be controlled at 
factory level, the management programme was not perceived as coherent and 
stimulating enough to alter the defensive and pragmatic attitude 
inspiring workers' behaviour. Indeed, on several grounds they were very 
critical of management. It was not clear to workers and shop stewards 
that management had a general and coherent vision of the way productivity 
and labour relations could be improved, so that the enterprise could be 
put back on a sound basis. Hence, these workers were 'exhibiting the 
characteristics of anomie: a feeling that they could not control their 
own destinies and that they were trapped in a profoundly irrational 
situation' (Edwards, 1983: 44). In this context, simply giving up job 
control was not a rational course of action either. Without getting 
involved in the general discussion about the influence of low value- 
consensus on the occurrence of 'industrial disorder' in Britain 
(Goldthorpe, 1977; Maitland, 1980,1983), this would appear to hold some 
significance here. Most probably, the endemic feeling that management 
was not the unique possessor of rationality was founded on more profound 
values about industrial conflict. In an important essay in which he 
discussed the historical foundation of this 'conflictual strategy' 
adopted by British labour, Alan Fox (1978: 20) noted that 
rank-and-file employees do not, on the whole, accept 
management leadership in the work situation; they do not 
see themselves as members of a works community; and they 
rarely appear to act on the principle that their own 
welfare is bound up with the economic health of the enter- 
prise in which they are employed. I 
I 
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While the managerial approach was not convincing enough, workers 
were not able either to develop an alternative course of action within 
their organisation. It was stressed in this dissertation that the 
organisational basis of British workplace unionism does not favour the 
development of collective strategies above the level of production. 
In short, the problem is not that the strength of this type of workers' 
organisation rests at the point of production; this may be the most 
significant basis for challenging management and shifting the frontier 
of control in capitalist enterprises. The major problem is rather 
the lack of necessary ideology and organisational resources to articulate 
the demand for control and develop collectively a broader and more 
positive strategy. 
0 
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